Appendix G:
Brief Summaries of Selected Reports on
the National Evaluation of the WtW Grants Program
[ Main page of Report |
Contents of Report ]
-
Targeted Help for the Hard to Employ: Outcomes of Two Philadelphia
Welfare-to-Work Programs
-
Welfare-to-Work Grants Programs: Adjusting to Changing
Circumstances
-
Giving Noncustodial Parents Options: Employment and Child Support
Outcomes of the SHARE Program
-
The Implementation of the Welfare-to-Work Grants Program
-
Doing What It Takes: Understanding the Costs of DOL Welfare-to-Work
Grants Programs, Final Report
-
Serving Noncustodial Parents: A Descriptive Study of Welfare-to-Work
Programs
-
Further Progress, Persistent Constraints: Findings from a Second
Survey of the Welfare to Work Grants Program
-
Early Implementation of the Welfare-to-Work Grants Program,
Report to Congress
The following pages summarize selected earlier reports on the results of
the National Evaluation of the Welfare-to-Work Grants Program, undertaken
by Mathematica Policy Research Inc., and its subcontractors the Urban Institute
and Support Services International.
This report examines the outcomes of participants in two programs that were
central to Philadelphia’s WtW strategy: the Regional Service Centers
(RSCs) and the Transitional Work Corporation (TWC). These programs differed
in that the RSCs offered 30 days of basic job search assistance to the broad
WtW-eligible population, while TWC provided paid work experience for up to
six months and targeted those with little or no work experience. The study
examined the employment, earnings, and TANF receipt outcomes of participants
in these programs. Key findings included the following:
-
TWC and RSC participants worked more, earned more, and were less likely
to receives TANF after program entry. Participants in both programs
had increases in employment immediately after program entry, followed by
declines. One-and-a-half years after program entry, participants from both
programs still had higher employment rates than before program entry. They
also had higher earnings and lower rates of TANF receipt than before program
entry.
-
Consistent with the targeting and sequencing of the programs, RSC and
TWC participants differed in their outcomes over time. RSC participants
had higher rates of employment, higher earnings, and lower rates of TANF
receipt than TWC participants one and a half years after program entry. However,
RSC and TWC participants also differed in their employment, earnings, and
TANF receipt prior to program entry.
-
Observable factors explained RSC and TWC participants’ difference
in employment and some of their differences in earnings and TANF
receipt. Controlling for demographic characteristics, prior work
and TANF receipt, and economic conditions accounts for the simple observed
differences in the percentage of RSC and TWC participants employed one and
a half years after program entry. Differences in earnings and TANF receipt
remained, with about one-third of the difference explained by these observable
factors.
-
Further research is needed to clarify how programs like the RSCs and
TWC contribute to participant outcomes. The results offer a hint
that the intensive TWC intervention might have partially made up for the
greater employment challenges faced by TWC participants. However, the study
raises questions that only a more rigorous evaluation can answer —
most notably, how did TWC participants’ outcomes compare to how they
would have fared in the absence of this intervention?
[Full report:
Targeted
Help for the Hard to Employ: Outcomes of Two Philadelphia Welfare-to-Work
Programs]
[ Go to Contents ]
This report, based on telephone calls to WtW grant administrators in 2003,
documented program status, future plans, program adjustments, and lessons
from WtW. Most programs were phasing down at the time of this study —
two sites completed their grant periods in 2001; the others in late 2003
or early 2004. Enrollment continued until about six months before the grant
ended. About one month before the end-date, remaining participants were usually
transferred to other, mainly WIA-funded, programs. In half the sites, there
was increased emphasis on particular groups, especially noncustodial fathers.
Among the main findings were:
-
In most sites, long-term funding for programs was uncertain.
Administrators were especially concerned about whether TANF or WIA funds
would be available to serve participants who were hardest to employ. Some
programs (in about two-thirds of the sites) expected being able to continue
for a year or two using TANF or WIA funds.
-
No adjustments were made due to TANF or WIA policies or the
economy. Although many participants hit time limits, WtW and TANF
were able to help — for example, via more job development, or moving
cases to state-funded welfare. There was some concern that one-stop career
centers might not be sensitive to welfare recipients, but in only one study
site did a center decrease its priority on welfare clients in 2003. Despite
the slow economy in 2003, participants were still able to find jobs, but
it took longer and they had fewer options (e.g., lower wages, fewer hours
per week). Employer partnerships, however, were harder to maintain because
firms were less able to commit to hiring individuals who successfully completed
the programs.
