By almost any measuregeographic reach of the storm, population displaced, destruction of property, costs of disaster relief, and prospective costs of rebuildingthe effects of hurricanes Katrina and Rita represent the largest single natural disaster on U.S. soil in the past 100 years. The events also produced one of the largest disaster response efforts by nongovernmental, charitable organizations, including both faith-based and community organizations (FBCOs).
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Purpose and Methods
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To obtain detailed data on FBCOs contributions to relief efforts following hurricanes Katrina and Rita and learn how these groups might help in future disasters, the Urban Institute conducted a two-year study for the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The study included a telephone survey of 202 FBCOs that provided hurricane-related human services in the Gulf Coast region and in-depth, field-based case studies of eight organizations in Louisiana and Mississippi that provided such services.
The telephone survey offers quantitative data on the types of FBCOs that participated in relief and recovery efforts, the services provided, individuals served, and the monetary and human resources and networks and collaborations used to provide relief and recovery services. Information was collected between November 2007 and February 2008 from a stratified random sample of FBCOs in the Gulf Coast region. Of the 202 respondents, 120 self-identified as faith-based organizations and 82 as secular nonprofits. Most of those who identified as faith-based were religious congregations, though a small number (14) were professional human services providers.
The case studies used in-depth, field-based interviews with the leaders of the study organizations and others with whom they interacted or who may have influenced the assistance provided. Site visits were conducted between May and July 2008. The purpose of the case studies was to understand how eight organizations in different communities and with different purposes before the storms responded to the disaster. The case studies explored what motivated these organizations to respond as they did, how they related to the larger web of disaster responders, and whether the efforts of these generally smaller or nontraditional responders will be sustainable over time or replicable in future disasters. Because the cases selected involved relationships among many organizations, the studies illustrate a complex network of actors, including public and private agencies, and generally a melding of faith-based and secular organizations.
The study addresses five broad research questions: (1) what are the characteristics of FBCOs that provided disaster-related human services; (2) what services were provided, and to whom; (3) what resources (monetary, material, and human) were used to deliver services; (4) what networks facilitated the ability of FBCOs to deliver services; and (5) what lessons can be learned from these relief efforts?
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Major Findings from the Survey
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Characteristics of the FBCOs
- FBCOs responding to the survey represented a wide range of local organizations. Some had operating budgets of less than $500; others more than $1 million. Faith-based organizations that responded to the survey were considerably older (median age 55 years) than secular nonprofits (25 years).
- Half the FBCOs in the survey used paid staff to deliver relief and recovery services, but the number of paid staff was relatively small (median of five). More than three-quarters of FBCOs used volunteers, with the median number of volunteers around 20. For most FBCOs in the survey, the volunteer workforce increased substantially after the hurricanes.
- Two-thirds of the FBCOs surveyed had no prior experience giving disaster relief assistance after a hurricane. This was especially true of secular nonprofits and those located a greater distance from the direct impact of the storms.
Types of Services
- Roughly 70 percent of survey respondents provided immediate relief services, such as food, water, clothing, and temporary shelter. A large proportion of faith-based groups, predominantly congregations, provided these services, as did FBCOs in geographic locations outside the storms direct impact.
- In contrast, fewer FBCOs provided long-term recovery services, such as housing rehabilitation, mental health counseling, or job training. Less than half the respondents indicated involvement in any of these services, and less than 25 percent provided child care or job training. The notable exception is in housing rehabilitation: nearly 60 percent of congregations in the survey engaged in sustained housing rehabilitation. Secular nonprofits tended to provide relief and recovery services for a longer period than faith-based organizations. Again, with the exception of housing rehabilitation services, faith-based organizations tended to end their services within three months after the storm, whereas secular nonprofits were more likely to stay for a year or more.
People Served
- Records were not often kept on the number of clients served during the crisis, so survey respondents provided a rough estimate of the number of individuals helped. About a quarter of respondents reported serving fewer than 50 people, while almost a fifth reported serving more than 1,000. These numbers could represent multiple visits by the same individual, as might be characteristic for some emergency services.
- Providing demographic information on people served is even more difficult than providing numeric counts. Nearly a third of survey respondents declined to provide even an estimate. Of those who did, recipients were most frequently described as low-income and families with children.
