



# Structure Matters: How State Child Support Program Administration and Procedures Can Impact Federal Spending and Support Order Establishment Performance

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## KEY POINTS

- Federal spending per child support case increased from \$374.31 to \$435.82 (in inflation-adjusted dollars) between Fiscal Year 2015 (FY15) and FY24. However, total federal spending fell from about \$5.2 billion to \$4.5 billion over the same period as caseloads declined by roughly 2 million cases.
- Locally-administered Child Support Enforcement (Title IV-D) programs have higher federal spending per case than state-administered programs. After controlling for state characteristics, average federal spending was approximately \$510 per case for locally-administered programs compared with \$358 per case<sup>i</sup> for state-administered programs, with no differences in the four federal performance measures examined<sup>ii</sup>.
- Judicial-only states (those that rely exclusively on courts to establish child support orders), have higher federal spending per case than states using a combination of judicial and administrative processes (\$403 versus \$345), after controlling for state factors. Order-establishment rates are also higher in judicial-only and highly administrative states (87 percent and 89 percent) than in states using a combined approach (85 percent).

## BACKGROUND

The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program, also known as the IV-D system, was established in 1975 primarily to reimburse state and federal governments for cash assistance paid to families through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program (which was replaced by the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program in 1996). Although this process, known as public

<sup>i</sup> Average federal spending per case are the results of the linear regression models. See Appendix for full regression table.

<sup>ii</sup> Cost-effectiveness was excluded.

assistance cost-recovery,<sup>1</sup> remains part of the program, CSE today primarily focuses on delivering child support payments to families—promoting self-sufficiency and preventing, rather than recouping, public costs.<sup>2</sup> The IV-D program is mandated to provide the following services: parent location, paternity establishment, establishment of medical and child support orders, review and modification of child support orders, collection of medical and child support, and distribution of child support payments.<sup>3</sup> As a federal-state program, states provide the required services, supported by a federal reimbursement of up to 66 percent for allowable costs.

In FY24, CSE programs served 12.2 million children and distributed a total of \$29.5 billion in child support, of which 97 percent went directly to families.<sup>4</sup> This brief summarizes federal spending and performance of CSE programs over the past 10 years and compares federal spending across states. In addition, the brief shows the results of new analysis examining how federal cost and performance relate to the ways states choose to administer their CSE programs.

#### Variation in State Title IV-D Administrative Models

**LOCAL VS. STATE PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION:** States differ in how they administer the program, potentially affecting both cost and state performance on core performance measures. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia (DC) administer their IV-D program centrally at the state level with regional offices following standard procedures. Nine states operate primarily at the local or county level, leading to greater variation in processes and practices.<sup>iii</sup>


**JUDICIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, OR MIXED PROCESSES TO ESTABLISH ORDERS:** States also vary in their approaches to establishing support orders. Nine states use highly administrative processes, allowing the IV-D agency to establish and modify child and medical support orders without court involvement in many cases. In contrast, 29 states rely exclusively on judicial processes, where orders are established and modified by a judge or other judicial officer. The remaining 13 states use a combined approach, employing both administrative and judicial processes.

#### The federal government supports CSE through cost reimbursement and incentive payments<sup>5</sup>

The IV-D program operates through coordinated federal, state, tribal, and local partnerships, supported by federal funding that covers a wide range of allowable expenditures. In FY24, total spending on CSE was \$6.6 billion, excluding territories. This includes \$4.5 billion in federal spending, including incentives, and \$2.1 billion in state spending. Through federal financial participation (FFP), the federal government reimburses states for up to 66 percent of eligible expenditures. Because FFP matches state IV-D expenditures, federal spending rises or falls with state spending. Federal matching funds may be used for activities necessary to establish paternity; establish, modify, and enforce child support orders; and collect and distribute support payments, as outlined in 45 CFR Part 304. Allowable expenditures include personnel and fringe benefits, administrative and overhead expenses, information technology and systems, contractual services, and other reasonable program costs.

<sup>iii</sup> Tribal CSE programs are funded under separate federal grant provisions.