-
Grantee administrators were generally positive about the WtW grants
program and its legacy. In particular, they cited (1) the local
flexibility in program design and (2) the momentum to increase collaboration
among WIA, TANF agencies, and community-based organizations. The report noted
several key lessons learned from the WtW programs, chiefly:
-
Complicated eligibility criteria contribute to operational
difficulties. Program startup was delayed as inter-agency agreements
were developed to verify eligibility and refer individuals from TANF. Congress
broadened eligibility in 1999, in a move welcomed by programs, but to little
effect. Programs had already been designed, service contracts were in effect,
and WtW-TANF agreements continued to use the original rules.
-
Longer-term or permanent funding is important when targeting hard-to-serve
groups. Program development, recruitment, and referral took longer
than expected. The five-year period was considered too short.
-
More specific technical assistance on service issues is
important. Grantees were glad to have discretion in programming,
but reported that they would have liked more help on some issues, such as
understanding TANF policies, performance goals, and data systems, and effective
recruitment and outreach strategies.
[Full report:
Welfare-to-Work
Grants Programs: Adjusting to Changing Circumstances ]
[ Go to Contents ]
This report examined a special initiative called SHARE (Support Has a Rewarding
Effect) that operated with WtW grant support and targeted noncustodial parents
(NCPs) in three counties in the state of Washington. SHARE offered three
options to NCPs whose children were receiving TANF and who were in arrears
of their child support obligations: (1) start paying support, (2) enroll
in a WtW program, or (3) face possible incarceration. The main objective
of the study was to examine the employment, earnings, and child support outcomes
from this innovative collaboration involving the welfare system, child support
enforcement agencies, the workforce investment system, and employment and
training providers. Key findings included the following:
-
NCPs took different paths through SHARE. About half of the
targeted NCPs appeared at a mandatory hearing at which the program was explained
to them. Many NCPs never learned about SHARE because staff could not locate
them.
-
NCPs worked more, earned more, and paid more child support after referral
to SHARE than before. The employment rate among all NCPs referred
to SHARE increased from one-quarter just before referral to one-third in
the quarter of referral, and remained about one-third for the following nine
quarters. Average earnings increased 39 percent between the quarter immediately
preceding referral and the quarter of referral, and continued to climb. The
rate of child support payment nearly doubled just after referral and consistently
exceeded pre-referral highs.
-
Outcomes improved for NCPs who took part in SHARE, but also for those
who did not. NCPs who appeared at a hearing and learned about SHARE
nevertheless had higher employment rates, average earnings, and child support
payments than NCPs who never appeared at such a hearing.
-
SHARE probably contributed to the observed increases in employment,
earnings, and child support payments. Factors other than
SHARE — such as unobserved characteristics of the NCPs or natural
ebbs and flows in their employment and ability to pay support —
probably played some role in the outcomes observed. However, differences
in key outcomes for NCPs who took different paths through the
initiative — insignificant before referral to SHARE —
become more marked and significant after referral to the program. This suggests
that all or some of SHARE’s components may have played a role in the
improvements observed for NCPs who did engage in the initiative.
[ Full report:
Giving
Noncustodial Parents Options: Employment and Child Support Outcomes of the
SHARE Program]
[ Go to Contents ]
The evaluation’s process and implementation component was the subject
of this report, which described the service delivery operations of WtW-funded
programs in 11 study sites. The findings — based on formal site
visits, interviews with administrators and staff, and analyses of program
management data — included:
-
The programs were decentralized. There were more than 90
programs — some operating in multiple locations — that
used varying service delivery organizations and different arrangements for
collaboration with TANF agencies. WIBs were the most common grantee, and
most had a formal arrangement with TANF agencies; for example, to operate
all or part of the TANF work program. Nonprofit organizations (and one
university) also played a major role, typically as program operators under
subcontract to a WtW grantee or as providers of special services.
-
Sites used one of three general program models, reflecting their primary
approach. Among the 11 sites, the following approaches were identified:
(1) Enhanced Direct Employment Models, which emphasized individualized
pre-employment job search assistance, counseling, case management, and
post-employment support; (2) Developmental/Transitional Employment Models
emphasizing skills development, usually in a transitional, subsidized, or
community service job; and (3) Intensive Post- Employment Skills Development
Models, wherein the dual objectives were job retention and skills development
for individuals who have already started a job.
-
Employment pathways varied, but most enrollees who found employment
received only job readiness and search assistance. In the eight sites
where data were available, about half of the participants obtained regular
unsubsidized employment. Regardless of the program model, about 60 percent
of participants who became employed, did so with just job search assistance
or job readiness services. Another 20 percent became employed after participating
in a transitional or subsidized job, and 5 percent after receiving job training
or education. The rest (15 percent) received a mix of services from the program
(job search assistance along with a transitional job and possibly training
or education.