Funding Relief/Recovery Services
- Estimating the amount of money spent on relief and recovery services was difficult. More than a third of survey respondents could not tell us an amount, in part because they did not keep records. Of those respondents that provided information, the median budget for relief/recovery work was $6,667.
- For most respondents, donations from individuals were the most common source of financial support. Faith-based organizations were more likely than secular nonprofits to receive individual donations. In contrast, secular nonprofits were about three to four times more likely than faith-based groups to have received financial support from government.
Networks and Collaborations
- Two of every three respondents worked with other groups to provide post-hurricane services. Nearly half reported that the collaborations were new, and another fifth reported a combination of new and old relationships. Most collaborations involved sharing resources such as space, equipment, and supplies.
- Relatively few respondents worked with state and local governments; however, secular nonprofits were twice as likely as faith-based groups to do so (23 percent versus 10 percent). Only about 7 percent of FBCOs worked with federal agencies. Faith-based organizations, mostly congregations, were most likely to work with other faith-based groups, while nonprofits were most likely to work with other nonprofits.
Perceptions of the Relief/Recovery Effort
- Perceptions of what went well in providing services after the storms differed by type of organization. Most faith-based respondents cited the people who were helped, while secular nonprofits pointed to the collaborations.
- Among the most common challenges mentioned were insufficient supplies and services, poor communication, and poor service coordination.
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Major Findings from the Case Studies
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Characteristics of Case Study Organizations
- Although half the case study organizations were secular and half were faith based, their collaborations represent a mix of faith-based and secular organizations. While religious faith may have provided a personal motivation for some organizations leaders, staff, or volunteers, the reasons for involvement were often indistinguishable between religious and secular organizations.
- Disaster responses in the case studies appear often to owe as much to chance as to deliberate planning. With one exception, none of the organizations studied had previously engaged in disaster response planning, and they made decisions in response to challenges created by the storms.
Catalysts for Response
- The magnitude of the disaster was the primary reason that FBCOs studied responded, and raises the question of who and how many would respond in future disasters. The level of devastation, the influx of evacuees to communities along the exit routes, and the inundation of cash, material donations, and volunteers both inspired engagement and demanded management and coordination (e.g., to sort, store, and distribute goods and to house, feed, triage, or supervise volunteers) on a level never before needed. Chance rather than prior disaster experience or preconceived plan explained the direction that the responses often took.
- The storms magnitude also focused attention on the personal and social dimensions of the disaster, including permanent loss of housing, widespread family dislocation and emotional trauma, and the particular vulnerabilities of low-income minority populations, issues not addressed in depth or at all in previous disasters. For many, these factors would worsen over time. The storms and flooding also created a vacuum in the human service delivery system and a serious challenge to serving the swelling numbers who needed assistance with resources already strained before the disaster.
- Traditional models for disaster response were severely challenged, overwhelmed, or dysfunctional, motivating newcomers to disaster response to try to help, and spawning new approaches to both relief and recovery. Traditional responders did not have the trained staff, resources, or protocols to provide more than limited assistance, and they were frequently ill prepared for the long-term need for shelter or the extent of psychological trauma in wide portions of the population.
Mechanics of Response
- Case study organizations together provided emergency aid, donations management, volunteer housing and coordination, case management, and direct human services; most provided some aspect of almost all these services. All the organizations used both paid staff and volunteers in their relief work. Seven of the eight organizations were supported by some public funding.
- Finding and maintaining staff was a challenge for some organizations studied. The order for total evacuation meant that public employees who were not exempt would be unavailable in the critical first days after the storms; even first responders might be unavailable if their families had not been provided for through pre-arranged plans. Several organizations in New Orleans reported losing a majority of their staff because housing and basic infrastructure in the city had not returned.
- Volunteers were important to the disaster response but could also create challenges, including the need for housing, feeding, careful supervision, and debriefing, as well as liability concerns. FBCOs using outside volunteer professionals, such as physicians and nurses, had no way, beyond basic licensing, of evaluating their quality or competence. Volunteers might come with truckloads of goods but had no place to stay and little money. As demucking of houses was completed, it became hard to match volunteer skills with tasks required for rebuilding. Some respondents suggested that some other FBCOs were in over their heads (for example, taking on shelters or feeding responsibilities with inadequate experience or resources) or less able to integrate their work with other relief efforts under way.