In addition to federal support through FFP, states receive incentive payments based on performance measures established under the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act (CSPIA) of 1998 (see graphic for description of performance measures).<sup>iv,6</sup> In general, states must meet the performance incentive baselines of 50 percent for paternity and order establishment, 40 percent for current collections and cases with arrears payments, and \$2 for cost-effectiveness to receive an incentive payment for those measures. States achieving the performance incentive ceilings of \$5 for cost-effectiveness and 80 percent for the other performance measures, receive the maximum incentive payment for that measure.<sup>7</sup> States must reinvest incentive payments in CSE-related activities,<sup>8</sup> but do not need to spend incentive payments the same year they receive them. Prior to FY07, states could claim federal matching funds on expenditures financed with federal incentive payments, but the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 eliminated this authority. States received \$679 million in federal incentive payments for FY23.<sup>v,9</sup> The FY24 incentive payment pool totals \$713 million; final state allocations are still being determined.<sup>10</sup>



State CSE programs also receive funding from public assistance cost-recovery and fees retained by states. These may include child support collections retained to reimburse governments for the costs of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or other public assistance provided to families; fees charged to certain families not receiving public assistance; and other fees charged or deducted from support collections to help offset program operating costs. Some retained collections and fees may reduce expenditures claimed for federal reimbursement. In FY24, cost recovery and fees collected by states was \$203.6 million (after deducting \$18.2 million in fees due to the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE)).

### Federal performance measures have been generally stable over the last decade

In the years following CSPIA implementation, state performance improved substantially and differences across states narrowed.<sup>11</sup> More recently, from FY15 to FY24 states and DC generally maintained stable performance levels across four of the five CSPIA measures,<sup>12</sup> with small improvements in some areas (Table 1). Paternity establishment remained near 100 percent, support order establishment between 85 and 87 percent, and current support collections around 64 to 65 percent. Arrears payments and cost-effectiveness experienced temporary shifts during the COVID-19 pandemic due to garnishment of stimulus checks and other economic supports before returning toward pre-pandemic levels by FY 2024. Cost-effectiveness was the only measure to decline overall, largely reflecting spending on major I system

<sup>iv</sup> The annual incentive payment pool is calculated by adjusting the prior year's incentive payment amount based on the change in the Consumer Price Index over the previous two fiscal years.


development. In FY24, every state and DC met the performance levels needed to receive at least some incentive payments for all five CSPIA measures.<sup>vii,13,14</sup>

**Table 1. National Average Performance on the Five CSPIA Measures in FY15 and FY24**

| Measure                 | FY15   | FY24   |
|-------------------------|--------|--------|
| Paternity establishment | 98.2   | 98.7   |
| Order establishment     | 85.3   | 86.7   |
| Current collections     | 63.9   | 64.8   |
| Arrearage collections   | 63.7   | 63.7   |
| Cost-effectiveness      | \$5.46 | \$4.39 |


## FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT SPENDING HAS DECLINED ALONGSIDE FALLING CASELOADS, EVEN AS SPENDING PER CASE RISES

Over the last 30 years, child support caseloads declined from around 17 million in 1999 to under 12 million in 2024 (Figure 1). One factor contributing to the decline in the IV-D caseload was the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). PRWORA replaced AFDC with TANF and introduced work requirements, sanctions, and time limits that reduced cash assistance participation. As TANF participation declined, so did the number of families required to participate in the IV-D program because they received cash assistance. Consequently, the IV-D caseload shifted from predominantly current-assistance families toward former- and never-assistance families (see graphic for definitions). Figure 1 shows the decline in families with child support orders who currently or formerly received cash assistance.



<sup>vii</sup> Appendix Figures A-1 – A-6 show performance measures nationally from FY15 to FY24, and for each of the 50 states and DC individually in FY24.


**Figure 1. Title IV-D Child Support Caseloads: All Cases, and Cases by Type, FY 1999–FY 2024**



Source: ACF, OCSE: FY 1999 to FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Form 157.  
Note: This figure includes data on all states, territories, and DC.

Against this backdrop of declining caseloads, federal spending shows two contrasting trends (Figure 2). As the IV-D caseload declined by about 21 percent from FY 2015 to FY 2024, total federal spending fell from about \$5.2 billion to \$4.5 billion. However, average federal spending per case increased from \$374 to \$436 (in 2024 dollars).

