The Use of TANF Work-Oriented Sanctions in Illinois, New Jersey, and South Carolina:

Chapter 3:
Imposing TANF Sanctions:
How Often, On Whom, and With What Outcomes?

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Content

The implementation of more stringent sanctions has raised the level of interest in understanding how often sanctions are imposed, on whom, and with what outcomes. Information on the frequency of sanctions can help us understand the role sanctions play in encouraging participation in work-related activities and helping families move towards self-sufficiency. It can also help us estimate how many recipients might be at risk of adverse consequences associated with the imposition of sanctions. Comprehensive information on sanctioned recipients can enhance our understanding of the demographic characteristics associated with higher rates of sanctioning and determine whether families facing personal and family challenges are at higher risk of sanctions. Finally, this information, combined with information on the employment of sanctioned recipients, can answer questions about how sanctioned recipients are faring.

This chapter uses administrative and survey data from the three study states to answer five research questions:

Because of data limitations, we cannot answer each question in all three of the study states. Instead, we expand our knowledge of the use of sanctions by exploiting the strengths of the data we have for each state. In all three study states, we are able to (1) document how often sanctions are imposed; (2) examine how often sanctioned recipients come into compliance, either because the sanction is lifted or because their TANF case is reopened; and (3) compare a limited set of background and demographic characteristics of sanctioned and nonsanctioned recipients. In South Carolina and Illinois, we can compare the presence of personal and family challenges and logistical barriers among sanctioned and nonsanctioned recipients. In Illinois, we can examine how these challenges and barriers independently influence the likelihood of being sanctioned when all other factors are held equal. Finally, in New Jersey, relying on the rich data collected for the Work First New Jersey evaluation, we can examine the employment and TANF status of families who were subject to a full family sanction for a year after the sanction was imposed.

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How Common Are Sanctions in the Three Study States?

Comparable to earlier studies by Fein and Lee (1999) and Holcomb and Ratcliffe (2000), our analysis provides information on the use of sanctions for a cohort of recipients that we follow over time. The analysis allows us to answer the question: What fraction of current TANF recipients is now sanctioned or will eventually be sanctioned? We believe that the study's estimates provide a reliable picture of the extent to which the study states impose sanctions, the extent to which recipients come into compliance after a sanction is imposed and a relatively complete accounting of the number of families that may be adversely affected for extended periods by the financial penalties imposed on them. Because some recipients might have been sanctioned before our period of observation, our estimates provide a lower bound of the likelihood that a recipient has ever been or ever will be sanctioned. Importantly, these estimates do not account for all families whose behavior might have been influenced by the state's sanction policy. For example, they do not account for potential sanctions that are resolved through a reconciliation process prior to being imposed or for families who may have changed their behavior in response to the possibility of a sanction being imposed.

There are many factors that might influence how often sanctions are imposed. Before presenting our findings for the study states, we highlight particular factors that we expect could influence the rates we observe. Owing to differences in the design of South Carolina's sanction policy and lower benefit levels, we expected — before undertaking our analysis — that the state's sanction rate would be lower than the partial but higher than the full-family sanction rate in Illinois and New Jersey. We based our prediction on two assumptions. First, we assumed that the use of an immediate full-family sanction in South Carolina would encourage greater compliance before imposition of the sanction, thus lowering the state's sanction rate to somewhere below the partial sanction rates in Illinois or New Jersey. Second, we assumed that the greater financial penalty associated with a full-family sanction (due to higher grant levels) in Illinois and New Jersey would encourage greater compliance than the lower financial penalty in South Carolina, resulting in a higher full-family sanction rate in South Carolina. After learning through our site visit to South Carolina that the state has chosen to use sanctions only as a last resort, we revised our expectations and anticipated that we would observe a very low sanction rate in South Carolina, which would be lower than the full family sanction rate in either New Jersey or Illinois.

