Long-Term Effects of the Minnesota Family Investment Program on Marriage and Divorce Among Two-Parent Families. Key Findings on the Effects of MFIP on Marriage and Divorce During a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period

06/01/2003

The effects of MFIP on marriage and divorce during a seven-year follow-up period, using marriage certificate records data and publicly available divorce records data, are presented in Tables 1 to 5 and Figures 1 to 6.(13) Effects of MFIP on marriage and divorce, as measured by differences between families in the program group and families in the control group, are shown for the total sample of two-parent recipient families and two-parent applicant families. Effects are presented according to marital status at the time of study entry for recipient families and then applicant families, and by various other subgroups according to characteristics of the families at the time of study entry; those characteristics include race/ethnicity, number of children in the family, age of youngest child in the family, and prior welfare and employment history.

Note that for those who were married at baseline, the primary outcome examined is the program's impact on their likelihood of divorcing during the follow-up period. However, for those who were cohabiting at baseline, we are interested in both the likelihood of marriage and in the likelihood of subsequent divorce. We present the program's impacts on marriage from two different perspectives. One is to estimate the couple's likelihood of ever marrying during the follow-up period, a proportion that cumulates over time as more marriages are observed. The second is to estimate the couple's likelihood of being married at a given point in time, particularly the end of the follow-up period. When estimating the percentage who are married at a point in time, couples are not counted as "married" in the time period after a divorce has been observed. Thus, the program's impact on cohabiters' likelihood of ever marrying may differ from its impact on the percentage who are married at the end of the follow-up period.

Effects on two-parent recipient families overall

  • MFIP decreased divorce by 3.5 percentage points, or by about 25 percent, seven years after study entry, indicating a lasting reduction in divorce.

Table 1 shows that 13.8 percent of AFDC recipient families had a finalized divorce by the seven-year follow-up point, compared with 10.4 percent of MFIP recipient families, a 3.5 percentage point difference, or a 25 percent reduction. These findings confirm that MFIP's effects on divorce held up for the full sample of two-parent recipient families. That is, effects were not limited to the 36-month follow-up survey sample of 290 families.(14) In addition, the effects have lasted well beyond the time period covered in the final evaluation report. Note that because virtually no couples who divorced were remarried to one another by the end of the follow-up period, any differences between the impacts on divorce in Tables 1 and 2 are caused by a drop in the sample that had the seven full years of follow-up required for the point-in-time estimates presented in Table 2.

Table 1.
Effects on Marriage and Divorce for Two-Parent Families
over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period
  Sample Size Ever Divorced (%) Ever Married (%)
MFIP AFDC Impacta Percentage Change MFIP AFDC Impacta Percentage Change
Recipient familiesb 1,515 10.4 13.8 -3.5** -25.0  
   Married at baseline 1,043 13.8 16.8 -2.9 -17.5 { Not applicable }
   Cohabiting at baseline 472 2.7 8.0 -5.3** -66.2 20.6 20.8 -0.3 -1.3
Applicant familiesc 731 21.0 18.8 2.2 11.7  
   Married at baseline 577 25.0 23.5 1.5 6.3 { Not applicable }
   Cohabiting at baseline 154 6.7 3.5 3.1 89.9 23.4 16.8 6.6 39.1
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using public divorce and marriage certificate records from the state of Minnesota.
NOTES: The sample includes members randomly assigned from April 1, 1994 to March 31, 1996, excluding the small percentage who were receiving or applying only for food stamps at random assignment. Approximately 96 percent of two-parent recipient families were randomly assigned from April 1994 to March 1995.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to regression-adjusted impact estimates. Statistical significance levels are indicated as ***= 1 percent; **= 5 percent; *= 10 percent.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in sums and differences.
a The difference is the impact of the financial incentives, mandatory services, reinforced incentive messages, and elimination of the 100-hour rule and work history requirement.
b Recipients have an average of 7.3 years of follow-up for marriage and an average of 6.9 years for divorce.
cApplicants have an average of 7.0 years of follow-up for marriage and an average of 6.7 years for divorce.
Table 2
Effects on Marriage and Divorce Status for Two-Parent Families
at the End of the Follow-Up Period
  Sample Size Divorced at End of Year 7 (%) Married at End of Year 7 (%)
MFIP AFDC Impacta Percentage Change MFIP AFDC Impacta Percentage Change
Recipient families 1,235 9.1 12.9 -3.8** -29.5  
   Married at baseline 852 12.1 16.8 -4.6** -27.7 { Not applicable }
   Cohabiting at baseline 383 2.4 4.6 -2.2 -48.0 20.4 15.9 4.5 28.2
  Divorced at End of Year 6 (%) Married at End of Year 6 (%)
Applicant families 696 19.0 15.8 3.3 20.6  
   Married at baseline 548 23.2 19.2 3.9 20.5 { Not applicable }
   Cohabiting at baseline 148 4.9 4.3 0.6 15.1 21.5 15.0 6.6 44.0
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using public divorce and marriage certificate records from the state of Minnesota.
NOTES: The sample includes members randomly assigned from April 1, 1994 to March 31, 1996, excluding the small percentage who were receiving or applying only for food stamps at random assignment. Approximately 96 percent of two-parent recipient families were randomly assigned from April 1994 to March 1995.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to regression-adjusted impact estimates. Statistical significance levels are indicated as ***= 1 percent; **= 5 percent; *= 10 percent.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in sums and differences.
Because of the long intake period, this table excludes recipients who did not have data for seven full years and applicants who did not have data for six full years.
a The difference is the impact of the financial incentives, mandatory services, reinforced incentive messages, and elimination of the 100-hour rule and work history requirement.
  • MFIP's effects on divorce primarily occurred late in the follow-up period, even after June 1998, when the MFIP pilot study ended and a statewide MFIP program was in place.