**Figure 2. Standardized and Inflation-Adjusted Trends in Total Federal Child Support Spending and State Level Federal Spending per Case, FY15–FY24**




Source: ACF, OCSE: FY15 to FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Forms 157 and 396. This figure includes FFP and federal incentive payments for all states and DC for each fiscal year, excluding territories.  
Note: Both series are adjusted for inflation using the CPI-U and standardized to allow for comparison of trends for measures reported in different units to FY15 (=100). Values above 100 indicate an increase relative to FY15, while values below 100 indicate a decrease.

## FEDERAL SPENDING VARIES WIDELY ACROSS STATES

The amount of federal funding states receive for their IV-D programs (through FFP and incentives) varies widely, ranging from \$116 to \$1,010 per case (Figure 3). Even states with programs of similar size can have very different levels of federal spending, suggesting that program size alone does not explain these differences. Evidence from other federal programs shows that both administrative structures and local economic conditions shape program costs and outcomes. These factors likely contribute to rising per-case spending over time, differences in spending across states, and variation in performance. For example, studies of Head Start and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) find that expenditures differ based on cost of living and how programs are administered, with county-administered SNAP programs generally incurring higher per-case costs than state-administered programs.<sup>12,13,14</sup> The analyses in this brief examine whether differences in how states administer their child support programs may help explain these spending patterns.

**Figure 3: Federal Expenditures per Case by State, FY24**



Source: ACF, OCSE: FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Forms 157 and 396.

## DATA AND METHODS

To assess whether child support program structure and processes help explain variation in federal spending across states, this study examines their relationship with federal spending and state performance. To do this, this brief analyzes FY15-FY24 pooled data for all 50 states and DC<sup>viii</sup> from OCSE on state Title IV-D administrative models, federal performance measures, and federal spending

<sup>viii</sup> Data limitations in control variables limited the analysis to the 50 states and DC. Except for the caseload trends shown in Figure 1, this analysis does not include US territories.



amounts,<sup>ix</sup> while controlling for state level conditions such as cost of living, caseload size, unemployment, rurality, and other program characteristics. State program characteristics came from Title IV-D State Plans and State Title IV-D policy and legislation information.<sup>x</sup>

The findings show associations, not causal effects. Since the analysis includes every state IV-D program from FY15 to FY24, the emphasis is on the size and practical importance of these relationships rather than on statistical significance alone. Detailed discussion of the data and methods, including the full statistical results, are provided in the Appendix.


## LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED CHILD SUPPORT PROGRAMS DO NOT PERFORM BETTER, DESPITE HIGHER FEDERAL SPENDING

Administrative structure may help explain variation in federal spending and performance across state IV-D programs. The analyses below compare state- and locally-administered programs, accounting for other state level characteristics that may influence these outcomes. Appendix Figure A-7 presents the unadjusted relationship between administrative structure and federal spending.

After accounting for state characteristics, locally-administered programs averaged about \$510 in federal funding per case in FY24 dollars, compared with about \$358 per case for state-run programs, a difference of about 42 percent (Figure 4).<sup>xi</sup>

The higher federal spending associated with local administration was not accompanied by measurably better performance on the outcomes examined. Locally-administered programs did not differ significantly from state-administered programs on any of the four federal performance measures analyzed (Appendix Table A-3).

**Figure 4. Federal Spending Per Case by Program Administration (Regression Results)**



N = 510. Note: Bars show predicted federal spending per case from multivariate regression models controlling for state level characteristics. Red lines are 95% cluster-robust confidence intervals. See Appendix Table A-2 for full regression results.

## JUDICIAL-ONLY OR HIGHLY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES HAVE HIGHER FEDERAL SPENDING PER CASE AND BETTER ORDER-ESTABLISHMENT PERFORMANCE THAN COMBINATION APPROACHES

How states establish child support orders, whether through judicial or administrative processes, or a combination of both, may also help explain differences in federal spending and performance across IV-D programs. The analyses below examine these relationships after accounting for other state

<sup>ix</sup> The analysis reflects federal Title IV-D spending, including FFP and CSPIA incentives paid to states and excluding FFP eligible non-IV-D administrative spending in FY15-FY24. The data come from state quarterly expense report (OCSE Form 396), published in Table 37 in OCSE Annual and Preliminary reports.

