Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee

Listening Session 3: Addressing Challenges Regarding Data, Benchmarking, and Risk Adjustment

Presenters:

Subject Matter Experts

- <u>Robert Saunders, PhD</u> Senior Research Director, Health Care Transformation,
 Adjunct Associate Professor and Core Faculty Member, Duke-Margolis Institute for Health Policy, Duke University
- Randall P. Ellis, PhD Professor, Department of Economics, Boston University
- Aneesh Chopra, MPP President, CareJourney
- John Supra, MS Chief Digital Health & Analytics Officer, Value-Based Care Institute, Cone Health

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Robert Saunders, PhD

Senior Research Director, Health Care Transformation, Adjunct Associate Professor and Core Faculty Member, Duke-Margolis Institute for Health Policy, Duke University

Accelerating Adoption of Accountable Care: Setting Benchmarks & Determining Financial Risk

September 17, 2024


Dr. Rob Saunders, Senior Research Director, Health Care Transformation




Lessons about benchmarking

- Benchmark is traditionally strong predictor of VBP performance (although less true in recent ACO results).
- Benchmark normally strongly related to long-term participation in ACO and other VBP programs (likely because of shared savings performance).
- Benchmark (and effects of benchmark) varies for different programs and types of organizations (e.g., hospital vs physician-led ACOs, safety net)
- New data and technical approaches can improve benchmarking's accuracy and overall incentives, but there will always be policy tradeoffs.


Benchmark continues to be important, but less of a predictor of shared savings for ACOs







Research has shown organizations with higher benchmarks more likely to stay in VBP programs



Research highlights different benchmarking challenges for different programs and organizations

- From research, organizations may not join VBP model if benchmark is low/challenging to meet, and organizations may leave VBP models if benchmark rebases/ratchets down over time (and therefore becomes increasingly challenging to meet).
- Benchmarking can affect participation differently for physician-led vs hospital-led ACOs based on benchmarks for their local providers.
- Safety net organizations and similar may not have culture of coding, which can lower their effective benchmark.
- Only some VBP programs account for factors related to medically and socially underserved populations in their benchmark (e.g., ACO REACH's Health Equity Benchmark Adjustment).
- Differences in overall incentives (combination of benchmark, risk adjustment, stop-loss provisions) can make some programs (like MA) more financially sustainable than many VBP programs.

Technical factors and new data can improve benchmarking and overall financial incentives

| Domain | Challenges and Opportunities |
|--|---|
| Data Collection and Quality | Social factors: Given the nascent collection of SDoH data, there are multiple legal, regulatory, and practical obstacles to better data quality and use. Many heath related social needs screening/referral tools that are not standardized, so payers are challenged with incorporating data and advising on its collection. Risk adjustment: New approaches could move from self-reported condition coding to leveraging eCQMs, EHR data, and other data that show management of conditions (not just coding). |
| Capturing Population's True Health Care Needs | Health equity benchmark adjustments are starting to be used, and early versions (leveraging geographic level ADI) may make VBP financially sustainable for several types of safety net organizations (especially in urban areas). Seriously ill populations and older, complex patients often not well captured under current risk adjustment (e.g., w/o frailty adjustments) or may be excluded (like through risk truncation). |
| Organizational Competency | Benchmarking is one tool for ongoing financial incentives, but upfront capital needed for building organizational capabilities to manage populations and improve care. |

Lessons about benchmarking

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- Benchmark normally strongly related to long-term participation in ACO and other VBP programs (likely because of shared savings performance).
- Benchmark (and effects of benchmark) varies for different programs and types of organizations (e.g., hospital vs physician-led ACOs, safety net)
- New data and technical approaches can improve benchmarking's accuracy and overall incentives, but there will always be policy tradeoffs.

Thank You!

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Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee

Listening Session 3: Addressing Challenges Regarding Data, Benchmarking, and Risk Adjustment

Randall P. Ellis, PhD

Professor, Department of Economics, Boston University

Risk Adjustment (RA) for Population-Based Total Cost of Care (PB-TCOC) Models

Randall P Ellis, Ph.D.

Professor of Economics

Boston University

September 17, 2024



My RA Background

- Co-inventor: HCC risk adjustment framework used for MA Part C, Part D, and ACA Marketplace, 1987 to 2000
- PI: AHRQ-funded a new disease classification system (DXI) 2018-2022
- Co-creator: New machine learning algorithm that automates RA formulas, JAMA HF 2024
- Co-I: Primary Care Payment Model (PCAL) approved for MassHealth ACOs 2024

Specific questions asked to address

- 1. What are the most appropriate risk-adjustment methods to use for PB-TCOC models?
- 2. What are the most important concerns to address in order to encourage increased provider participation in PB-TCOC models?
- 3. How should the optimal risk-adjustment approaches differ for different types of organizations and/or performance measures?



#1 Most appropriate risk-adjustment (RA) methods for PB-TCOC models?

- Concurrent models, not prospective
- Use ACA not MA risk equalization
- Use multiple, not one, RA formula, to refine incentives across different dimensions
- Estimate on very large samples
- Use a very detailed diagnosis classification systems that capture distinctions in illness
- Include adjustments for Social Drivers of Health (SDOH)
- Update regularly, including ex post adjustments.



#2 How to best encourage increased provider participation?

- Don't make it optional?
- Build in higher rewards for participating than for not participating (as in Traditional Medicare)
- Minimize administrative burdens on providers
- Tilt payments to favor continuity of care for complex, high-cost patients
 - Avoid overpaying very healthy
 - Appropriately RA for complex, chronic patients (See #1)
 - Reinsurance
 - FFS for prevention and other necessary work
 - Adjust payments when patients change PCPs



Make performance pay >10% of total, not 1%


#3 How to RA different organizations and/or performance measures?

- Calculate RA models for each performance measure
- Use different contracts for organizations
 - E.g., ACA has different formulas for Platinum/Gold/Silver/Bronze
 - E.g., MassHealth uses RA for three ACO contracts
 - Medical care only
 - Medical + OP Behavioral health
 - Medical + IP and OP Behavioral health
 - Medicare Advantage uses 11 RA formulas
 - Community, new enrollee, LTC facility, ESRD,
- Use unified DXI+SDOH RA predictors
- Use relevant measures of model performance and fairness
 - Focus on O:E Ratios of observed to expected for outcomes and population subgroups of interest
- Standardize approach, keep it simple

Why Use a New RA Framework?

- US HCC system largely unchanged for 20 years
- Growing problems of fraud and gaming
- Current methodology not well-documented
- New ICD-10-CM coding from 2015 not fully used
- Need for flexibility and routine, speedy updates
- Better data, faster computers, better algorithms
- New RA models can do much better on people with multiple conditions, rare diseases, or in special population subsamples.

Figure 4: Model Residuals When Enrollees Are Grouped by Their Rarest Diagnosis



CCI=Charlson Comorbidity Index; CCSR = AHRQ Clinical Classification Software Refined; DXI = Diagnostic Items; DCG=Diagnostic Cost Groups



Footnote to Figure 4

Notes: CCI is the Quan et al. (2005) version of the Charlson Comorbidity Index, HHS-HCC is the Department of Health and Human Services Hierarchical Condition Category model, CCSR is the Clinical Classifications Software Refined model, DCG is the Diagnostic Costs Groups algorithm, and DXI is the Diagnostic Items model. All models include age-sex dummy variables. We calculated enrollee-weighted mean residuals in the validation sample using the binned frequencies of diagnoses in the full sample, with frequency intervals determined by powers of ten per million. Plot whiskers correspond to 95% confidence intervals, corrected for clustering at the patient level.



Relevant References

- 1. Andriola, Corinne, Randall P Ellis, et al (2024). "A Novel Machine Learning Algorithm for Creating Risk-adjusted Payment Formulas" *JAMA Health Forum*, Apr 5; 5(4):e240625. doi.org/10.1001/jamahealthforum.2024.0625.
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- 3. Ellis, Randall P, Heather E Hsu, Chenlu Song, et al. (2020) "<u>Diagnostic Category Prevalence in 3</u> <u>Classification Systems Across the Transition to the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision, Clinical Modification"</u> *JAMA Network Open*. April 8. 3(4), e202280-e202280.
- 4. Ash, Arlene S., Eric O. Mick, Randall P. Ellis, et al., (2017) <u>Social Determinants of Health in Managed Care Payment Formulas</u>. *Journal of the American Medical Association Internal Medicine*. Published online August 07, 2017. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2017.3317. Supplementary material.
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- 6. Chen, Danrong, Corinne Andriola, and Randall P. Ellis, (2024) "Insurance Adjustments to Risk Adjustment Payment Models," Danrong Chen PhD Dissertation Chapter 3, July 2024. (Unpublished)



Risk Adjustment (RA) for Population-Based Total Cost of Care (PB-TCOC) Models

Randall P Ellis, Ph.D.