Figure 1 shows that rates of finalized divorces in MFIP families were lower from month 26 to month 50, and from month 60 to month 83, compared with the same rates for AFDC families, with these differences being significant in the sixth and seventh year of the follow-up (see Appendix Table 2). Figure 2 further shows that reductions in the rates of finalized divorces primarily occurred after June 1998, when the MFIP pilot ended and a statewide MFIP program was in place.(15) After June 1998, all two-parent families in the pilot MFIP evaluation were subject to the benefits and requirements of the new statewide MFIP program.(16)

Figure 1.
Cumulative Percent Ever Divorced for Two-Parent Recipient Families
over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period

Cumulative Percent Ever Divorced for Two-Parent Recipient Families over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period

Figure 2.
Cumulative Percent Ever Divorced for Two-Parent Recipient Families in Calendar Months:
Comparing Pre-June 1998 and Post-June 1998, When the Pilot Study Ended and MFIP-S Was Implemented

Cumulative Percent Ever Divorced for Two-Parent Recipient Families in Calendar Months: Comparing Pre-June 1998 and Post-June 1998, When the Pilot Study Ended and MFIP-S Was Implemented

Given that the MFIP pilot program ended in 1998, how could it have such prolonged effects? Although few previous evaluations have found impacts on marriage, one might expect that MFIP and AFDC families would look similar four years after the end of the pilot; an analogy to this situation would be the common occurrence of control group catch-up in employment impacts, in which a control group experiences the same effects as a program group after the program group no longer receives a given intervention. The complication in this example is that both groups in the pilot program were subjected to the benefits and requirements of a new program, MFIP-S (Minnesota's current welfare reform program).

There are a number of possible explanations for the persistence of the impacts. First, the pilot program (with its streamlined eligibility rules, generous earnings disregard, and consolidation and cashing out of welfare benefits) could have prompted a permanent change in two-parent recipient families that set them on a different path. Second, statewide MFIP  with relatively less generous benefits than the original MFIP  may not have provided an environment that allowed AFDC families to stabilize or increase marriage rates. Third, even if statewide MFIP has the potential to affect two-parent families positively, it may be that timing matters, and that it was too late for the marriages of AFDC families in the pilot program to be significantly affected by the changes instigated by the statewide program. Fourth, many of the two-parent recipient families may have left welfare after four years or more, limiting the possibility for the statewide program to have any effects. Some of these possibilities will be investigated in future work examining the long-term economic impacts of the program.

It is likely that the persistence of effects was caused by some combination of all of these factors. Furthermore, because one would expect some control group catch-up to occur after June 1998, it may be that the current estimates on divorce are a lower bound of what may have happened had statewide MFIP not been implemented: Movement of the control group into the statewide MFIP program may have decreased the differences that would have occurred had the treatment difference continued indefinitely.