<sup>x</sup> This analysis uses OCSE-approved state plan information to classify states as state-administered (42) or locally (or county)-administered (9). Other sources may use different classifications relying on secondary interpretations.

<sup>xi</sup> The average per case dollar amounts are regression-adjusted predictions, not observed averages, so the values presented here would not be expected to align with those in the OCSE Annual Report.

characteristics. Appendix Figure A-8 presents the unadjusted relationship between child support order establishment processes and federal spending.

### Judicial-only processes are associated with higher federal spending per case than combination approaches.


After accounting for state characteristics, average federal spending was about \$403 per case for judicial-only states, \$389 for highly administrative states, and \$345 for combination states (FY24 dollars, Figure 5). The difference between judicial-only and combination states was statistically significant, while spending did not differ significantly between judicial-only and highly administrative states. Full regression results are provided in Appendix Table A-2.

### Judicial-only and highly administrative processes are associated with better order-establishment performance

Order-establishment performance was also higher among states using judicial-only or highly administrative processes than among states that combined these approaches. After accounting for state characteristics, estimated order establishment rates were 89.2 percent for highly administrative states and 86.6 percent for judicial-only states, compared with 84.7 percent for states using a combination of both (Figure 6). Full regression results are provided in Appendix Table A-3.


Differences of this magnitude are meaningful in the context of the national IV-D caseload. A two-percentage point increase in that national order-establishment rate in FY24 would have required establishing orders in approximately 233,000 additional child support cases.

**Figure 5. Federal Spending per Case by Order Establishment Process, FY15–FY24 (Regression Results)**



Note: N = 510. Bars show predicted federal spending per case from multivariate regression models controlling for state level characteristics. Red lines are 95% cluster-robust confidence intervals. See Appendix Table A-2 for full regression results.

**Figure 6. Order Establishment Performance by Order Establishment Process, FY15–FY24 (Regression Results)**



Note: N = 510. Bars show predicted support order establishment rates from multivariate regression models controlling for state level characteristics. Red lines are 95% cluster-robust confidence intervals. See Appendix Table A-3 for full regression results.



## CONCLUSION

The findings in this brief suggest that program structure is important for understanding opportunities to reduce federal child support spending while maintaining or improving performance. Although the analyses identify associations rather than causal relationships, they show meaningful differences in federal spending and performance across administrative structures and order-establishment processes. Between FY15 and FY24, total federal child support administrative spending declined in real terms as the IV-D caseload fell, while federal spending per case increased. National performance remained generally stable, with all 50 states and DC meeting the levels required to receive at least some incentive payments across all five CSPIA measures in FY24. Together, these trends suggest that differences in standard performance measures are not fully explained by differences in federal spending per case.

One of the clearest findings is that locally-administered child support programs receive substantially more federal funding per case than state-administered programs, even after accounting for other state characteristics. Average federal spending was about \$510 per case for locally-administered programs compared with \$358 for state-administered programs, a difference of roughly 42 percent. However, this higher spending was not associated with better performance on the four performance measures examined. The analysis classifies nine states as locally administered based on their OCSE state plans, although other sources suggest that some states classified as state-administered operate more locally in practice. Further research could examine whether these classifications accurately reflect how programs operate and distinguish higher costs associated with states' legal, political, geographic, or administrative environments from practices that could be changed to reduce costs.

Order-establishment processes were also associated with both federal spending and performance. After accounting for state characteristics, judicial-only processes had the highest federal spending per case, while highly administrative processes had the strongest child support order establishment performance. Both approaches had higher federal spending and stronger performance than combination approaches. Although the differences in performance were modest, even small improvements could translate into a substantial number of additional support orders nationwide.

Overall, the findings point to program structure and administrative processes as areas for further investigation into opportunities to improve efficiency. Future research could identify which expenditures and practices contribute to better outcomes, which costs reflect circumstances that states have limited ability to change, and where changes in administrative practices could reduce federal spending without compromising performance.