Thank you!

September 17, 2024



Risk Adjustment (RA) for Population-Based Total Cost of Care (PB-TCOC) Models

Randall P Ellis, Ph.D.

Department of Economics

Boston University

SUPPLEMENTARY SLIDES



Outline

- Background
- Data
- DXI disease classification system
- Primary Care PCAL model
- Machine Learning DCG algorithm
- Conclusions



Variables Used for Risk Adjustment

- Age and sex
- Diagnoses
- Pharmaceuticals
- Survey Information
- Eligibility information
 - Health plan
 - Employment

SOCIAL DRIVERS OF HEALTH

- Individual-specific or neighborhood information?
- Education, crowding
- Chemicals in air, food, water
- Homelessness
- Behavioral health/Substance abuse
- Summarized into one Neighborhood Stress Score (Ash et al, 2017, 2024)



Risk Adjustment in the News

The New York Times

By Reed Abelson and Margot Sanger-Katz

Published March 22, 2023

Billions in Medicare Fraud Ignites Lobbying Frenzy




The New York Times

By Reed Abelson and Margot Sanger-Katz Published March 22, 2023

Diabetes with chronic complications Diabetes without complication +100% +100% +50% +50% Same rate Same as Medicare -50% -50% ← Plans that Plans that → ← Plans that Plans that → diagnose diagnose diagnose diagnose less less more more

These Diagnoses Are Much More Common in Medicare Advantage Than Traditional Medicare

Medicare is proposing to remove bonus payments for patients diagnosed with these conditions.



Each bar represents 10 percent of Medicare Advantage contracts, adjusted for enrollment size, sorted by those that diagnose the fewest illnesses to those that code the most. • Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission • By Alicia Parlapiano

These three categories of disease are dropped from the payment formula altogether in FY2024.

All types of diabetes are being put in one category.


Peripheral artery disease home tests are a big problem

Two questions

- Why is this upcoding happening?
- How can we design better risk adjustment payment formulas?



Existing CMS-HCC Diabetes Hierarchy



For 2024: CMS is constraining all diabetes diagnoses to be the same \$2148

HCC Payment formula rewards even unspecified type of diabetes with unspecified complications.



Using acute vs chronic vs with complication is vague and highly gameable

Over 400 diagnoses for diabetes with complications in 2020 formula

| ICD10 | ICD10 Label |
|--------|---|
| E13621 | Other specified diabetes mellitus with foot ulcer Modifiers |
| E13622 | Other specified diabetes mellitus with other skin ulcer |
| E13628 | Other specified diabetes mellitus with other skin complications |
| E13630 | Other specified diabetes mellitus with periodontal disease |
| E13638 | Other specified diabetes mellitus with other oral complications |
| E13649 | Other specified diabetes mellitus with hypoglycemia without coma |
| E1365 | Other specified diabetes mellitus with hyperglycemia |
| E1369 | Other specified diabetes mellitus with other specified complication |
| E138 | Other specified diabetes mellitus with unspecified complications |

Only six diagnoses for diabetes without complications

| ICD10 | ICD10 Label |
|-------|---|
| E089 | Diabetes mellitus due to underlying condition without complications |
| E099 | Drug or chemical induced diabetes mellitus without complications |
| E109 | Type 1 diabetes mellitus without complications |
| E119 | Type 2 diabetes mellitus without complications |
| E139 | Other specified diabetes mellitus without complications |
| Z794 | Long term (current) use of insulin |



For 2024, all types of diabetes are in one plan payment category.

Similar problems with chest pain, severe malnutrition, and congestive heart failure, which were dropped from the payment formula altogether in FY2024.

Existing HCC risk adjustment formula makes it too easy for health plans to change coding patterns to increase revenue.

No easy way to update or change the payment formula to respond to incentives and inequities.



DXI/DCG project's contribution

- Rich new classification created 3000 Diagnostic Items (DXIs) with strong clinical foundation
- Two new clinically-derived disease metrics created
- New machine learning (ML) algorithm for variable selection in risk adjustment formulas
 - Computationally feasible on very large samples
 - Transparent and replicable
 - Gaming incentives are mitigated
 - Rare but potentially high-cost conditions incorporated
- Small reduction in model fit from worrying about incentives
- Enormous improvement on payment accuracy for rare diseases
- ML reduces the number of variables by 73%
- Publicly posted software



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Table 1 Summary Statistics for diverse outcomes and key demographic variables in Development and Validation Samples, 2016-2018

| | Developme: $(N = 59,2)$ | * | Validation Sample $(N = 6,604,259)$ | |
|---|-------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------|----------|
| | Mean | Std Dev | Mean | Std Dev |
| | | | | |
| Total Spending Tanadad at | \$6,167 | \$26,405 | \$6,146 | \$26,336 |
| Total Spending Topcoded at \$250,000 | \$5,862 | \$18,159 | \$5,847 | \$18,156 |
| Plan Paid | \$5,318 | \$25,888 | \$5,297 | \$25,823 |
| Plan Paid Topcoded at \$250,000 | \$5,020 | \$17,582 | \$5,006 | \$17,579 |
| Out-of-pocket (OOP) Spending | \$850 | \$1,485 | \$849 | \$1,491 |
| Emergency department (ED) visits | 0.24 | 0.83 | 0.24 | 0.84 |
| Inpatient days | 0.23 | 2.78 | 0.23 | 2.75 |
| Age | 33.93 | 17.09 | 33.92 | 17.09 |
| Female | 0.515 | | 0.515 | |
| Months eligible in prediction year Ellis PTAC RA for TCOC 9/17/2024 | 11.34 | 1.78 | 11.34 | 1.78 |

DXI creation

- Physicians in 20 specialties clustered 94,000 ICD10-CM diagnoses into 3000 Diagnostic Items (DXIs)
- Included all root codes to make compatible with WHO ICD10.
- Base model predicting annualized spending, top-coded at \$250,000
- Used data from 2016-2017



Disease chapters

- **BLD Blood**
- CIR Circulatory
- DIG Digestive
- EAR Ear
- **END** Endocrine
- EXT External_causes
- EYE Eye
- FAC Factors_influencing
- **GEN Genito-urinary**
- **INF** Infections

INJ Injuries

- **MAL Malformations**
- MBD Mental_behav_devel
- MSK Muscular_skeletal
- **NEO Neoplasm**
- **NVS Nervous**
- PNL Perinatal
- **PRG** Pregnancy
- **RSP** Respiratory
- SKN Skin_Connective
- SPL Special
- **SYM Symptoms**



