[ Main page of Report | Contents of Report ]
This study was undertaken to increase our knowledge of how TANF sanctions are being used to encourage participation in work activities. In contrast to earlier studies that all have been conducted in a single state, we examined the use of TANF sanctions in two local sites in each of three states, affording us the opportunity to examine the use of TANF sanctions in several settings using comparable methodology. Another major contribution of this study is its use of several data sources in each of the study states in order to develop a more comprehensive picture of the use of work-oriented sanctions. While this study expands our knowledge of the use of TANF sanctions, it is important to note that the use of TANF sanctions in these three states does not necessarily represent the experiences of all states. Illinois, New Jersey and South Carolina were selected for this study because of the availability of data, collected for other purposes, that could be used to answer questions about the use of TANF sanctions In this chapter, we present our major findings for each research question and then suggest areas for additional research that would further our understanding of the use of TANF sanctions.
[ Go to Contents ]
The present study is the first post-welfare reform study to take a detailed look at how sanctions are being implemented in local welfare offices operating under a range of different welfare reform policies. Based on our findings, we draw several conclusions about the implementation of TANF sanctions. First, it is clear that the implementation of TANF sanctions requires substantial staff effort. Three of the six local sites we visited during the study had restructured their staff responsibilities so that at least one staff member focused exclusively on the implementation of TANF sanctions. Monitoring program participation, contacting clients to reengage them in program activities, documenting the reason for imposing a sanction, and making eligibility changes are all extremely labor-intensive tasks.
Second, TANF case managers have considerable discretion in deciding whether to impose a sanction, although some tend to exercise that discretion more than others. Many factors influence their decisions, including their overall workload, the message they have received from program administrators regarding the use of TANF sanctions, the amount of work involved in imposing a sanction, client circumstances, and the relationship they have developed with their clients. When workloads are high, case managers tend to base their sanctioning decisions primarily on participation reports. When workloads are lower, however, case managers take a more individualized approach to sanctioning and make an extra effort to reengage clients in program activities.
Third, TANF case managers sometimes use the flexibility accorded them to adjust work requirements for clients experiencing personal, family, or logistical challenges that make participation in work activities difficult. However, some believe that the strong emphasis on the achievement of high work participation rates discourages the development of individualized employment plans and results in a mismatch between the level and type of participation that is expected and what clients can realistically achieve. Finally, local offices use various review mechanisms to encourage the proper use of sanctions. In some cases, the reviews occur before a sanction is imposed and, in others, after a sanction is imposed.
[ Go to Contents ]
New Jersey and Illinois impose sanctions on a modest proportion of the caseload to promote participation in work activities. On the other hand, South Carolina rarely imposes them. Over a 10-month period, 5 percent of recipients are fully sanctioned in South Carolina compared with 10 and 12 percent in Illinois and New Jersey, respectively. When initial partial sanctions and a longer time period (18 months) are considered, 31 percent of recipients in Illinois and 39 percent of recipients in New Jersey see their grants reduced as a consequence of a sanction.
South Carolina's experience illustrates the extent to which the message regarding the use of sanctions, and possibly the severity of the initial penalty, can influence the use of sanctions to promote participation in work activities. South Carolina's low rate of sanctioning is most likely attributable to an explicit state administrative decision to encourage the use of sanctions only as a last resort. The decision represents a response to advocacy groups and others that raised concerns about the large number of case closures attributable to full family sanctions. Procedural requirements implemented at the local level that have had the effect of discouraging case managers from imposing sanctions include (1) extensive documentation of all actions taken to address participation problems, (2) a multilayered review process, and (3) a considerable lag from the time of the initial sanction recommendation to the final sanctioning decision.
While Illinois and New Jersey impose sanctions more often, their rate of sanctioning is lower than that found in the two earlier cohort studies. Fein and Lee estimate that 52 percent of Delaware TANF recipients received work-related sanctions (partial or full) during an 18-month period. In a similar study, Holcomb and Ratcliffe (2000) estimate that, during a 10-month period, 45 percent of Indiana TANF recipients were partially sanctioned for failure to comply with work requirements. The later timeframe of the present study may, in part, explain why we find a lower incidence of sanctions. As welfare reform has progressed and policies and practices have become more systematic, it is possible that many noncompliant recipients already have been sanctioned off or have otherwise exited from TANF. Additionally, if sanctions have become more credible over time, more people may be complying with program requirements before a sanction is imposed.