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## APPENDIX

### Detailed Methodology

#### ***Data Sources and Unit of Analysis***

This analysis used a balanced state-year dataset covering FY15 through FY24. The unit of analysis was the state-year, with one observation for each of the 50 states and DC in each year, for a total of 510 observations. Because the dataset includes all states and DC rather than a sample, results are interpreted primarily in terms of the magnitude and direction of associations within the observed population. Standard errors and p-values are reported to characterize the precision of model estimates.

The dataset combined child support program spending, caseload, performance, program structure and policies, and state economic and demographic characteristics. Child support expenditure, caseload, and performance data came primarily from OCSE reports compiled from data submitted quarterly and annually through OCSE Forms 34, 157, and 396. State program characteristics (including administrative structure, offices, and mandatory referral policies) came from Title IV-D State Plans and state Title IV-D policy and legislation information. State economic and demographic measures came from publicly available Bureau of Economic Analysis, USDA Economic Research Service, and Department of Labor data and included per-capita personal consumption expenditures, unemployment, and the rural (nonmetropolitan) population share. Because the rurality measure was derived from 2020 county-level population data, it was constant within states over the study period and captures cross-state rather than within-state variation over time.

#### ***Spending Measures and Inflation Adjustment***

The primary spending measure is federal IV-D administrative spending, which includes federal financial participation (FFP) and CSPIA incentive payments. Expenditures were adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2024 dollars. Federal spending is strongly related to state caseload size; therefore, the analysis used federal spending per case (calculated as federal IV-D administrative expenditures divided by total child support caseload) to facilitate comparisons across programs of different sizes. Because federal spending per case was right-skewed, its natural logarithm was used in the regression models. This transformation reduced the influence of high-spending state-years and allowed the performance models to estimate how percentage differences in federal spending per case were associated with differences in performance.

#### ***Child Support Performance Measures***

The analysis examined CSPIA child support performance measures calculated from OCSE administrative data. Additional information on the measure definitions and formulas is available in the FY24 Preliminary Data Report.<sup>3</sup>

Performance measures were stored as proportions in the analytic dataset (e.g., a value of 0.65 represents 65 percent) and converted to percentages for presentation in the text, figures, and tables.

#### ***Program Structure Measures***

The primary program structure measures captured two dimensions of IV-D program administration: whether programs were administered at the state or local level and the process used to establish child support orders. Other program characteristics were included as control variables.

Administrative structure was classified using OCSE-approved Title IV-D State Plans. Based on these plans, 41 states and DC were classified as state-administered and nine states as locally administered. Other sources indicate that these formal designations may not fully reflect how some programs operate in practice; however,

the analysis relied on State Plan classifications to apply a consistent classification across states. Administrative structure was modeled as a categorical variable.

Child support order establishment processes were coded in categorical variables distinguishing judicial-only, highly administrative, and combination approaches. Numeric versions of these variables were used for modeling, but they were treated as categorical factors rather than continuous scales.

## **Controls**

### State Program Characteristics

The models included additional measures of state program characteristics. State office structure varies with IV-D caseload size, so the number of offices was standardized by caseload and expressed as a rate (offices per 100,000 cases) to facilitate interpretation. This measure was used instead of the raw office count because it better reflects office availability relative to program size.

The models also accounted for variation in the number of mandatory referral pathways through which new IV-D cases may enter the program. While federal law requires referrals from TANF, Medicaid, and Title IV-E programs, states have discretion in implementing Medicaid and Title IV-E referrals and may also require cooperation with child support enforcement for families receiving SNAP or child care subsidies. Binary indicators were created for referrals from TANF, Medicaid, Title IV-E, SNAP, and child care subsidy programs, and were summed to create a count of active referral pathways for each state-year. Because TANF referrals were mandatory in all state-years, the TANF indicator had no variation and was excluded from the analyses. In models using the referral count, one mandatory pathway (effectively TANF only) served as the reference category.

### State Context

The models also controlled for state economic and demographic characteristics that may be associated with program spending or performance: per-capita personal consumption expenditures (which reflects cost-of-living), the unemployment rate to reflect labor market conditions, and nonmetropolitan population share (as a measure of rurality). Nonmetropolitan population share was calculated using 2020 county-level population data and therefore varied across states but not over time within states.

## **Analytic Approach**

The analysis began with descriptive summaries and trend analysis of spending, caseload, and performance outcomes over time. Spending was expressed in FY24 dollars to account for inflation. Bivariate analyses examine relationships between key system factors and expenditures before estimating multivariate models.