  • MFIP particularly reduced rates of divorce among families whose youngest child, at study entry, was less than 6 years old.

Table 3 presents MFIP's effects on divorce for two-parent recipient families over a seven-year follow-up, for various subgroups. The first panel of Table 3 shows the effects of MFIP on divorce by the number of children in the recipient family. One hypothesis is that if MFIP's streamlined eligibility rules (e.g., the elimination of the 100-hour rule) were an important policy component driving MFIP's effects on marital behavior, we should see larger reductions in divorce for large families than small families. Under the 100-hour rule, large families  who may have found it difficult to make enough income working part-time in a low-wage job  have a larger incentive than small families to divorce in order to maintain welfare eligibility while working more than 100 hours per month. MFIP's effects on divorce were slightly more pronounced for families that had three or more children at study entry, reducing divorce from 12.3 percent for AFDC families to 7.0 percent for MFIP families. However, effects on divorce for families with three or more children were not significantly different from effects on divorce for families with less than three children, weakening the evidence that streamlined eligibility rules were primarily responsible for MFIP's impacts.(17)

The second panel of Table 3 shows that recipient families in MFIP who had a young child at study entry, were less likely to divorce compared with their AFDC counterparts, by 5.0 percentage points, or 35 percent. In contrast, MFIP had no effect on divorce for families who, at study entry, had a child aged 6 or older.

Table 3.
Effects on Divorce for Two-Parent Recipient Families
over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period, by Subgroup
  Ever Divorced (%)
Sample Size MFIP AFDC Impacta Percentage Change P-Value for Subgroup Differences
All recipient families 1,515 10.4 13.8 -3.5** -25.0  
Number of children 0.52
   Fewer than 3 children 789 12.4 15.5 -3.1 -20.0  
   3 or more children 699 7.0 12.3 -5.2** -42.8  
Age of youngest child 0.10
   Less than 6 years old 1,152 9.4 14.4 -5.0*** -34.7  
   6 years old or older 336 13.2 11.2 2.0 17.8  
Race/Ethnicity 0.10
   White, non-Hispanic 895 14.0 16.1 -2.1 -13.1  
   Black, non-Hispanic 243 6.8 16.7 -9.9** -59.4  
   Asian/Pacific Islander 239 6.1 5.1 1.0 19.7  
   Otherb 125 3.7 15.4 -11.7* -76.1  
Employment 1 year prior to study entry 0.84
   One parent employed 544 11.2 14.5 -3.4 -23.1  
   Both parents employed 450 14.5 20.3 -5.9 -28.9  
   No parent employed 521 5.5 9.0 -3.5 -39.3  
Welfare receipt prior to study entry 0.41
   Less than 2 years 518 13.0 14.4 -1.4 -9.9  
   2 years to 5 years 455 7.6 14.6 -7.0** -48.0  
   More than 5 years 526 10.1 13.3 -3.1 -23.7  
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using public divorce and marriage certificate records from the state of Minnesota.
NOTES: The sample includes members randomly assigned from April 1, 1994 to March 31, 1996, excluding the small percentage who were receiving or applying only for food stamps at random assignment.
Approximately 96 percent of two-parent recipient families were randomly assigned from April 1994 to March 1995.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to regression-adjusted impact estimates. Statistical significance levels are indicated as ***= 1 percent; **= 5 percent; * =10 percent.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in sums and differences.
Information at baseline on some subgroup characteristics was missing for some sample members. Therefore, the average impact across subgroups does not always replicate the impact for all recipients.

a The difference is the impact of the financial incentives, mandatory services, reinforced incentive messages, and elimination of the 100-hour rule and work history requirement.
b Hispanic, American Indian, and Alaskan.
  • MFIP reduced rates of divorce among black recipient families by 59 percent by the end of the seven-year follow-up period.

Nearly 60 percent of recipient families identify themselves as white, non-Hispanic; 16 percent as black, non-Hispanic; 16 percent as Asian/Pacific Islander; and about 10 percent as other ethnicities. Table 3 shows that 16.7 percent of black AFDC families had a finalized divorce compared with 6.8 percent of black MFIP families over the seven-year follow-up period, a 9.9 percentage point, or 59 percent, reduction. Though the sample is small, rates of divorce were also significantly reduced for the combined group of Hispanic, American Indian, and Alaskan families; in this group, 15.4 percent of AFDC recipient families divorced, compared with 3.7 percent of MFIP recipient families. There were no impacts on rates of finalized divorces among white, non-Hispanic and Asian/Pacific Islander AFDC and MFIP recipient families.