Disease chapters

BLD Blood

CIR Circulatory

DIG Digestive

EAR Ear

END Endocrine

EXT External_causes

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MBD Mental behav devel

MSK Muscular_skeletal

NEO Neoplasm

NVS Nervous

PNL Perinatal

PRG Pregnancy

RSP Respiratory

SKN Skin_Connective

SPL Special

SYM Symptoms

Hierarchies

INJ Head neck eye

INJ_Thoracic

INJ_Abdominal

INJ_Spine_back

INJ Fracture

INJ_Minor

INJ_Foreign_body

INJ_Burn

INJ_Frostbite_hypotherm

INJ_Poisoning

INJ_Abuse

INJ_Allergies

INJ_Complic

INJ_Nerves

INJ_Traumatic_injuries

INJ_Vascular

INJ_Self_harm

INJ_Vague



Disease chapters

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INJ Poisoning

INJ_Abuse

INJ_Allergies

INJ_Complic

INJ Nerves

INJ_Traumatic_injuries

INJ_Vascular

INJ_Self_harm

INJ_Vague

DXI main effects

Concussion

Dislocation

Fracture_oth

Fracture_spondylolysis_and_

spondylolisthesis

Fracture_stable_burst

Injury_nerves

Lesion_spinal_cord



Disease chapters

BLD Blood

CIR Circulatory

DIG Digestive

EAR Ear

END Endocrine

EXT External causes

EYE Eye

FAC Factors_influencing

GEN Genito-urinary

INF Infections

INJ Injuries

MAL Malformations

MBD Mental_behav_devel

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INJ_Burn

INJ_Frostbite_hypotherr n

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INJ Nerves

INJ_Traumatic_injuries

INJ_Vascular

INJ_Self_harm

INJ_Vague

DXI main effects

Concussion

Dislocation

Fracture_oth

Fracture_spondylolysis_and_

spondylolisthesis

Fracture_stable_burst

Injury_nerves

Lesion_spinal_cord

CCSR

Dislocations, initial encounter

Dislocations, subsequent encounter

Fracture of the spine and back, initial

encount

Fracture of the spine and back, subseq

encount

Spinal cord injury (SCI), initial encount

Spinal cord injury (SCI), subseq encount



DXI Structure for Diabetes

Disease chapters

ENDocrine

Hierarchies

Diabetes

Abn_glucose_in_preg_chldbrth_and_puerperium

Diabetes_gestational_in_preg_chldbrth_and_puerperium

Diabetes_mellitus_drug_or_chemical_induced

Diabetes_mellitus_oth

Diabetes_mellitus_secondary

Diabetes mellitus Type 1

Diabetes_mellitus_Type_2

Diabetes_pre-existing_in_preg_chldbrth_and_puerperium

Diabetes_unsp_in_preg_chldbrth_and_puerperium

Postprocedural_hypoinsulinemia

Stable_prolif_diabetic_retinopathy



DXI Structure for Diabetes

Disease chapters

ENDocrine

Hierarchies

END_DM_Type_1
END_DM_Type_2
END_DM_Drug_Chem
END_DM_Other

DXI1 Main effects

Abn_glucose_preg_chldbrth_puerperium
Diabetes_gestational
DM_secondary
DM_pre-existing_preg_chldbrth_puerp
DM_unsp_in_preg_chldbrth_and_puerp
Postprocedural_hypoinsulinemia
Stable_prolif_diabetic_retinopathy

DXI2 Modifiers

right left Bilateral

diet_controlled insulin_controlled controlled_by_oral_hypoglyc_drugs_preg unsp_control

w_coma
w_hyperglycemia
w_ketoacidosis
w_kidney_complications
w_neurological_manifestations
w_ophthalmic complications
w periperhal circulatory manifestations

intraop_and_postproc
moderate



Disease chapters

BLD Blood

CIR Circulatory

DIG Digestive

EAR Ear

END Endocrine

EXT External_causes

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PNL Perinatal

PRG Pregnancy

RSP Respiratory

SKN Skin_Connective

SPL Special

SYM Symptoms

Hierarchies

MBD_Anxiety

MBD_Dementia

MBD_Eating_Disorder

MBD_Gender_Sexuality

MBD_Mood_Disorder

MBD_Neuro_Physio_Develop

MBD_Personality_Behavioral

Other

MBD_Psychosis

MBD Schizophrenia

MBD_Sleep

MBD_Stress_Trauma

MBD_Substance_Abuse

MBD_Suicide

MBD Symptoms

MBD Anxiety

MBD Dementia

MBD_Eating_Disorder

MBD_Gender_Sexuality

DXIs

Alcohol-related_disorders

Opioid-related_disorders

Cannabis-related_disorders

Sedative-related disorders

Stimulant-related_disorders

Hallucinogen-related_disorders

Inhalant-related_disorders

Tobacco-related_disorders

Other_specified substance-related_disorders



Diagnostic Items

- Project physicians mapped all 94k diagnoses (with illegal roots) into Diagnostic Items (DXI)
- Current version 1.5 has 3407 DXIs
 - 2446 DXI1 main effects
 - 961 DXI2 modifiers
 - 17 DXI3 continuous scale measures



Table 2 R-Square in the Validation Sample

| | Age-sex OLS | Age-sex + HCC OLS | Age-Sex + CCSR OLS | Age-Sex + CCSR + DXI OLS | Age-Sex + CCSR + DXI Stepwise |
|--|----------------|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Annualized Total Spending | 1.37% | 34.75% | 40.16% | 47.35% | 47.35% |
| Annualized Total Spending Topcoded at \$250,000 | 2.54% | 42.68% | 52.14% | 56.98% | 56.98% |
| Annualized Plan Paid | 1.18% | 33.91% | 38.94% | 46.30% | 46.30% |
| Annualized Plan Paid Topcoded at \$250,000 | 2.21% | 41.99% | 50.84% | 55.80% | 55.79% |
| Annualized Out-of-pocket (OOP) Spending | 3.95% | 18.86% | 30.66% | 32.49% | 32.48% |
| N =6,604,259 | | | | | (2.070.) |
| N 1 C 1 4 '11 | 20 | 166 | 560 | 2.015 | (2,079 to) |
| Number of explanatory variables | 30 | 166 | 569 | 3,015 | 2,061) |

Note: All dependent variables were annualized and then weighted by the fraction of the year each enrollee is eligible to reflect values per annual period. 4 Models were estimated using the development sample with N=59,297,201, These validation sample measures use N =6,604,259.

Overfitting has a Minor Impact on R-Square in Development and Validation Samples

| | Age-sex OLS | Age-sex + HCC OLS | Age-Sex + CCSR OLS | Age-Sex + CCSR + DXI OLS | Validation Age-Sex + CCSR + DXI Stepwise | Develop- ment sample, Same model |
|---|----------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--|--|
| Annualized Total Spending | 1.37% | 34.75% | 40.16% | 47.35% | 47.35% | 47.79 |
| Annualized Total Spending Topcoded at \$250,000 | 2.54% | 42.68% | 52.14% | 56.98% | 56.98% | 57.19 |
| Annualized Plan Paid | 1.18% | 33.91% | 38.94% | 46.30% | 46.30% | 46.74 |
| Annualized Plan Paid Topcoded at \$250,000 | 2.21% | 41.99% | 50.84% | 55.80% | 55.79% | 56.01 |
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| N =6,604,259 | | | | | (2,079 to | (2,079 to |
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Note: All dependent variables were annualized and then weighted by the fraction of the year each enrollee is eligible to reflect values per annual period. 4 Models were estimated using the development sample with N=59,297,201. Validation sample measures use N =6,604,259.

Table 3 Comparison of HCC, CCSR, and DXI Classification Systems

| WHO Chapter | ICD Code Range | Labels | Billable ICD-10 | HHS- HCCs | CCSR Categories | Total DXI_1 Items | Billable Diagnoses per DXI | Statistically Sign. DXI_1 in Model 1.2 |
|----------------|-------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|--------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| 1 | A00-B99 | Infectious and parasitic diseases | 1,058 | 5 | 12 | 110 | 10 | 73 |
| 2 | C00-D49 | Neoplasms | 1,661 | 6 | 74 | 145 | 11 | 100 |
| 3 | D50-D89 | Blood, blood-forming organs and immunity diseases | 247 | 9 | 10 | 47 | 5 | 39 |
| 4 | E00-E89 | Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases | 908 | 9 | 17 | 85 | 11 | 71 |
| 5 | F01-F99 | Mental, behavioral and neurodevelopmental disorders | 747 | 9 | 32 | 153 | 5 | 127 |
| 6 | G00-G99 | Nervous system diseases | 622 | 13 | 22 | 129 | 5 | 96 |
| 7 | | Eye and adnexa diseases | 2,606 | 0 | 12 | 270 | 10 | 141 |
| 8 | H60-H95 | Ear and mastoid process diseases | 656 | 0 | 6 | 38 | 17 | 30 |
| 9 | I00-I99 | Circulatory system diseases | 1,350 | 11 | 39 | 95 | 14 | 84 |
| 10 | J00-J99 | Respiratory system diseases | 341 | 4 | 17 | 64 | 5 | 56 |
| 11 | K00-K95 | Digestive system diseases | 799 | 9 | 25 | 107 | 7 | 86 |
| 12 | L00-L99 | Skin and subcutaneous tissue diseases | 845 | 1 | 7 | 93 | 9 | 55 |
| 13 | M00-M99 | Musculoskeletal system and connective tissue diseases | 6,487 | 6 | 38 | 222 | 29 | 182 |
| 14 | N00-N99 | Genitourinary system diseases | 669 | 3 | 26 | 109 | 6 | 90 |
| 15 | O00-O9A | Pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium | 2,267 | 6 | 30 | 136 | 17 | 86 |
| 16 | P00-P96 | Perinatal period conditions | 443 | 0 | 15 | 54 | 8 | 44 |
| 17 | Q00-Q99 | Congenital malformations, deformations, chromosomal abnormalities | 817 | 3 | 10 | 26 | 31 | 23 |
| 18 | R00-R99 | Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and lab findings | 720 | 2 | 17 | 178 | 4 | 134 |
| 19 | S00-T88 | Injury, poisoning and other consequences of external causes | 40,570 | 7 | 76 | 176 | 231 | 118 |
| | U00-U99 | Emergency code additions | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | |
| 20 | V00-Y99 | Factors influencing health status and health service contacts | 6,865 | 0 | 30 | 31 | 221 | 11 |
| 21 | Z00-Z99 | Infectious and parasitic diseases | 1,253 | 11 | 25 | 175 | 7 | 135 |
| Ellis PTAC RA | A for TCOC | 9/17/2024 Totals | 71,934 | 114 | 540 | 2,446 | 29 | 1,781 |