- The inability to communicate readily created a major challenge to locating staff, congregants, volunteers, and partners to restart operations. Some FBCOs studied developed creative ways to use the Internet, including organizations own web sites, email networks, and official government sites, to generate large responses from social and professional networks and the general public, and to match organizational needs with volunteer skills and interest. One FBCO set up a 211 information number outside the impact area to help hurricane victims find services they had used in New Orleans. Another equipped a van with satellite communications to bring help to devastated areas and allow hurricane victims and first responders to communicate their whereabouts to others.
- Leaders in several case study organizations illustrated attributes of particular value in the crisis. Leaders were often high-energy people able to donate large amounts of time, sometimes pro bono, in part because their own lives had not returned to normal. Several brought expertise, such as in management, housing operations, logistics training, or human service delivery, and in working in stressful circumstances. Others used connections to community and political institutions to catalyze funding and craft services based on unique understandings of services and populations. Because this disaster presented new and larger issues than experienced in the past, leaders had to learn to change approaches as populations and needs changed over time. Several leaders of case study organizations seemed to understand the limits of their expertise and connected with others in the area to broaden their services and skill sets.
- Familiarity with local areas and perceived legitimacy were keys to overcoming distrust of severely traumatized individuals. Traditional responders were often unfamiliar with local conditions and local facilities and services, and any knowledge gained on the ground was lost as new teams were rotated in.
- All the cases studied involved inter-organizational collaboration, some formal partnerships and others in which assistance was episodic or informal as needed. Several FBCOs studied connected with local, state, or federal agencies. These relationships were based more on social and professional networks than on support from formal hierarchical affiliations. These relationships created access to restricted areas, access to rebuilding assistance, sharing of facilities or resources, and access to financial help or professional expertise.
Accountability and Equity
- Accountability for handling funds, distributing other resources, identifying needed services, and ensuring that they are delivered to those in need can be problematic in an emergency. There is clearly a trade-off between accountability and flexibility in the context of an emergency. Oversight of the emergency response sometimes took a back seat because of the magnitude of need and to allow for more flexibility in the delivery of assistance. Only two organizations studied were held explicitly accountable for the populations they were serving. In three sites, the principal reason for working outside formal long-term recovery structures was the ability to help more people without the burden of red tape and bureaucracy.
- The lack of guidelines and specificity for designated use of funds, populations served, standards about what constituted need, or service units raises questions about equitable treatment among service recipients. While income and other assistance received was typically a part of the review in a long-term recovery committee structure, some in the field complained about the lack of transparency in needs assessments. In cases that were not part of a formal case management framework, chance and informal contacts often determined allocation of assistance. How evacuees sorted themselves or were triaged to different congregations for assistance is unknown.
Life Cycles and Sustainability
- As time passes, funding diminishes, and the needs of those served before the storm come back into focus, many FBCOs return to their original mission despite continuing needs related to the 2005 hurricanes. Three FBCOs studied that did not previously have a disaster response mission have returned to their original functions, but each is likely to retain the internal capacity to respond to future disasters.
Connections to Traditional Disaster Relief and Human Services Systems
- Except for the two FBCOs that were part of the formal response system, connections to traditional response or human service systems were rare or nonexistent among the studied sites. Two sites declined invitations to participate in long-term recovery structures or resigned after a short time, viewing these structures as too slow and burdened by red tape, or potentially inequitable. Some officials interviewed who were responsible for the areas emergency response plans were focusing on how to incorporate local FBCOs into their plans, though the specifics were not always clear.
- Among those FBCOs that provided emergency assistance, cross-communication was often minimal, especially for coordinating volunteers and distributing donations. This lack of communication could create duplication of services and oversupplies of certain types of donations.
- The Red Cross and FEMA were perceived as overwhelmed by the magnitude of the storm, the duration of needed assistance, and the nature of need. FEMA was criticized for its slow, rigid bureaucracy and the absence of a strategy to provide needed social services as a part of the provision of emergency housing. The use of rotating teams of those unfamiliar with the local area and unable to make meaningful referrals was also criticized.