Effects on married two-parent recipient families

  • MFIP somewhat increased marital stability, by decreasing divorce among two-parent recipients who were married at study entry.

Table 1 shows that approximately 17 percent of AFDC families who were married at study entry were divorced by the seven-year follow-up point, compared with 14 percent of MFIP families. Figure 3 shows that rates of finalized divorce during the seven-year follow-up period were generally lower for MFIP families than for AFDC families, with significant reductions occurring during the seventh year (see Appendix Table 2).

Figure 3.
Cumulative Percent Ever Divorced for Two-Parent Recipient Families Who Were Married
at Baseline, over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period

Figure 3. Cumulative Percent Ever Divorced for Two-Parent Recipient Families Who Were Married at Baseline, over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period.

  • MFIP's effects on marital stability were most pronounced among black recipient families, reducing rates of divorce among black married couples by over 70 percent. Effects on marital stability did not vary by family size, prior marital status, prior employment history, or prior welfare history of the family.

Table 4 expands on the analyses presented in Table 3, examining MFIP's effects on finalized divorces over a seven-year follow-up period across subgroups (those with adequate sample sizes), for two-parent recipients who were married at study entry. The variation in divorce rates for members of the control group provides helpful context for interpreting the program's impacts on divorce for these subgroups. In particular, within the control group, the rate of divorce over the seven-year follow-up was substantially higher for families who were black, non-Hispanic compared with whites or Asian/Pacific Islanders. MFIP particularly increased marital stability for this group. Table 4 shows that 28.2 percent of black married AFDC families ever divorced during the follow-up period, compared with 7.8 percent of black married MFIP families, for a 21 percentage point, or 73 percent, reduction. MFIP's effects on divorce for married recipients did not vary by family size or by the prior marital, employment, or welfare history of the family.

Table 4.
Effects on Divorce for Two-Parent Recipient Families Who Were Married at Baseline,
over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period
  Sample Size Ever Divorced (%)
MFIP AFDC Impacta Percentage Change P-Value for Subgroup Differences
All recipient families 1,043 13.8 16.8 -2.9 -17.5  
Number of children 0.6
   Fewer than 3 children 519 17.8 20.0 -2.2 -11.1  
   3 or more children 504 9.0 13.3 -4.4 -32.6  
Marital history prior to study entryb 0.6
   Married within 5 years 189 29.9 29.1 0.8 2.7  
   Married 5 years or more 854 10.7 13.8 -3.1 -22.6  
Race/Ethnicity 0.03**
   White, non-Hispanic 587 20.7 19.3 1.3 6.8  
   Black, non-Hispanic 155 7.8 28.2 -20.5*** -72.5  
   Asian/Pacific Islander 229 5.4 5.1 0.3 6.2  
Age of youngest child 0.2
   Less than 6 years old 724 13.7 18.1 -4.5 -24.7  
   6 years old or older 299 14.1 12.1 2.0 16.6  
Employment 1 year prior to study entry 0.4
   One parent employed 348 17.8 15.8 2.0 12.8  
   Both parents employed 292 20.9 26.8 -6.0 -22.2  
   No parent employed 403 7.1 10.5 -3.3 -31.8  
Welfare receipt prior to study entry 0.4
   Less than 2 years 365 15.9 17.3 -1.4 -8.2  
   2 years to 5 years 313 11.2 19.0 -7.8* -41.1  
   More than 5 years 354 14.4 14.7 -0.3 -2.2  
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using public divorce and marriage certificate records from the state of Minnesota.
NOTES: The sample includes members randomly assigned from April 1, 1994 to March 31, 1996, excluding the small percentage who were receiving or applying only for food stamps at random assignment. Approximately 96 percent of two-parent recipient families were randomly assigned from April 1994 to March 1995.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to regression-adjusted impact estimates. Statistical significance levels are indicated as ***= 1 percent; **= 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in sums and differences.
Information at baseline on some subgroup characteristics was missing for some sample members.
Therefore, the average impact across subgroups does not always replicate the impact for all recipients.
Subgroups with fewer than 150 families are not reported.
a The difference is the impact of the financial incentives, mandatory services, reinforced incentive messages, and elimination of the 100-hour rule and work history requirement.
b Marital history is determined based on matches with the marriage certificate records and thus may not precisely capture the timing of every marriage as reported on the Background Information Form.