-
Sites used several innovative strategies. While this component
of the evaluation did not address program effectiveness, a number of potentially
promising approaches were identified in the sites. Among these were: (1)
extensive involvement of nonprofit organizations as program operators and
special service providers, particularly to provide services to special
populations; (2) collaborations with employers — for example, in
designing pre-employment components, sponsoring internships, and partnering
with post-employment skills development; and (3) transitional work components,
such as paid community service jobs, part-time community service job plus
wrap-around education, supervised temporary employment, sheltered workshops,
and on-the-job training. Nearly all grantees operated the latter to some
extent, with the aim of providing a bridge to regular employment.
-
The findings suggest a number of policy and operations lessons for
serving welfare recipients and low-income parents with employment
problems. Among them: (1) detailed eligibility and fiscal provisions
can delay program implementation; (2) temporary funding and authority imposes
added challenges to program implementation; (3) programs benefit from public
and private partnerships and collaborations at the local level; and (4) carefully
designed programs can reach populations with serious employment
problems — particularly those utilizing nonprofit community-based
organizations and systematic outreach and recruitment efforts, and offering
comprehensive services.
[Full report:
The
Implementation of the Welfare-to-Work Grants Program]
[ Go to Contents ]
This report examined the costs of 18 WtW programs in nine sites that operated
with federal grant support. The main objectives of the analysis were to
understand the cost structure of selected programs, and the factors influencing
it. Program evaluators and planners should find this information useful in
assessing the outcomes of WtW programs and in making decisions about future
programs with similar objectives. Key findings from the study included the
following:
-
The average WtW program spent $3,607 to serve each participant.
The least costly WtW program spent $1,887 per participant, while the most
costly spent $6,641.
-
WtW costs per participant reflected meaningful differences in program
design. Variations in WtW costs per participant reflected three dominant
service approaches. Enhanced Direct Employment programs (average cost: $3,559)
emphasized quick entry to employment while also offering pre-employment
preparation and retention support. Transitional Employment programs either
emphasized paid work experience (average cost: $4,346) or helped WtW participants
prepare for jobs with employer partners (average cost: $4,513). Post-employment
Services programs cost less (average cost: $2,178) because they provided
mostly intensive case management to already employed individuals.
-
WtW programs cost more than WIN, less than Supported Work, and about
the same as JOBS programs. Differences in WtW costs per participant
as compared to earlier interventions reflected three factors. First, WtW
programs targeted hard-toemploy individuals who were excluded from participation
mandates (as in WIN) or often deferred from participation (as in WIN and
JOBS). Second, although WtW programs did not emphasize education and training
(as in JOBS), they sought to build a foundation for employment through direct
work experience and other skill upgrade activities more closely linked to
employment. Third, to maintain their simultaneous focus on employment and
human capital development for hard-to-employ participants, WtW programs expanded
case management and other services. Nevertheless, WtW efforts were not as
comprehensive as those undertaken by Supported Work programs.
-
Future efforts could cost as much as, or more than, WtW. Expanded
individual and aggregate TANF work requirements may motivate states to continue
to focus on hardto- employ individuals and even intensify elements such as
structured job readiness, paid work experience, or post-placement case
management — which could raise average costs. Increased flexibility
in program design could also lead to greater use of education and training
activities, which might also be costly.
[Full report:
Doing
What It Takes: Understanding the Costs of DOL Welfare-to-Work Grants Programs,
Final Report]
[ Go to Contents ]
This report examines the strategies used by 11 WtW grantees to design programs
for and delivery services to low-income noncustodial parents (NCPs). Two
of the sites were in-depth study grantees for the formal WtW evaluation;
the other nine were selected to represent a range of services and approaches.
Six of the programs were operated by workforce development agencies, four
by nonprofit community-based organizations, and one by a corrections department.
The programs brought together a wide range of partners, including workforce
development agencies, child support agencies, courts, and TANF agencies.
For most grantees, the availability of the WtW funds often spurred an interest
in — or further impetus for — serving NCPs.
-
Programs used similar services, focusing primarily on job search
assistance. All programs conducted some type of employability assessment
and job search assistance (usually in a group setting) and post-employment
support to help participants retain jobs. The programs also provided a case
manager for each participant. Some programs offered education and job training,
but most participants were uninterested, preferring to get a regular job.
Parenting and relationship services were typically not emphasized, although
a few programs placed high priority on these issues (all programs could refer
participants to other special agencies for assistance).