Ellis PTAC RA for TCOC 9/17/2024

Outline

- Background
- Data
- DXI disease classification system
- Primary Care PCAL model
- Machine Learning DCG algorithm
- Conclusions



Primary care is underpaid and underprovided in the US

- FFS payment rewards treatment, not prevention
- Higher fees for surgery and imaging than primary care
- Too few primary care providers (PCP)
- Specialists collude to keep PCP fees low
- Capitation may make this worse because it does not pay for extra burdens of complex patients
- Patient needs depend not only on diseases but Social Drivers of Health (SDoH)

Ash and Ellis work on PCAL

- 1. Arlene S. Ash, Matthew J. Alcusky, Ellis et al. Fixing Primary Care Through Payment Reform, May, 2024. Working paper: *Do not cite/quote*.
- 2. Alcusky MJ, Mick EO, Allison JJ, et al. Paying for Medical and Social Complexity in Massachusetts Medicaid. JAMA Netw Open 2023;6:e2332173. doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.32173. PMID: 37669052.
- 3. Vats, Sonal, Arlene S. Ash and Randall P. Ellis. (2013) "Bending the Cost Curve? Results from a Comprehensive Primary Care Payment Pilot." *Medical Care*. 51(11):964-969. DOI: 10.1097/MLR.0b013e3182a97bdc
- 4. Ash, Arlene, and Randall P. Ellis (2012) "Risk-Adjusted Payment and Performance Assessment for Primary Care." *Medical Care*. Aug. 2012 50(8):643–53 doi: 10.1097/MLR.0b013e3182549c74
- 5. Ellis, Randall P., and Arlene S. Ash (2012) "Payments in Support of Effective Primary Care for Chronic Conditions." *Nordic Economic Policy Review*. 2:191-210.https://blogs.bu.edu/ellisrp/files/2012/08/2012-

EllisAsh_PracticalPCMHPayment_NEPR_20120815.pdf

Problem #1: Many primary care services are poorly paid using FFS payments

- Prevention services
- Follow-up care to hospital, ED, specialists, prescription drugs
- Counseling, behavioral health
- End-of-life planning, hospice care
- Group therapy
- Email, telemedicine, remote care
- Physician referrals
- Much more



Problem #2: Additional burdens of complex patients badly captured by their diagnoses

- Homelessness
- Low education
- Language barriers
- Race and discrimination
- Environmental factors: air, water, food, insects, crime, illegal drugs
- Behavioral problems, family stress, scarcity
- Low income



Problem #3: Approach assumes each enrollee can be assigned to an identified PCP

- People move around between different facilities and doctors
- Need to assign based on prior year data
- What to do with new enrollees?
- What to do when patients go outside of their assigned network of providers?
- What to do if a specialist acts as the PCP?
- What to do when patients do not see any PCP?



Ash et al PCAL Solution

- Use a separate payment formula for Primary Care called the Primary Care Burden Activity Level (PCAL)
- Recognize and pay for all diagnoses relevant
- Recognize Social Drivers of Health (SDoH)
- Come up estimated resources needed to treat complex patients using Proxies of spending on hospitals, drugs, specialists, and emergency departments
- Use principal components to collapse multiple SDoH into a single index to avoid overfitting
- Validate model predictions by PCP review of credibility
- Choose a PCP assignment that accommodates PCP switchers but rewards keeping the same one.

 BOSTON

What is in PCAL? Dependent variable

Infer the extra primary care resources needed to *prevent or manage* the other kinds of care episodes likely to experience.

The model sums:

- All primary care service costs
- Fractions of the dollars spent on other services, such as
 - Specialty care
 - Hospital care
 - ED care
 - Prescription drugs

Principle: Members expected to incur these other health care costs may be likely to need more attention from their primary care teams



What is in PCAL? Dependent variable

| Type of Activity | % of All Such Costs Contributing to Constructed PCAL | % of PCAL |
|-------------------------|--|-----------|
| Primary care activities | 100% | 64% |
| Specialty care related | 6% | 20% |
| Hospital care | 6% | 1% |
| ED spending | 30% | 5% |
| Rx spending | 9% | 10% |

Note: Spending on services also subject to a maximum and minimum.



What is in PCAL? Independent variables of MassHealth SDH 3.2

| PCAL 2022 Model | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------|------|--|--|--|--|--|
| taPCAL_22 | Coef. | t | | | | | |
| RxCG RRS | 288 | 262 | | | | | |
| RxCG-spline-5 | -233 | -147 | | | | | |
| DxCG RRS | 523 | 419 | | | | | |
| DxCG-spline-5 | -124 | -65 | | | | | |
| DxCG-spline-20 | -288 | -61 | | | | | |
| Serious Mental Illness | 180 | 56 | | | | | |
| Opioid Use Disorder | 400 | 82 | | | | | |
| Alcohol Use Disorder | 117 | 22 | | | | | |
| Other Substance Use Disorder | 224 | 41 | | | | | |
| Serious Emotional Disturbance | 54 | 10 | | | | | |
| Other Disabled | 50 | 14 | | | | | |
| DDS (not DMH) | 557 | 79 | | | | | |
| DMH Client | 1115 | 94 | | | | | |
| NSS7+ X DxCG | 5 | | | | | | |
| Rural Area | 22 | 5 | | | | | |
| Housing Problems x DxCG x BH | 41 | 90 | | | | | |

PCAL independent variables / model design

- Largely consistent w/ SDH3.2, with three important differences:
 - Non-linear relationship with DxCG and RxCG
 ("spline"): moving from "healthy" to "sick" leads
 to larger revenue increase than moving from
 "sick" to "very sick"*
 - <u>Fewer BH/SUD variables</u>: better correlated with PCAL
 - <u>Several variables excluded</u> (e.g., newborn complexity) that lacked clear correlation with PCAL
- Overall model concurrent R-squared is 68.8%

^{*} The RxCG and DxCG scores have a declining slope; higher scores will increase the coefficient but at a lower rate. For example, DxCG scores up to 5 will get \$523 per DxCG point. If a member has a DxCG score of 10, their coefficient will be (523*4) + ((523-124)*6). These "splines" are for better fit with the data



Data used to capture SDoH

| Table 1. MassHealth Members, Age 0-64 years, 2019 (1,014,625 | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------|------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| person-years) | | | | | | | | |
| Member Characteristics | Person-years | % | | | | | | |
| Age 18 years and younger | 512,955 | 46.9 | | | | | | |
| Female | 579,891 | 53.1 | | | | | | |
| Housing Problems | | | | | | | | |
| Homeless | 21,010 | 1.9 | | | | | | |
| Unstably Housed (not homeless) | 99,495 | 9.1 | | | | | | |
| Neither of the above | 972,242 | 89.0 | | | | | | |
| Disability Status | | | | | | | | |
| DMH Client | 6,919 | 0.6 | | | | | | |
| DDS Client (not DMH) | 19,441 | 1.8 | | | | | | |
| Other Disability | 108,791 | 10.0 | | | | | | |
| None of the above | 957,596 | 87.6 | | | | | | |

Data used to capture SDoH - 2

| Table 1. MassHealth Members, Age 0-64 years, 2019 (1,014,625 | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------|------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| person-years) | | | | | | | | | |
| Member Characteristics | Person-years | % | | | | | | | |
| Behavioral Health Comorbidity | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| Serious Mental Illness | 145,440 | 13.3 | | | | | | | |
| Opioid Use Disorder | 55,516 | 5.1 | | | | | | | |
| Other Substance Use Disorder | 48,011 | 4.4 | | | | | | | |
| Severe Emotional Disorder (in children) | 38,381 | 3.5 | | | | | | | |
| Rural* | 45,423 | 4.5 | | | | | | | |
| | Mean | SD | | | | | | | |
| Age | 25.9 | 18.4 | | | | | | | |
| Neighborhood Stress Score (NSS) | 0.00 | 1.0 | | | | | | | |
| Medical morbidity (Rx-based) score | 0.99 | 2.1 | | | | | | | |
| Medical morbidity (Dx-based) score | 1.00 | 2.1 | | | | | | | |

Data used to capture SDoH - 3

Notes

- Requires 183+ days of managed care eligibility (MassHealth as primary insurer).
- Homeless requires a Z59.0 ICD-10 code; unstably housed is having 3 or more addresses during 2019.
- Disability status indicates MassHealth eligibility as a client of the Department of Mental Health
 (DMH), or, if not DMH, then as a client of the Department of Developmental Services (DDS), or, if
 neither DMH or DDS, entitled to Medicaid due to disability ("Other disability").
- DxCG is the v4.2 concurrent Model 88 risk score; RxCG, the v4.2 concurrent Model 86 risk score,
 each normalized to have mean = 1 in the full MassHealth population.
- The NSS is standardized (mean = 0; SD = 1); higher scores indicate greater socioeconomic stress.