Effects on cohabiting recipient families

  • For MFIP cohabiting couples  coupled parents who shared a biological child at study entry  the proportion who ever married during the follow-up period was similar to that for AFDC cohabiting couples.

Table 1 and Figure 4 show that cumulative rates of marriage (i.e., the percentage who ever married, without adjusting for subsequent divorce) among MFIP cohabiting couples and AFDC cohabiting couples were similar through the seven-year follow-up period.

Figure 4.
Cumulative Percent Ever Married for Two-Parent Recipient Families Who Were Cohabiting at Baseline,
over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period

Figure 4. Cumulative Percent Ever Married for Two-Parent Recipient Families Who Were Cohabiting at Baseline, over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period.

  • However, MFIP cohabiting couples were 66 percent less likely than AFDC cohabiting couples to divorce at some point during the follow-up period. Consequently, as shown in Figure 5, the proportion of cohabiting couples that were married at the end of the follow-up was slightly higher among MFIP families than among AFDC families.

As shown in Table 1, approximately 8 percent of AFDC cohabiting families had a finalized divorce by the seven-year follow-up point, compared with 2.7 percent of MFIP cohabiting families, for a 5.3 percentage point, or 66 percent, reduction in divorce. Beginning about two years after random assignment, rates of finalized divorces were consistently higher through most of the follow-up period for AFDC cohabiting families, compared with MFIP cohabiting families (see Figure 6). Consequently, as shown in Table 2 and in Figure 5, the proportion of cohabiting couples that were married at the end of the follow-up was higher by eight percentage points, or 55 percent, among MFIP families than among AFDC families. The ultimate effect of MFIP on marriage among cohabiting couples  an increase in marital stability  is similar to MFIP's effect for married two-parent recipient families.

Figure 5.
Marital Status in Each Month of Follow-Up for Two-Parent Recipient Families
Who Were Cohabiting at Baseline

Figure 5. Marital Status in Each Month of Follow-Up for Two-Parent Recipient Families Who Were Cohabiting at Baseline.

Figure 6.
Cumulative Percent Ever Divorced for Two-Parent Recipient Families Who Were Cohabiting
at Baseline, over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period

Figure 6. Cumulative Percent Ever Divorced for Two-Parent Recipient Families Who Were     Cohabiting at Baseline, over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period.

  • MFIP's effects on marriage and on subsequent divorce among couples who were cohabiting at study entry did not vary by race/ethnicity, age of children, or prior employment or welfare history of the family. However, MFIP cohabiting couples with three or more children were 52 percent less likely than AFDC cohabiting couples ever to marry.(18)

Table 5 presents MFIP's effects on divorce and on ever being married among cohabiting couples at study entry across various subgroups (those with adequate sample sizes). MFIP cohabiting recipient couples with three or more children were 12.6 percentage points, or 52 percent, less likely to marry, compared with AFDC cohabiting recipient couples with three or more children. In contrast, MFIP cohabiting recipient couples with less than three children were more likely to marry (by 7.9 percentage points, though not statistically significant). MFIP's effects on marriage and on subsequent divorce among cohabiting recipient couples did not significantly vary within any other subgroups. However, two noteworthy patterns did emerge. First, MFIP's effects on divorce among cohabiting recipient couples consistently occurred across a variety of subgroups. Second, though effects on divorce were quite consistent across subgroups, the pattern of effects on marriage varied across subgroups. For example, MFIP appeared to reduce marriage and significantly reduced subsequent divorce among cohabiting recipient couples who were long-term welfare recipients, but appeared to increase marriage with no noted difference in subsequent divorce rate among cohabiting recipient couples that were short-term welfare recipients. Future analyses of long-term effects on economic outcomes may help explain some of these differing patterns in marriage and divorce across these subgroups.