[ Go to Contents ]
We find that the demographic characteristics associated with sanctioning are those that, in previous research, have been associated with longer welfare stays and lower rates of employment. These findings are consistent with other studies that compare the demographic characteristics of families that have ever been sanctioned with those that have never been sanctioned. All else equal, those who are younger, less educated, never married and African American more likely to be sanctioned than recipients without the same characteristics.
We also find that families that experience one or more personal, family, or logistical challenges are more likely to be sanctioned than families that do not experience any of these challenges. These findings confirm what many case managers report and many program administrators and advocates have long suspected. Challenges that significantly increase the likelihood of receiving sanctions include limited recent work experience, the existence of a physical or mental health problem, several arrests, and child care problems. In most cases, the presence of one of these challenges increases by one-half to two-thirds the probability of being sanctioned. The effect is much greater when several barriers are present; the probability of being sanctioned when four or more liabilities are present is twice as high as the probability of being sanctioned when any one barrier is present.
[ Go to Contents ]
In both Illinois and New Jersey, the majority of families who are sanctioned are back on TANF within a relatively short period of time. Many families never progress to a full-family sanction and the majority of those that do, return to TANF within a year. The number of fully sanctioned families who return to the TANF rolls is lower in South Carolina, possibly because of the lower grant amount and lower eligibility threshold. In New Jersey, where we have the most complete data on TANF receipt and employment for the year after a full family sanction is imposed, we find that families who are fully sanctioned experience some disruption in their income, but few show no connection to either the labor market or the welfare system (see Figure IV.1); families with no record of receiving TANF or working represent only 1.7 percent of the cohort of recipients examined for this study.
Figure IV.1.
The Sanction and Post-Sanction Status of TANF Recipients in New
Jersey
Note: All Percentage are based on the current caseload.
[ Go to Contents ]
The present study did not set out to examine the extent to which sanctions promote compliance with work requirements. However, the results suggest that program participation is probably higher than it would be without the use of sanctions. Case managers often use the prospect of a sanction to promote compliance, and many sanctioned families eventually do come into compliance. A question of interest not addressed by the present study is whether a more stringent sanction promotes greater participation in work activities. None of the study states imposed only a partial sanction; therefore, we do not know how the use of sanctions and recipients' responses to them might differ in an environment where the potential for adverse consequences is not as great. In South Carolina, the stringency of the sanction almost certainly contributed to concerns about the number of families that were sanctioned. However, we don't know whether the stringency of the sanctions might also have contributed to greater compliance. We do know that the state set the bar higher than other states for imposing a sanction, but other factors may also be at play. With sanction policies similar in New Jersey and Illinois, our findings there do not allow us to draw any conclusions about how the design and structure of sanctions influence the rate of participation in work activities.
A study that looks at the relationship between state sanction policies and work participation and employment rates may offer some insight into whether a particular approach to sanctions, controlling for state characteristics and other welfare reform policies, contributes to higher work participation rates. Such a study could build on earlier studies that look at the relationship between various state TANF policies and caseload declines. A key methodological challenge of such a study would be developing a strategy to account for employment among recipients who leave the TANF rolls and for participation in employment activities for those who remain.
Finally, a study that looks at the relationship between sanctions and time limits could provide greater insight into how these policies work together or separately to encourage families to become self-sufficient. In states where sanctions are imposed routinely for non-compliance, fewer families than expected may reach time limits. This could occur if sanctions encourage recipients who might have been long-term recipients to engage in activities that help them to move towards self-sufficiency more rapidly or if they remove recipients from the TANF rolls who do not comply with program requirements and who may have stayed for an extended period in the absence of sanctions. In contrast, in states like South Carolina where sanctions are only applied as a last resort, more families may reach time limits and lose their TANF benefits as a result of them.
Main Page of Report | Contents of Report
Home Pages:
Human Services Policy
(HSP)
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
(ASPE)
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)