Table 3. Ratios of Observed to Expected (O:E) PCAL for Select Patient Subgroups

| | | Observed | O:E ratio with E predicted by | | |
|----------------------|---------|-----------------|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Person-Years | | Mean PCAL \$ | Average | Age-Sex Model | PCAL model |
| Age Groups in years | | | | | |
| 0-6 | 142,749 | \$787 | 0.80 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| >6-12 | 160,978 | \$528 | 0.54 | 1.00 | 1.01 |
| >12-18 | 150,483 | \$579 | 0.59 | 1.00 | 0.99 |
| >18-26 | 106,538 | \$783 | 0.80 | 0.98 | 1.00 |
| >26-44 | 245,682 | \$1,197 | 1.22 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| >44-64 | 199,203 | \$1,619 | 1.64 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Rurality | | | | | |
| Level 2 Rural | 45,423 | \$913 | 0.93 | 0.90 | 1.01 |
| Non-Rural | 969,176 | \$989 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Housing Problems | | | | | |
| Homeless | 19,501 | \$3,378 | 3.43 | 2.75 | 0.95 |
| Unstably Housed Only | 92348 | \$1,188 | 1.21 | 1.30 | 1.02 |
| None | 902,407 | \$913 | 0.93 | 0.92 | 1.00 |


Table 3 (cont.). Ratios of Observed to Expected (O:E) PCAL Select Patient Subgroups (continued)

| | | Observed | O:E ratio with E predicted l | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|--------------|------------------------------|------------------|---------------|--|
| Person-Years | | Mean PCAL \$ | Average | Age-Sex Model | PCAL model | |
| Total | 1,014,625 | 985 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | |
| Race | | | | | | |
| White, Non Hispanic | 349,900 | \$1,114 | 1.13 | 1.06 | 1.01 | |
| Black, Non-Hispanic | 103,418 | \$883 | 0.90 | 0.93 | 0.96 | |
| Hispanic | 78,776 | \$1,045 | 1.06 | 1.07 | 1.00 | |
| Other | 57,017 | \$701 | 0.71 | 0.72 | 0.97 | |
| Unknown | 425,514 | \$932 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 1.00 | |
| NSS Quintile | | | | | | |
| Least Stressed | 202,519 | \$965 | 0.98 | 0.95 | 1.01 | |
| 2nd Quintile | 202,567 | \$984 | 1.00 | 0.98 | 1.01 | |
| 3rd Quintile | 202,150 | \$979 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.01 | |
| 4th Quintile | 203,316 | \$988 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 0.99 | |
| Most Stressed | 204,072 | \$1,010 | 1.03 | 1.05 | 0.97 | |
| None | 902,407 | \$913 | 0.93 | 0.92 | 1.00 | |

How MassHealth will apply PCAL

Illustrative ACO monthly payment flow

April 2023 illustration



PCE funding is
allocated to
PID/SLs and
must be based
on tier and
member health
status

For RY23, the health status adjustment will not affect the rate paid by MassHealth to ACOs or the rate ACOs pay to PCEs; PCEs should use the PCAL scores by RC to distribute dollars between PID/SLs accordingly; in future years, MassHealth anticipates using PCAL to apply a health status adjustment to the market rate by PCE

SDH 4.0 Model

CONTEXT

- Over the last several years, MassHealth has refined its ACO/MCO risk adjustment model to achieve better predictive results and its policy objectives, particularly to supplement the model with additional SDoH variables and add coefficients for disease states to improve prediction
- In 2022, MassHealth started a project to revisit its risk adjustment model more holistically for RY24 rates

OBJECTIVES

SDH 4.0 will be the risk adjustment model that MassHealth implements in RY24, with the following objectives:

- Decide on base medical model. MassHealth has been using Cotiviti's DxCG, but wanted to evaluate other more commonly used Medicaid risk adjustment models
- Assess and align on the SDoH variables that we risk-adjust for in SDH 4.0, including Z codes and indices/composite metrics like NSS7
- **Evaluate other aspects of model**. Pharmacy v. medical model, core medical model "splines," etc.
- Evaluate data sources we use for risk adjustment, (e.g. alternative data sources). Will be assessed for RY25

Outline

- Background
- Data
- DXI disease classification system
- Primary Care PCAL model
- Machine Learning DCG algorithm
- Conclusions



Warning

- What three things will you enjoy less if you see when they are being made?
- Sausages
- Econometric estimates
 - Risk adjustment models

eTable 2A: Modeling Principles used in this project expanded from Ash et al. (2000)⁶ as in CMS-CIOO (2021)^[]

- 1. Diagnostic categories should be clinically meaningful.
- 2. Diagnostic categories should predict medical (including drug) expenditures.
- 3. Diagnostic categories that will affect payments should have adequate sample sizes to permit accurate and stable estimates of expenditures.
- 4. In creating an individual's clinical profile, hierarchies should be used to characterize the person's illness level within each disease process, while the effects of unrelated disease processes accumulate.
- 5. The diagnostic classification should encourage specific coding.
- 6. The diagnostic classification should not reward coding proliferation.
- 7. Providers should not be penalized for recording additional diagnoses (monotonicity).
- 8. The classification system should be internally consistent (transitive).
- 9. The diagnostic classification should assign all ICD-10-CM codes (exhaustive classification).
- 10. Discretionary diagnostic categories should be excluded from payment models.

Two new principles were added in this project:

- 11. Models should do well even on sets of rare diagnoses and demographics.
- 12. Parsimonious models with fewer parameters are preferred.



Difference between predictive and payment models

- Worry about incentives
 - To control costs
 - To upcode by coding more serious codes
 - To reward vague coding
- Simplicity and explainability to policy makers
- Desirable to be able to recalibrate on samples of 1 million



Machine Learning RA Techniques

Major concerns

- Computationally challenging for N > 1 million. Most researchers use, N < 1 million, K < 200
- Diagnoses are complex. Many people have >10 in a year
- Black box: Difficult to interpret results
- Enforcing nonnegative predictions?
- Ease of updating?
- Stability over time?



Machine Learning (Neural Networks)?

ICD10 Predictions/ interpretation codes A01 A02 **Black Box** A03 **Z998**



We built upon the DCG and HCC approaches

- Clinical input
- Very big data
- Hierarchies
- Explainable
- Automated estimation



DXI model specification

$$Y_i = A_{ia} * \alpha_a + DXI_{ij} * \beta_j + \epsilon_i$$
 (1)

DCG model specification

$$Y_{i} = A_{ia} * \alpha_{a} + \sum_{h} \sum_{g} DCG_{ihg} * \beta_{hg} + \varepsilon_{i}$$
 (2)

Index notation:

```
t = time (year) (omitted)
i = person-year observation
```

a =age-sex group

j = DXI items

$$A_{ia}$$
 = age-sex groups



Gains in incentives from four things

- Aggregating into DCGs to avoid rewarding slight coding variation
- Hierarchies ignore less serious conditions
- Ignoring low cost, common, vague or gameable information
- Avoiding the underpayment of rare diagnoses



Having a rare disease is not so rare!