- Despite the massive need for health and social services, FBCOs that did not typically provide social services did not usually connect to the larger human services system. FBCOs post-hurricane contacts were more likely to be the result of efforts connected to long-term recovery structures, chance, or the doggedness of individual staff to locate services. Vulnerable populations often have an array of preexisting challenges, which are exacerbated by the trauma of evacuation and dislocation and the breaking of essential family and social networks that are difficult, if not impossible, to reestablish. Without attention to the full dimensions of psychological trauma, there was greater potential for persistent dysfunction and inability to resettle successfully.
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Lessons Learned
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Many organizations that are not traditional disaster responders, including small community-based social service providers and local congregations, played important roles in the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Several lessons can be drawn from the telephone survey and the case studies about what roles such organizations might play in future disasters.
- Those preparing emergency preparedness plans need to better understand the availability and capability of FBCOs. Recent federal recommendations[1] recognize the importance of including FBCOs in emergency planning and delivery of human services. Simply being able to identify who is left after a disaster, what their needs are, and who might provide assistance is critical to a response effort. The majority of survey respondents provided assistance; how many other organizations were unavailable because they were wiped out by the storm is unknown. Incorporating an inventory of local FBCOs and their contact information into disaster plans would be helpful. Ideally, the nature of their facilities, their capabilities, and prior experience would be included in the plan.
- Recovery services after a disaster of this magnitude extend far beyond the traditional boundaries of emergency relief. Longer-term recovery activities in a traditional disaster response model are largely focused on physical rebuilding and dependent on a limited circle of organizations providing aid. These traditional models are not well equipped to deal with deep and sustained injuries of disaster victims, both physical and psychological, and they are not well connected to the broader universe of expertise and service delivery that might provide appropriate and sustained interventions. Lists of potential governmental and private providers, as well as regional and national experts who specialize in trauma and vulnerable populations, could help local areas tap into that expertise after a disaster.
- Many FBCOs involved in long-term recovery appreciate the need to coordinate activities, as evidenced by new attention to data-sharing mechanisms among some traditional responders. The case studies suggest the critical need for coordination among a wider array of providers, including federal, state, and local agencies; experts in various specialized interventions; and private donors whose contributions may be critical to success.
- Major disasters generate major humanitarian responses, which sometimes include those with the best intentions but uneven capabilities. The case studies suggest the importance of seeking out the best performersthose with proven track records in addressing complex or challenging needs, the ability to work with the populations affected, and the ability to integrate their work with others. Those who are not sufficiently experienced, not culturally competent, or cannot recognize appropriate ways to coordinate their services with others are likely to be less successful in their relief efforts or create problems for others trying to give assistance.
- Soliciting and managing cash and material donations as well as volunteers is a key to effective disaster response. Some FBCOs studied learned to use the Internet to disseminate real-time information, reach out for help, solicit and vet volunteers, share databases, and establish 211 directories to identify resources. Government and FBCOs might devise ways to work together to set up web sites to serve as clearinghouses, manage solicitations, and allocate resources, including donations, volunteers, and emergency services.
- How FBCOs will respond in the future will likely depend on the magnitude of the disaster and the extent of damage they sustain to their own operations. Many that were new to disaster response learned how to perform effectively after the 2005 hurricanes. It would be valuable to incorporate those experiences into disaster preparedness planning, including how to increase flexibility for traditional disaster responders. The fact that social and professional connections were so important to case study organizations reinforces the need to nurture connections, perhaps through strategic conferencing and other methods, to create awareness of how to tap connections before disaster strikes.
The Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005 have put a new lens on the limits of understanding among researchers and policymakers of the breadth and depth of a major disasters effects. More work remains to understand the effects of the disaster and the most effective ways to provide immediate and long-term assistance. Collecting and reexamining data on the effects of the storms, particularly on the most vulnerable populations, and incorporating these lessons into planning for future disaster responses is clearly important. Data sharing among organizations, such as FEMA, that have detailed information on hurricane victims could be used to provide follow-up services for people who still need help. These data could also be used to support needed evidence-based research on the effects of the storms and outcomes of sustained treatment, particularly mental health services, for individuals who are the victims of major disasters. The data could also provide needed evidence for proposed changes in disaster response planning.
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