Multivariate linear regression models were then used to estimate associations between federal spending, state program structures, and performance. Models included year fixed effects to account for national policy, economic, and administrative changes affecting all states in a given year, and standard errors were clustered by state to account for correlation among repeated observations of the same state over time. Federal spending was measured per case to facilitate comparisons across programs of different sizes.


The federal spending model (Table A-2) estimates the relationship between child support program structure and federal spending using logged federal spending per case as the outcome to estimate its association with program structure and other state characteristics. The four performance models (Table A-3) use each CSPIA performance measure (paternity establishment, support order establishment, current support collections, and arrearage collections) as an outcome and included logged federal spending per case, program structure, and other state characteristics as predictors to analyze the association between program structure differences and performance.

### ***Limitations***

The analyses identify associations rather than causal effects and cannot determine whether particular administrative structures or processes cause the observed differences in federal spending or performance. Unmeasured state characteristics, including staffing practices, caseload complexity, court practices, technology systems, and policy environments, may be associated with both program structure and the outcomes examined.


Several measures, including rurality and some program structure characteristics, are time-invariant or changed little within states during the study period. These variables are useful for explaining differences across states but are less useful for explaining within-state changes over time. In addition, the State Plan classifications used to identify state- and locally administered programs may not fully reflect how programs operate in practice. Finally, cost-effectiveness was examined descriptively but not modeled because expenditures are part of its denominator, creating a mechanical relationship between spending and the measure.

**Figure A-1. National Average Performance on the Five CSPIA Measures, FY15–FY24**



Source: ACF, OCSE: FY15 to FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Forms 34, 157, and 396


**Figure A-2. Paternity Establishment by State, FY24**



Source: ACF, OCSE: FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Form 157




**Figure A-3. Order Establishment by State, FY24**




Source: ACF, OCSE: FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Form 157

**Figure A-4. Current Support Collections by State, FY24**




Source: ACF, OCSE: FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Form 157

**Figure A-5. Cases with Arrears Payments by State, FY24**




Source: ACF, OCSE: FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Form 157

**Figure A-6. Cost-Effectiveness by State, FY24**



Source: ACF, OCSE: FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Forms 34 and 396


**Figure A-7. Federal Spending per Case by State and Program Administrative Structure, FY24**



Source: ACF, OCSE: FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Forms 157 and 396 and OCSE Title IV-D State Plans

Note: This figure does not account for state level factors that may affect spending, such as cost-of-living, and should be interpreted cautiously. This figure includes FFP and federal incentive payments for all states and DC in FY24.

**Figure A-8. Federal Child Support Expenditures by State Order-Establishment Processes, FY24**



Source: ACF, OCSE: FY24 Child Support Program data submitted by State Title IV-D programs in OCSE Forms 157 and 396

Note: This figure does not account for state level factors that may affect spending, such as cost-of-living, and should be interpreted cautiously. This figure includes FFP and federal incentive payments for all states and DC in FY24.

**Table A-1. Summary Statistics**

| Variable                                                                          | N   | Mean/Percentage | SD         |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----------------|------------|
| <b>Federal expenditure per case (FY24 Dollars)</b>                                | 510 | \$397.77        | \$7.95     |
| <b>Federal expenditure per case (FY24 Dollars) by State Program Structure</b>     |     |                 |            |
| State                                                                             | 420 | \$371.56        | \$164.12   |
| Local                                                                             | 90  | \$520.08        | \$197.56   |
| <b>Federal expenditure per case (FY24 Dollars) by Order Establishment Process</b> |     |                 |            |
| Judicial Only                                                                     | 290 | \$405.55        | \$206.94   |
| Highly Administrative                                                             | 90  | \$396.76        | \$135.43   |
| Combination of Judicial and Administrative                                        | 130 | \$381.12        | \$134.46   |
| Paternity Establishment                                                           | 510 | 1.002           | 0.331      |
| Support Order Establishment                                                       | 510 | 0.866           | 0.055      |
| Current Collections                                                               | 510 | 0.645           | 0.065      |
| Arrearage Collections                                                             | 510 | 0.653           | 0.069      |
| Cost Effectiveness                                                                | 510 | 5.203           | 2.044      |
| Total Caseload                                                                    | 510 | 256,125         | 286,819    |
| Personal Consumption Expenditures                                                 | 510 | \$45,722.33     | \$9,409.15 |
| Unemployment Rate                                                                 | 510 | 4.378           | 1.560      |
| Percent of State Population in Nonmetro Counties                                  | 510 | 23%             | 18%        |
| Number of Mandatory Referral Programs                                             | 510 | 2.714           | 1.068      |
| Offices per 100,000 Child Support Cases                                           | 510 | 16.080          | 12.672     |