Frequency Table for Rarest Diagnosis Category per Enrollee Year in the Validation Sample, 2006-2008

| Bin | Count | % of enrollees |
|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| No diagnoses present | 1,479,306 | 22% |
| < 1 per million | 197,181 | 3% |
| 1-10 per million | 769,591 | 12% |
| 10-100 per million | 1,730,611 | 26% |
| 100-1,000 per million | 1,726,323 | 26% |
| 1,000-10,000 per million | 513,109 | 8% |
| 10,000-100,000 per million | <u> 188,138</u> | 3% |
| Total | 6,604,259 | 100% |



Table 3 Sensitivity Analysis: Validation sample measures of alternative specifications

| | | | | Rare disease mean |
|-----------------------------------|--------|----------|------------|----------------------|
| | | | | error: enrollee-year |
| | | | | mean residual of |
| | | Mean | | people with any |
| | R- | absolute | Number of | diagnosis rarer than |
| | Square | error | parameters | 100 per million |
| Prediction models | | | | |
| HCC | 0.428 | \$5,227 | 166 | \$1,927 |
| DXI additive model | 0.589 | \$3,785 | 2929 | -\$82 |
| Payment Models | | | | |
| Appropriateness to Include (ATI)\ | | | | |
| Scores | | | | |
| DCG ATI=0 | 0.4689 | \$4,520 | 445 | \$609.99 |
| DCG ATI<2 | 0.5032 | \$4,313 | 526 | \$296.03 |
| DCG ATI<3 | 0.5264 | \$4,151 | 619 | -\$4.18 |
| DCG ATI<4 (Base) | 0.5345 | \$4,113 | 661 | -\$70.50 |
| DCG Base, omitting CCSR | 0.5050 | .t. | (21 | d. |
| , 6 | 0.5253 | * | 691 | * |



Outline

- Background and methodology
- Data
- New DXI disease classification system
- New machine learning algorithm
- Results from DXI/DCG estimation
- Conclusions and ideas for future work



DXI model specification

$$Y_i = A_{ia} * a_a + DXI_{ij} * \theta_j + \varepsilon_i$$
 (1)

DCG model specification

$$Y_i = A_{ia} * a_a + \sum_h \sum_g DCG_{ihg} * \beta_{hg} + \varepsilon_i$$
 (2)

Index notation:

t = time (year) (omitted)

i = person-year observation

a =age-sex group

r = CCSR categories

j = DXI items

 Y_i = dependent variable

 A_{ia} = age-sex groups

CCSR_{ir} = Clinical Classification System, Refined categories


DXI_{ij} = Diagnostic Items

DCG_{hg} = Diagnostic Cost Groups



Endocrine system **DXI** regression coef - 1


11 CCSR and 83 Diagnostic Items (DXIs) Arranged into 9 END Hierarchies






Endocrine system **DXI** regression coef - 2

11 CCSR and 83 Diagnostic Items (DXIs) Arranged into 9 END Hierarchies



Endocrine system **DXI** regression coef - 3

11 CCSR and 83 Diagnostic Items (DXIs) Arranged into 9 END Hierarchies



Incremental Annual Cost (2018 \$)

DXI/DCG ML algorithm parameters

Base values

Minimum N for a DCG 2000

Maximum percent difference between

coefficients put together in one DCG 30%

Minimum size needed for residual DXI 0

Statistical significance required for

including a DCG in final model

Whether to allow negative DCGs

p<0.0001


no



DXI/DCG algorithm details


- MDs cluster DXIs into 218 HIER groups
- Run OLS using all DXIs to predict residual spending to get incremental cost coefficients.
- Sort DXIs from highest to lowest cost coefficients not yet assigned to any HIER
- Group DXIs into DCG_i using:
 - 1. Highest coefficients
 - 2. Reasonably similar coef (base case: <30% difference)
 - 3. Require minimum N for DCG_i (base case: >2000 people)
 - 4. Disregard statistical significance of individual DXIs except for stopping rule
- Reset any assigned DXIs in any DCG_i to zero.
- Rerun regression while including the DCG_i variables and new conditional DXIs.
- Iterate until no more nonnegative DXIs are available to group
- Drop all DXI with negative or insignificant coefficients
- Rerun regression using only DCGs
- Drop DCGs with negative coefficients
- Use stepwise regression to keep only DCGs with statistically significant positive coefficients

Figure 1: Flow chart of assignment of DXIs to DCGs in Hierarchy A



Notes: DXI is a Diagnostic Item, and DCG is a Diagnostic Cost Group.


Single hierarchy DCG algorithm (Ash et al. 1989) can also be modeled as a regression tree.



Patient with conditions in A₂, and A₃ get paid only for DCG A₂




The DXI/DCG algorithm uses coefficients, not sample averages, to calculate payments contribution for each leaf, and uses multiple hierarchies. Here there are two HIER groups, A and B, with each DXI assigned uniquely to one HIER.



Patient with conditions in A_2 , A_3 , and B_3 get paid for sum of coefficients on DCG A_2 and DCG B_3 while DCG A3 gets ignored.




eFigure 2: Flow Chart of Hypothetical DCG Algorithm assignment when DXI_X maps to both Hierarchies A and B






Coefficients for four Diabetes HIER DCGs, DXIs and CCSRs by iterations collapsing ten DXIs into 4 DCGs




- DCG_END_DM_Type_1_01
- DXI_Diabetes_mellitus_Type_1 274,086
- DCG_END_DM_Type_2_01
- DXI_Diabetes_mellitus_Type_2 2,495,734
- -DCG_END_DM_Drug_Chem_01
- --- DXI_Diabetes_mellitus_drug_or_chemical_induced 5,395
- DCG_END_DM_Drug_Chem_02
- DXI_Stable_prolif_diabetic_retinopathy 3,267
- --- DCG_END_DM_Other_01
- DXI_Diabetes_mellitus_oth 81,113
- DXI_Diabetes_mellitus_secondary 41,868



Coefficients for four Diabetes HIER DCGs, DXIs and CCSRs by iterations collapsing ten DXIs into 4 DCGs



Four additional DXIs/CCSRs included but dropped when not significant



CCSR Coronary atherosclerosis/oth

Figure 3: Model Parameter Counts across DCG iterations for the Base Model







Figure 3: Model R² across DCG iterations for the Base Model





Footnote to Figure 2

Notes: HHS-HCC is the Department of Health and Human Services Hierarchical Condition Category model, CCSR is the Clinical Classifications Software Refined model, DXI is the Diagnostic Items model, and DCG is the Diagnostic Costs Groups algorithm. The HHS-HCC model uses the combined set of HHS-HCCs included in the adult, child or infant models in a single regression. Base Case CCSR uses OLS on 538 observed CCSR categories, while Base case DXI uses CCSR plus DXIs. As DCGs are created, DXI and CCSR which fall into them are dropped from the model. After all DCGs have been found, the DCG SW iteration estimates a stepwise regression that omits any all remaining DXI and CCSR variables not assigned to DCGs and includes only statistically significant DCGS. The run labeled Final excludes any variables with negative coefficients. All models include age-sex dummy variables.



DXI classification structure

Disease chapters

BLD Blood

CIR Circulatory

DIG Digestive

EAR Ear

END Endocrine

EXT External_causes

EYE Eye

FAC Factors_influencing

GEN Genito-urinary

INF Infections

INJ Injuries

MAL Malformations

MBD Mental_behav_devel

MSK Muscular_skeletal

NEO Neoplasm

NVS Nervous

PNL Perinatal

PRG Pregnancy

RSP Respiratory

SKN Skin_Connective

SPL Special

Ellis PTAC RA for TCOC 9/17/202 SYM Symptoms

Hierarchies

INJ_Head_neck_eye

INJ_Thoracic

INJ_Abdominal

INJ_Spine_back

INJ_Fracture

INJ_Minor

INJ_Foreign_body

INJ_Burn

INJ_Frostbite_hypotherr n

INJ_Poisoning

INJ_Abuse

INJ_Allergies

INJ_Complic

INJ Nerves

INJ_Traumatic_injuries

INJ Vascular

INJ_Self_harm

INJ Vague

DXI main effects

{Next slide}

CCSR

Dislocations, initial encounter

Dislocations, subsequent encounter Fracture of the spine and back, initial encounter

