While the designated CLASS Plan is operational, solvency or legal problems may prevent the CLASS Program from continuing to implement the plan. The Secretary might determine that the CLASS plan could no longer be reasonably expected to remain solvent, even if she were to make statutorily authorized changes to the plan, or a court might conclude that the designated CLASS Benefit Plan violates the CLASS Act. In those circumstances, there is substantial uncertainty about both what the Secretary would have authority to do and what a court would require. If such a circumstance occurred, there is a risk that the CLASS program would have to be entirely shut down, rather than simply closed to future enrollment, and then-existing enrollees or eligible beneficiaries would have no opportunity to receive the anticipated benefits, although it is possible--though by no means guaranteed--that they may be able to recoup some portion of their paid premiums.
The Secretary and the statutorily created Board of Trustees for the CLASS Independence Fund have a continuing obligation to monitor and take steps to ensure the solvency of the program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ll-2(b)(1)(B), 300ll-5(a)(2), 300ll-7(a), 300ll-7(d)(5). Based on actual take-up or claims rates, rather than the ones that were originally assumed when the program was developed and tested for solvency, the Secretary and the Board might conclude that the program will become insolvent and the reasonable premium increases or other means authorized by the statute are inadequate to avoid insolvency. The statute requires the Secretary and the Board to submit annual reports to Congress on the CLASS program and fund, and to recommend legislative action as they deem to be appropriate. Id. §§ 300ll-5(a)(2)(C), 300ll-7(d)(5). For the Board of Trustees, the statute expressly provides that it should recommend legislative action, including whether to adjust monthly premiums or impose a temporary moratorium on new enrollments. Id. § 300ll-5(c)(2)(C). There are no guarantees, however, that Congress will enact any legislative changes necessary to ensure program solvency. Absent any necessary legislative changes, the Secretary might conclude that it is necessary to close down, at least in part, the then-operational plan.
The Secretary might also reach that conclusion because of a court decision. If a court concluded that the designated plan violated the statute, a court might order a range of remedies, from simply invalidating specific elements found to violate the statute to shutting down the entire program. The remedy required will depend in significant part on the nature and extent of the violation. Even if a court only invalidated specific features, such as the heightened minimum earnings requirement or the phased enrollment process, and did not order closure of the CLASS program, the Secretary might nonetheless conclude that there is no statutorily authorized manner in which the CLASS program could proceed and remain solvent.
Under any of these circumstances, the Secretary might prefer to close the CLASS program to future enrollment while leaving the existing program intact, insofar as it already has enrollees or beneficiaries and could remain solvent. This preference might be motivated by a concern that wholesale closure of the program could leave enrollees or beneficiaries worse off than they would have been had they never enrolled in the CLASS program. In particular, enrollees who would have bought private long-term care insurance in the absence of the CLASS plan might no longer be unable to purchase such insurance after the CLASS program terminates because of health conditions that developed after they had enrolled in the CLASS program, or because their more advanced age at termination may make the premiums that they would now have to pay for private insurance unaffordable. Yet whether the Secretary would be permitted by a court, or has the independent authority to choose, to close the CLASS program only for new enrollments is not clear.
The CLASS Act itself does not define the scope of the Secretarys authority in this context. It specifies only that she must submit an annual report to Congress and include [r]ecommendations for such administrative or legislative action as the Secretary determines is necessary to . . . ensure the solvency of the program. Id. § 300ll-7(d)(5). It is true that the statute has a general provision requiring the Secretary to promulgate such regulations as are necessary to carry out the CLASS program in accordance with this title. Id. § 300ll-7(d)(5). We think that that authority may reasonably be interpreted to include shutting down the program, if the program cannot be made solvent through statutorily authorized changes. It is less clear whether that provision would authorize the Secretary to keep the program operational for existing enrollees or beneficiaries while imposing a moratorium on future enrollments. The statutes express reference to that option as legislative action that the Board of Trustees should recommend, if appropriate, could support the view that continued operation of the program, with the moratorium, requires legislative action.15 In any event, as stated above, the Secretarys authority to allow the continued operation of the program for individuals already enrolled, or in beneficiary status, at the time of the decision would likely depend in part on the features of the program.
Beyond the CLASS Act, other relevant sources also do not illuminate what the Secretary may do, or may be required to do. On the one hand, an argument can be made that, insofar as the government contracts to provide individuals with benefits in exchange for premium payments, it may not unilaterally repeal the contract. On this view, although the CLASS program could halt future enrollment, it would have to honor its contract with enrollees, or at least active beneficiaries, to provide benefits. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), provides some support for this view. There, after Congress enacted the Economy Act, the relevant section of which provided that all laws granting or pertaining to yearly renewable term insurance are hereby repealed, beneficiaries of war risk insurance policies challenged the United States refusal to pay out on their policies. Id. at 575 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 717). The United States responded by claiming that, through the Economy Act provision, it had withdrawn its consent to suit for claims relating to the insurance policies. Id. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the United States argument, holding instead that the Economy Act repealed laws establishing or governing insurance policies, not laws waiving sovereign immunity for the purpose of making claims under those policies that were otherwise authorized. Id. at 585. In reaching its decision, the Court stated in dicta that Congress [is] without power to reduce expenditures by abrogating contractual obligations of the United States. To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen government expenditure, would be not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation. Id. at 580.
On the other hand, an argument can also be advanced that the CLASS program may be closed in its entirety. Courts have broad remedial powers and may shut down programs that lack statutory authority. The less the CLASS plan resembles the plan envisioned by the statute, the more reasonable it would be for a court to order the plan shut down in its entirety. Lynch, moreover, does not address whether the government must continue to honor its obligations under an insurance program; it simply interpreted the Economy Act to address the question of sovereign immunity. Even if a court were to conclude that the government was obliged, in some way, to honor its contractual obligations, the court could use its equitable power not to force the program to remain in operation for existing enrollees and beneficiaries, but instead to order the distribution of, or direct the Secretary to distribute, the amounts held in the CLASS Independence Fund among enrollees, beneficiaries, and any other relevant parties. This possibility is heightened by the statutes express prohibition on the use of any federal funds from a source other than premiums to pay for benefits.
The CLASS program, if implemented, might be required to disclose these uncertainties to potential enrollees. Although such disclosures might make marketing the program more challenging and impair the chances that any of the potential plans would be solvent, the disclosures would dispel any claims that the CLASS program had misled the public or had encouraged reliance on its program under false pretenses.
Accordingly, we conclude that there is substantial uncertainty about what would follow if solvency or legal problems prevented the CLASS program, once operational, from continuing to implement the plan. We cannot with any confidence predict that the CLASS program would be able to honor its commitments to individuals who had already enrolled or entered beneficiary status in the program, or avoid leaving them worse off, or that such individuals would be able to recoup their paid premiums.