Table 5.
Effects on Marriage and Divorce for Two-Parent Recipient Families
Who Were Cohabiting at Baseline, over a Seven-Year Follow-Up Period
  Ever Married (%) Ever Divorced (%)
Sample Size MFIP AFDC Impacta Percentage Change P-Value for Subgroup Differences MFIP AFDC Impacta Percentage Change P-Value for Subgroup Differences
All recipient families 472 20.6 20.8 -0.3 -1.3   2.7 8.0 -5.3** -1.3  
Number of children 0.01**   0.29
   Fewer than 3 children 270 26.5 18.6 7.9 42.4   3.5 6.4 -3.0 -45.9  
   3 or more children 195 11.7 24.3 -12.6** -51.9   2.0 10.1 -8.1** -80.1  
Race/Ethnicity
   White, non-Hispanic 308 25.9 23.6 2.3 9.8   4.0 9.9 -6.0* -60.1  
Age of youngest child
   Less than 6 years old 428 21.1 22.0 -0.9 -4.0   2.6 8.4 -5.8** -69.4  
Employment 1 year prior to study entry 0.63   0.82
   One parent employed 196 25.9 30.5 -4.6 -15.2   3.8 9.4 -5.5 -59.1  
   Both parents employed 158 24.9 19.8 5.1 25.7   2.0 11.0 -8.9** -81.4  
Welfare receipt prior to study entry 0.23   0.17
   Less than 2 years 153 24.8 17.1 7.8 45.7   6.3 7.2 -1.0 -13.2  
   More than 5 years 172 12.2 21.1 -8.9 -42.1   0.1 12.1 -12.0*** -99.4  
SOURCES: MDRC calculations using public divorce and marriage certificate records from the State of Minnesota.
NOTE: The sample includes members randomly assigned from April 1, 1994 to March 31, 1996, excluding the small percentage who were receiving or applying only for food stamps at random assignment. Approximately 96 percent of two-parent recipient families were randomly assigned from April 1994 to March 1995.
A two-tailed t-test was applied to regression-adjusted impact estimates. Statistical significance levels are indicated as ***= 1 percent; **= 5 percent; * =10 percent.
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in sums and differences.
Information at baseline on some subgroup characteristics was missing for some sample members. Therefore, the average impact across subgroups does not always replicate the impact for all recipients.
Subgroups with fewer than 150 families are not reported.
aThe difference is the impact of the financial incentives, mandatory services, reinforced incentive messages, and elimination of the 100-hour rule and work history requirement.

Effects on two-parent applicant families

  • MFIP had no average effect on divorce among two-parent applicant families, but did somewhat increase divorce later in the follow-up period.

Table 1 shows that the rate of divorce over the seven-year follow-up period was similar for MFIP and AFDC two-parent applicant families. However, MFIP two-parent applicant families were slightly more likely to have divorced during the fourth through sixth year of follow-up, with a statistically significant increase in divorce occurring in year five (see Appendix Table 3).

  • A trend showed increased marriage and increased subsequent divorce among cohabiting applicant families. These effects, however, were not statistically significant during most years of the follow-up period, possibly due to the small sample size of cohabiting applicant families.

Table 1 shows that for cohabiters, the pattern of results is different for applicants than for recipient families. Compared to their control group counterparts, MFIP cohabiting applicant families were more likely to be married by the end of the follow-up, though this pattern is not statistically significant. MFIP cohabiting applicant families are also somewhat more likely to ever divorce by the end of the follow-up. Although neither of these overall effects are statistically significant over the seven-year follow-up period (as shown in Table 1 and 2), significant increases in divorce did occur for cohabiting applicant families during the first two years of follow-up (see Appendix Table 3).

  • Although there were no effects on divorce among all married two-parent applicant families, MFIP increased divorce among a few subgroups of two-parent applicant families.

Appendix Table 4 presents findings on MFIP's effects on divorce among subgroups of all two-parent applicant families and subgroups of married applicant families.(19) MFIP increased divorce by 11.6 percentage points among two-parent applicant families with three or more children at study entry, an effect that appears to be clustered among those two-parent applicants with three or more children who were married at study entry (see bottom panel of Appendix Table 4). This effect on divorce is significantly different from MFIP's effects on divorce among two-parent applicant families with less than three children. MFIP also increased divorce by 10 percentage points among two-parent applicant families in which only one parent was employed prior to study entry. However, this effect was not significantly different from MFIP's effects on divorce among two-parent applicant families in which both parents were employed prior to study entry.

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