Fracture of the spine and back, subseq encounter

Spinal cord injury (SCI), initial encounter

Spinal cord injury (SCI), subseq encount



DXIs main effects for INJ_poisoning

Poison antibiotics anti-infect antiparas hormones exc insul hypoglyc Poisoning Isd unsp psychodysleptics Poisoning ace inhibitors Poisoning mercury Poisoning affecting cardiovascular Poisoning narcs psychodysl exc cannabis lsd unsp system except ace inhibitors psychodys Poisoning_agents_affecting_cardiovasc_ Poisoning_nonopioid_analgesics_antipyretics_ antirheumatics syst exc ace inhibitors Poisoning agents affect gastrointestinal Poisoning oth arthropods Poisoning agents affecting smooth and_skeletal_musc_and_resp_sys Poisoning oth gasses Poisoning_anesthetics_theraputic_gasses Poisoning_oth_household_chemicals Poisoning antiepileptic sedative hypnotic antiparkinsonism Poisoning oth metals Poisoning cannabis Poisoning pesticides Poisoning carbon monoxide Poisoning psychotropic drugs Poisoning contact marine animals Poisoning reptile and scorpion Poisoning contact_plant_or_oth_animals Poisoning seafood Poisoning diuretics Poisoning spider Poisoning drugs affect autonom Poisoning_systemic_hematological_agents nervous system Poisoning food except seafood Poisoning topical skin eye ent dental drugs Poisoning foreign body Poisoning toxic effects oth unsp

Poisoning unsp drugs

Paisoning insulin_hypoglycemic

Poisoning lead

BOSTON

DCG Model Coefficients

(K=4 using 24 out or 47 DXIs)

11 CCSR and 35 Diagnostic Items (DXIs) Arranged into 4 INJ Poisoning Diagnostic Cost Groups (DCG)




Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis: Validation Sample Measures of Alternative Specifications

| | | | | Rare disease mean error: |
|-----------------|--------|----------|-------------|------------------------------|
| | | Mean | | enrollee-year mean residual |
| | R- | absolute | Number of o | of people with any diagnosis |
| | Square | error | parameters | rarer than 100 per million |
| DCG: Base model | 0.535 | \$4,114 | 624 | -\$73 |

Panel A: Alternative Model

Structures

| Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI) | 0.227 | \$6,116 | 18+30=48 | \$3,055 |
|----------------------------------|-------|---------|------------|---------|
| HHS-HCC Marketplace using | | | | |
| hierarchies | 0.428 | \$5,227 | 136+30=166 | \$1,927 |
| CCSR additive model | 0.539 | \$4,140 | 567 | -\$114 |
| DXI+CCSR additive model | 0.589 | \$3,786 | 2,929 | -\$83 |
| Disease chapters additive model | 0.201 | \$6,226 | 52 | \$556 |

All models include 30 age*sex dummy variables

The CCI index has been used in 12,800 articles indexed in Google scholar since 2023, despite being a very weak predictor.

Physicians also rated DXIs by their Appropriateness to Include scores

- 0 => no concerns about using for payment
- 1 Trivial concerns ...
- 2 Minor concerns ...
- 3 Meaningful concerns ...
- 4 Serious concerns ...
- 5 Major concerns: avoid using for payment Later added
- 6 DXI/CCSR is too collinear with other DXIs



Figure 3: Percent Distribution of Appropriateness to Include (ATI) scores in DXI Main Effects and CCSRs




Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis: Validation Sample Measures of Alternative Specifications Panel B

| | | | | Rare disease mean error: |
|-----------------|--------|----------|-------------|------------------------------|
| | | Mean | | enrollee-year mean residual |
| | R- | absolute | Number of o | of people with any diagnosis |
| | Square | error | parameters | rarer than 100 per million |
| DCG: Base model | 0.535 | \$4,114 | 624 | -\$73 |

Panel B: Appropriateness to Include (ATI) Score

(0 = least gameability/vagueness concerns, 5 = most concerns)

| DCG: $ATI = 0$ | 0.469 | \$4,520 | 445 | \$610 |
|---------------------------|-------|---------|-----|--------|
| DCG: ATI < 2 | 0.503 | \$4,313 | 526 | \$296 |
| DCG: ATI < 3 | 0.526 | \$4,151 | 619 | -\$4 |
| DCG: ATI < 4 Base without | | | | |
| forcing monotonicity | 0.535 | \$4,113 | 661 | -\$71 |
| DCG: ATI < 5 | 0.536 | \$4,134 | 667 | -\$115 |
| DCG: ATI All Values | 0.539 | \$4,112 | 683 | -\$109 |

All models include 30 age*sex dummy variables



Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis: Validation Sample Measures of Alternative Specifications Panel C

| | | | | Rare disease mean error: |
|---------------------------------------|----------|--------------|------------|-----------------------------|
| | | | | enrollee-year mean |
| | | Mean | 1 | residual of people with any |
| | | absolute | Number of | diagnosis rarer than 100 |
| | R-Square | error | parameters | per million |
| DCG: Base model | 0.535 | \$4,114 | 624 | -\$73 |
| | | | | |
| Panel C: Alternative Informat | ion Sets | l | | |
| DCG: Including EXT, FAC chapters | 0.568 | \$3,910 | 710 | -\$139 |
| DCG: Allow negative/insignificant | | | | |
| coefficients | 0.534 | \$4,114 | 672 | -\$74 |
| DCG: No exclusions imposed within | | | | |
| hierarchies (DCC model) | 0.541 | \$4,071 | 687 | -\$87 |
| DCG: Single hierarchy for each chapte | er 0.495 | \$4,339 | 202 | -\$26 |
| DCG: Single hierarchy | 0.315 | \$5,031 | 28 | \$898 |
| DCG: Base model using only CCSR | | | | |
| variables | 0.461 | \$4,514 | 248 | \$212 |
| DCG: Base model using only DXI | | | | |
| variables | 0.524 | \$4,170 | 676 | \$22 |

Commitment to public posting of models and software

- DXI classification system and formulas posted on the web, linked at Ellis et al JAMA 2022 DXI article. (Open access)
- SAS software implementing DXI models (and eventually BU-DCG models) posted at http://tinyurl.com/DXI-Software
- DXI models have been successfully tested on Belgian and South Korean data!



Conclusions and Limitations

Limitations

- Do not currently used diagnostic modifier information
- More complex than existing HCC models
- Have not applied to additional populations (e.g. Medicaid and Medicare)

Contribution

We have developed a new Machine Learning algorithm that is

- Automated
- Readily interpreted
- Highly predictive
- Avoids negative predictions
- Resistant to upcoding
- Downweights vague and inappropriate diagnoses



Many possible extensions

- Better machine learning algorithms
- Use diagnostic modifiers and interactions
- Focus on insurance type (Medicaid, Medicare, Marketplace)
- Population subgroups children, women, racial groups
- Data from other countries
- Add in social drivers of health info
- Further examine measures of equity
- Develop prospective models, add dynamics, lags
- Empirical measures of gameability and vagueness
- Use for detecting fraud, errors, overpricing, technology choices
- Redo the analysis of 1000s of papers that used inferior risk adjustment models (HCC, Charleson, Elixhauser)
- Calibrate for diverse outcomes and performance measures
- Use for epidemiological work

Diagnostic Item (DXI) and Diagnostic Cost Group (DCG) Formulas for Healthcare Payment and Decision-making

Randall P Ellis, Corinne Andriola, Jeffrey J Siracuse, Alexander Hoagland, Tzu-Chun Kuo, Heather E Hsu, Allan Walkey, Karen E. Lasser, Arlene S Ash

Thank you!



Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee

Listening Session 3: Addressing Challenges Regarding Data, Benchmarking, and Risk Adjustment

Aneesh Chopra, MPP

President, CareJourney

PTAC Listening Session:

Addressing Challenges Regarding Data, Benchmarking, Risk Adjustment

Aneesh Chopra @aneeshchopra



Skating to the Puck, Converging on FHIR

PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR EXECUTION OF THE HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT PROGRAM

Draft, February 24, 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The \$19 billion health information technology (HIT) investment authorized in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) represents a landmark opportunity to improve health care. In considering how best to execute on this opportunity, it is critical to understand that to treat the HIT investment program as a pure technology implementation program is to effectively guarantee its failure. HIT is not magic. In the absence of provider payment reform and care delivery innovation, it is all too easy to imagine spending \$19 billion on HIT adoption and producing little tangible social benefit. However, there is a clear path to victory:


- If we avoid focusing the HIT investment program narrowly on HIT adoption and instead focus it explicitly on the actual improvement of population health, and
- If we use the HIT investment to catalyze a "virtuous cycle" of (1) provider payment reform, (2) care delivery innovation, and (3) HIT adoption
- Then: the HIT investment can literally transform health care as we know it.


"Low HIT adoption cripples the ability to pursue provider payment reform..."