-
A variety of public and private organizations can establish and operate
programs for NCPS. no single model or provider is necessarily preferable,
and collaboration among agencies can ensure a range of services to address
families’ varied problems
-
Outreach and recruitment are major components of — and challenges
to — NCP programs. The target population was difficult
to reach and often initially reluctant to participate, fearing repercussions
from the child support enforcement agency. Programs developed a variety of
approaches to outreach and to retaining participants in the program once
enrolled.
-
A combination of positive incentives and pressures may prove more
successful than either a voluntary or harshly punitive program. Positive
incentives may not only enhance outcomes, but facilitate recruitment. Among
the positive incentives for participating were employment services,
transportation assistance, vouchers for workrelated expenses, and help in
communicating with the child support agency. Requirements and sanctions in
some programs took the form of a threat of incarceration for nonpayment of
child support. Most programs, though, were voluntary.
-
Helping NCPs understand and navigate the child support enforcement
system may be an important program service. Most of the programs
incorporated some focus on child support, including helping participants
work with child support, often with a designated worker at the child support
agency.
[Full report: Serving
Noncustodial Parents: A Descriptive Study of Welfare-to-Work Programs]
[ Go to Contents ]
This report documented the continuing implementation progress of the WtW
grants program. To capture changes as program implementation advanced, the
survey of WtW grantees nationwide, noted above, was repeated in late 1999.
Although this second survey identified signs of progress, it also found that
the eligibility criteria continued to constrain enrollment (Congressional
action to expand the eligible population had not yet taken effect at the
time of the survey). Other findings suggested some operational changes, but
confirmed many of the findings from the first survey. The main findings from
the second survey were as follows:
-
WtW program implementation had advanced but participation levels still
lagged. Most grantees, except those who were recently funded, were
delivering services and operating at a somewhat larger scale than that observed
in the first survey a yearearlier. However, restrictive eligibility rules
still in effect in late 1999 continued to impede enrollment. As a result,
the average pace of enrollment had not increased.
-
The scale at which WtW programs were projected to operate remained
modest. Respondents to the second survey had formulated more conservative
participation targets, largely reflecting the enrollment difficulties encountered
prior to the survey. Despite the declines in TANF rolls, survey respondents
perceived no decline in overall need for WtW services.
-
Grantees emphasized unsubsidized employment but set realistic placement
goals. While an unsubsidized job was the ultimate goal for all WtW
participants, respondents expected some program attrition and had some
reservations about the availability of jobs. They anticipated placing somewhat
less than half of all WtW enrollees in unsubsidized employment.
-
Most placements to date had been in low-wage, service
occupations. Grantees moved expeditiously to place WtW participants
enrolled in their programs. They succeeded in placing about a quarter of
their projected placements — more than 50,000 individuals. Most
participants were placed in services and administrative support positions,
which were available even to those with limited skills and poor work history.
Participants’ placement wages averaged just $6.81 per hour and opportunities
for advancement appeared limited.
[Full report:
Further Progress,
Persistent Constraints: Findings from a Second Survey of the Welfare to Work
Grants Program]
[ Go to Contents ]
This report responded to a congressional mandate for rapid findings on WtW
program implementation. Responses to an early survey of WtW grantees nationwide,
conducted at the end of 1998, provided an outline of the federally funded
WtW programs and their initial start-up experiences. The WtW grantee survey
provided an overall description of program structure, sponsorship, target
populations, services provided, scale of operations, outcomes achieved, and
challenges encountered. Early survey findings included the following:
-
From the outset, WtW programs emphasized rapid attachment to supportive
work. WtW grantees allocated substantial resources to getting
participants quickly into work activities. In addition, the grantees emphasized
supported employment — through wage subsidies and worksite
training — over simple placement in regular jobs.
-
Grantees were in the very early stages of implementation. About
half of the grantees surveyed were not awarded grants until the latter part
of 1998, and it took them several months to begin delivering services. By
late 1998, about 40 percent of grantees had started enrolling
participants — but each had enrolled an average of only 60 people.
Many grantees were having trouble recruiting at their anticipated pace in
the early months, suggesting that overall enrollment numbers could be lower
than grantees had planned.
-
Grantees felt that the WtW eligibility criteria were too
strict. Most grantees reported that the original eligibility criteria
excluded some people from their programs who had serious barriers to employment,
most notably individuals who had earned a high school credential but still
had low skills.
[Full report: Early
Implementation of the Welfare-to-Work Grants Program, Report to Congress]
Where to?
Top of Page | Contents
Main Page of Report | Contents
of Report
Home Pages:
Human Services Policy
(HSP)
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
(ASPE)
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)