**Table A-2. Detailed Linear Regression Results: Federal Expenditures Per Case (log transformed)**

|                                                               | Coefficient | SE     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|--------|
| <b>State Program Structure (ref: State)</b>                   |             |        |
| Local                                                         | 0.352*      | 0.133  |
| <b>Support Order Establishment Process (ref: Combination)</b> |             |        |
| Judicial Only                                                 | 0.155+      | 0.078  |
| Highly Administrative                                         | 0.120       | 0.101  |
| Offices per 100,000 cases                                     | 0.002       | 0.004  |
| Personal Consumption Expenditures                             | 0.000***    | 0.000  |
| Total Caseload (logged)                                       | -0.168**    | 0.0566 |
| Unemployment Rate                                             | -0.0112     | 0.0302 |
| Percent Of the State's Population in Nonmetro Counties        | -0.263      | 0.334  |
| <b>Number of Mandatory Cooperation Programs (ref = 1)</b>     |             |        |
| 2                                                             | -0.236**    | 0.0863 |
| 3                                                             | -0.335**    | 0.105  |
| 4                                                             | -0.590****  | 0.114  |
| 5                                                             | -0.696****  | 0.147  |
| <b>Year (ref. 2015)</b>                                       |             |        |
| 2016                                                          | -0.009      | 0.021  |
| 2017                                                          | -0.026      | 0.035  |
| 2018                                                          | -0.063      | 0.052  |
| 2019                                                          | -0.052      | 0.060  |
| 2020                                                          | 0.043       | 0.077  |
| 2021                                                          | -0.132*     | 0.069  |
| 2022                                                          | -0.234*     | 0.114  |
| 2023                                                          | -0.222      | 0.134  |
| 2024                                                          | -0.239*     | 0.142  |
| Constant                                                      | -6.749***   | 0.949  |
| N                                                             | 510         |        |
| R <sup>2</sup>                                                | 0.652       |        |
| ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1                       |             |        |
| Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state.              |             |        |