- 1 Coverage (Benefits)
- 2 Clinical Data (Payment)
- **3** Bulk FHIR Networks
- 4 Price Transparency
- 5 Consumer Navigation



#1: SDOH Data Standards








#2: Clinical Data for VBC Payment

MARCH 05, 2024

Improving Cancer Care Through
Better Electronic Health Records:
Voluntary Commitments and Call
to Action


"Commitments to adopt the core EOM data elements...were made by Epic; Oracle; Ontada, a McKesson business; Meditech; Flatiron; and ThymeCare. CVS Health and Athenahealth are working to promote these steps in their work as well."



#3: TEFCA for Population Health

Health Care Operations (HCO) SubXP-1: means transactions for any of the following activities, under TEFCA Exchange, to the extent permitted by Applicable Law and the Common Agreement:

Conducting quality assessment and improvement activities, including outcomes evaluation and development of clinical guidelines, provided that the obtaining of generalizable knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies resulting from such activities; patient safety activities (as defined in 42 CFR 3.20); population-based activities relating to improving health or reducing health care costs, protocol development, case management and care coordination, contacting of health care. providers and patients with information about treatment alternatives; and related functions that do not include treatment.1




Veteran Interoperability Pledge

The Veteran Interoperability Pledge works toward developing a framework to allow VA and community providers to securely exchange information to assist in the care of Veterans receiving treatment inside and outside VA.

"With commitments to transfer vital information and records electronically between VA and signatory health systems, we also hope that this this pledge will make it seamless for our partner health systems to identify Veterans at the point of care," said VA Under Secretary for Health Dr. Shereef Elnahal. "That is inherently valuable for the Veteran receiving care, but it will also allow us to send helpful information to our partner health systems that they can then offer to Veterans in their care — to include information about new benefits we are offering under the PACT Act and other resources that assist with suicide prevention and identifying social risk factors"

- VA Under Secretary for Health, Dr. Shereef Elnahal



#4: Request Price (Bundle) Estimates

OMB Control Number [XXXX-XXXX] ExpirationDate [MM/DD/YYYY]

[NAME OF PROVIDER OR FACILITY]

Good Faith Estimate for Health Care Items and Services

| atient First N | lame | Middle Name | Last Name |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Opt | al Hip I | • | nent with Surgeries |
| SSPI | ct clarity s Beta Short ription | UPPORTED • Consumer-Fr | iendly |
| a | al Hip Replac geries | ement with Opti | ional Grafting |
| atient Prima | ry Diagnosis | Prim | nary Diagnosis Code |
| atient Secon | dary Diagnosis | Sec | ondary Diagnosis Code |

| Facility Fees | 27 Fees |
|---|-----------|
| Total Hip Replacement with Optional Grafting Surgeries | 27 |
| 100% Association Index | 27 |
| \$17818 Estimated Charge | • |
| Dynamic One-on-one Therapeutic Activity to Improve Functioning, 15 Minutes Each | 975 |
| 100% Association Index | 37. |
| \$490 Estimated Charge | , |
| Implantable Joint Device For Motion Restoration | Cr |
| 89% Association Index | HC |
| \$19119 Estimated Charge | HC. |
| Operating Room Services - General | 03 |
| 84% Association Index | Revenue C |
| \$20766 Estimated Charge | Revenue C |
| Medical/surgical Supplies and Devices (also See 062x, an Extension of 027x) - | |
| Other Implants | O |
| 82% Association Index | Revenue C |
| \$13596 Estimated Charge | |
| | |
| Professional Fees | 2 Fees |
| | 2 Fees |
| Professional Fees Total Hip Replacement with Optional Grafting Surgeries | |
| | 2 Fees |

"FHIR is already being used to support electronic data exchanges among providers, payers, and patients, and **may allow a consumer friendly AEOB** to be produced that could encourage important discussions between patients and their care teams regarding cost and value." –

Administrator Brooks-LaSure

#5: "Opt-In" for Navigation, Alignment

MARCH 08, 2024

FACT SHEET: Biden Cancer Moonshot Announces Commitments from Leading Health Insurers and Oncology Providers to Make Navigation Services Accessible to More than 150 Million Americans

Navigators are "opt-in" services that connect patients with community resources, care transition services, behavioral health support, identify appropriate providers for clinical care, and helps secure appointments, track health outcomes such as ER & urgent care visits, patient-reported outcomes, and other care quality and experience measures.

"...consumers have access to their own health data – and to the applications and services that can safely and accurately analyze it..." – President Obama (January 2015)



Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee

Listening Session 3: Addressing Challenges Regarding Data, Benchmarking, and Risk Adjustment

John Supra, MS

Chief Digital Health & Analytics Officer, Value-Based Care Institute, Cone Health


Pathways on the Value-Based Care Journey toward Open Data Exchange and Shared Analytics

John Supra

Chief Digital Health & Analytics Officer

Value-Based Care Institute, Cone Health

A Data Path to Value-Based Participation Where do I Start with Data & Analytics?



- Receive data from multiple sources, often new unfamiliar ones
- Report data back to various sources
- Engage with vendors selection, integration, and learning
- Understanding of terms and concepts related to value-based care and contracts

Quality Reporting Financial Reporting

Operational Reporting

Clinical Data Payor Data Program Data 3rd Party Data

A Data Path to Value-Based Participation Where do I Start with Data & Analytics?



- Receive data from multiple sources, often new unfamiliar ones
- Report data back to various sources
- Engage with vendors selection, integration, and learning
- Understanding of terms and concepts related to value-based care and contracts



Requires Artisan Craftsmanship

- Requires building expert skills and knowledge in a variety of data and analytics areas
 - Data types and methodologies not common in the practice of medicine and traditional FFS billing
- Demands investments that require significant upfront costs
- Develops a reliance on a single or patchwork of vendors (experts)



Unintended Consequences

Value-based contracting is intended to incentivize care improvement, but it is unlikely a clinician or practice can reasonably optimize against 50 or more measures at a time.

We found saturation of the quality measure environment as a possible explanation: average physicians were incentivized to meet 57.08 different quality measures annually.

Value-Based Contracting in Clinical Care

Claire Boone, PhD; Anna Zink, PhD; Bill J. Wright, PhD; Ari Robicsek, MD JAMA Health Forum. 2024;5(8):e242020. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2822685


Standardization – A Strong First Step

- Standard Data Models
 - United States Code Data for Interoperability (USCDI)
- Standard Data Exchange Specifications
 - Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR)
- Common Framework for Data Exchange
 - Trusted Exchange Framework and Common Agreement (TEFCA)



Data Services – A Good Second Step

- Meaningful Progress
 - Beneficiary Claims Data API (BCDA) https://bcda.cms.gov
 - 4 Innovation API (4i)
 https://developer.4innovation.cms.gov
 - Claims Data to Part D Sponsors (AB2D) https://ab2d.cms.gov
- Accelerate Access to Data
- Enable System-level Integration
- Still Require "Craftsmanship" to Leverage Benefits



Need for Health Data & Analytics Ecosystems



- Data Sharing Approaches Healthcare data exchange remains dominated by point-to-point (sharing of specific files). Shift toward enabling open, standards-based, secure frameworks to replace the point-to-point exchange
- Modernize –Use of modern technologies and cloud data platforms to reduce and eliminate the reliance on an ETL/ELT mindset
- Easy-Onboarding Reduce the burden and "ramp-up" on providers and ACOs to get engaged in value-based care programs and non-value-add duplicative efforts

CMS Innovation Center Key Takeaways

- Timing and Frequency Valued More Than Perfect Data
- Participant Heterogeneity
- Data-Sharing Heterogeneity
- Context is Key
- Learning Data System Needed
- Data As a Burden

Improving Participation in Value-Based Care—The CMS Innovation Center's Data-Sharing Strategy Initiative
William J. Gordon, Zoe Hruban, Velda McGhee, Todd Couts, Purva Rawal, Elizabeth Fowler
Health Affairs Forefront. August 21, 2024. https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/improving-participation-value-based-care-cms-innovation-center-s-data-sharing-strategy

Opportunities for Alignment

CMS Data Availability

- Accelerate the speed at which data is made available to VBC model participants
- Shift toward data-system-ready reporting
 - Shift CMS standard reporting to include data ingest formats
 - Availability of CMS standard reporting and data feeds as secure data shares

Open Model Metrics

- Require value-based care model metrics to have an open-source code to run over specific data sets, these may include operational proxies
- Facilitate and/or incentivize open-source data applications (tools) that leverage standard data models and sources