Table A-3. Detailed Linear Regression Results: CSPIA Performance Measures

|                                                               | Paternity<br>Establishment | Order<br>Establishment | Current<br>Collections | Arrearage<br>Collections |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>State Program Structure (ref: State)</b>                   |                            |                        |                        |                          |
| Local                                                         | -0.024<br>(0.053)          | 0.016<br>(0.016)       | 0.015<br>(0.030)       | -0.019<br>(0.023)        |
| <b>Support Order Establishment Process (ref: Combination)</b> |                            |                        |                        |                          |
| Judicial Only                                                 |                            | 0.0189*<br>(0.010)     |                        |                          |
| Highly Administrative                                         |                            | 0.0445**<br>(0.019)    |                        |                          |
| <b>Number of Mandatory Cooperation Programs (ref = 1)</b>     |                            |                        |                        |                          |
| 2                                                             | -0.208*<br>(0.118)         | -0.039*<br>(0.020)     | -0.008<br>(0.018)      | 0.014<br>(0.017)         |
| 3                                                             | -0.117<br>(-0.141)         | -0.055**<br>(-0.030)   | 0.003<br>(-0.021)      | 0.0308+<br>(0.017)       |
| 4                                                             | -0.133<br>(0.113)          | -0.058**<br>(0.025)    | 0.029<br>(0.029)       | 0.0472*<br>(0.020)       |
| 5                                                             | -0.095<br>(0.128)          | -0.088***<br>(0.030)   | -0.006<br>(0.040)      | 0.028<br>(0.023)         |
| <b>Support Order Establishment Process (ref: Combination)</b> |                            |                        |                        |                          |
| Judicial Only                                                 |                            | 0.0189*<br>(0.010)     |                        |                          |
| Highly Administrative                                         |                            | 0.0445**<br>(0.019)    |                        |                          |
| <b>State Program Structure (ref: State)</b>                   |                            |                        |                        |                          |
| Local                                                         | -0.024<br>(0.053)          | 0.016<br>(0.016)       | 0.015<br>(0.030)       | -0.019<br>(0.023)        |
| <b>Offices per 100,000 cases</b>                              | 0.003*<br>(0.002)          | 0.000<br>(0.001)       | 0.000<br>(0.001)       | 0.001+<br>(0.001)        |
| <b>Total Caseload (logged)</b>                                | -0.026<br>(0.018)          | 0.0164**<br>(0.007)    | 0.028**<br>(0.011)     | 0.0415***<br>(0.009)     |
| <b>Personal Consumption Expenditures</b>                      | -0.000*<br>(0.000)         | 0.000<br>(0.000)       | 0.000<br>(0.000)       | 0.000<br>(0.000)         |
| <b>Unemployment Rate</b>                                      | 0.011<br>(0.013)           | 0.000<br>(0.004)       | -0.014**<br>(0.006)    | -0.004<br>(0.005)        |
| <b>Percent of the state's population in nonmetro counties</b> | -0.099<br>(0.235)          | 0.158***<br>{0.050}    | 0.135***<br>(0.050)    | 0.174***<br>(0.043)      |
| <b>Federal expenditures per case (logged)</b>                 | 0.116*<br>(0.067)          | 0.0257*<br>(0.015)     | 0.0721***<br>(0.026)   | 0.118***<br>(0.023)      |
| <b>Year (ref. 2015)</b>                                       |                            |                        |                        |                          |

|                                                                                                                             | Paternity<br>Establishment | Order<br>Establishment | Current<br>Collections | Arrearage<br>Collections |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>2016</b>                                                                                                                 | 0.0172**<br>(0.008)        | 0.008***<br>(0.002)    | -0.004<br>(0.004)      | 0.001<br>(0.003)         |
| <b>2017</b>                                                                                                                 | 0.028<br>(0.018)           | 0.0135***<br>(0.004)   | -0.015**<br>(0.007)    | -0.006<br>(0.005)        |
| <b>2018</b>                                                                                                                 | 0.172<br>(0.138)           | 0.0144**<br>(0.007)    | -0.020*<br>(0.010)     | -0.004<br>(0.007)        |
| <b>2019</b>                                                                                                                 | 0.052<br>(0.032)           | 0.014<br>(0.009)       | -0.023*<br>(0.012)     | -0.005<br>(0.009)        |
| <b>2020</b>                                                                                                                 | -0.031<br>(0.034)          | 0.009<br>(0.015)       | 0.030*<br>(0.015)      | 0.0814***<br>(0.013)     |
| <b>2021</b>                                                                                                                 | 0.038<br>(0.031)           | 0.012<br>(0.015)       | -0.014<br>(0.014)      | 0.0407***<br>(0.009)     |
| <b>2022</b>                                                                                                                 | 0.081<br>(0.056)           | 0.009<br>(0.019)       | -0.058**<br>(0.022)    | -0.001<br>(0.015)        |
| <b>2023</b>                                                                                                                 | 0.101<br>(0.065)           | 0.002<br>(0.021)       | -0.063**<br>(0.026)    | -0.018<br>(0.018)        |
| <b>2024</b>                                                                                                                 | 0.090<br>(0.069)           | 0.001<br>(0.021)       | -0.061**<br>(0.028)    | -0.022<br>(0.019)        |
| <b>Constant</b>                                                                                                             | 0.985**<br>(0.373)         | 0.487***<br>(0.163)    | -0.129<br>(0.269)      | -0.531**<br>(0.216)      |
| <b>Observations</b>                                                                                                         | 510                        | 510                    | 510                    | 510                      |
| <b>R<sup>2</sup></b>                                                                                                        | 0.089                      | 0.336                  | 0.345                  | 0.594                    |
| ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1<br>Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state. Standard errors in parentheses. |                            |                        |                        |                          |

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