Illinois's and New Jersey's sanction policies are nearly identical and their benefit levels, similar; however, we expected to see a lower sanction rate in Illinois because of its applicant job search requirement and because of the presence of more longer-term recipients. The applicant job search requirement is intended to engage families in work activities rapidly and to provide TANF benefits only to those willing to look for work actively or who can demonstrate that they are experiencing personal or family challenges that limit their ability to work. Almost certainly, among the families that do not fulfill the job search requirement are those that would have experienced difficulty in meeting the work requirement if their application for assistance had been approved; such families would have been candidates for sanctioning if the requirement were not in place. Our visits to the two local offices confirmed that the offices enforce this requirement, with administrators reporting that many families that apply for assistance never complete the process.

In both Illinois and New Jersey, case managers appear to impose sanctions regularly when recipients are not complying with work requirements and they have exhausted their efforts to reengage them. Since recipients are expected to begin meeting their work requirements shortly after they begin receiving assistance, we would expect sanctions to be imposed less frequently on longer-term recipients who presumably are meeting their work requirements or they would have already been sanctioned. Since Illinois has more long-term recipients on their caseload, we would expect their sanction rate to be somewhat lower than New Jersey's.

As we anticipated, the rate at which the study states impose sanctions differs somewhat between Illinois and New Jersey and, substantially between South Carolina and the other two study states (see Table III.1). Over 10 months — the maximum period for which we have data for all three states — only 5 percent of South Carolina TANF families had received a full-family sanction. In Illinois and New Jersey, the full-family sanction rate over the same 10-month period was 10 and 12 percent, respectively. Over this same time period, 24 percent of families in Illinois and 30 percent of families in New Jersey experienced any type of sanction, including a full-family sanction. When we consider the full 18-month time period for which we have data, the percentage of families with any grant reduction due to a sanction in Illinois and New Jersey increases to 31 and 39 percent, respectively. In both Illinois and New Jersey, about 40 percent of those sanctioned over the 18-month follow-up period were sanctioned within the first three months and about 60 percent were sanctioned within the first six months.

The sanction rates in all three states are lower than those found in previous studies using a similar methodology. For example, in their analysis of the use of partial sanctions in Indiana, Holcomb and Ratcliffe (2000) found a sanction rate of 45 percent over a 12-month period. In their analysis of the use of gradual full-family sanctions for participation in work-related activities in Delaware, Fein and Lee (1999) found a sanction rate of 52 percent over an 18-month period.

Table III.1.
Incidence and Timing of Sanctions
(Percentages, Unless Otherwise Indicated)
  Illinois New Jersey South Carolina
Initial Partial Full Any Initial Partial Full Any Full
Full Sample
Ever received sanction through month:
1 6 3 8 8 0 8 1
3 10 5 13 15 3 16 2
6 16 7 19 23 8 25 3
9 20 9 24 28 11 30 4
10 21 10 25 29 12 31 5
12 23 11 27 32 14 33 n.a.
15 25 12 29 35 16 37 n.a.
18 26 13 31 38 17 39 n.a.
New Entrants Only
Ever received sanction through month:
1 1 3 4 2 0 2 0
3 4 4 8 10 1 10 1
6 10 5 14 22 5 23 3
9 16 7 20 27 11 29 4
10 17 7 21 29 12 30 5
12 19 8 23 31 14 33 n.a.
15 21 9 25 34 16 35 n.a.
18 22 10 26 36 17 38 n.a.
Sample Size
Full sample 33,478 51,539 10,852
New entrants only 2,246 23,267 961
Source: Analysis of state administrative data by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Note: "New entrants" are defined as those whose case opened in November 2001 in Illinois; those who were not receiving TANF in June 2000, but who entered or returned to the program some time during the one-year period, July 2000 to June 2001 in New Jersey; and those whose case opened in June 2002 in South Carolina.
n.a. = Data are not available.

Surprisingly, in all three states, the sanction rates for new entrants are almost identical to those for all recipients. Working on the assumption that many noncompliant families would have already been sanctioned off the rolls, we would have expected the sanction rate for new entrants to be higher. The similarity in rates might reflect the presence of many short-term recipients on the caseloads, creating less of a distinction between current recipients and new entrants than was evident before welfare reform. In addition, in some cases, these new entrants may be clients who are returning to TANF after receiving a full-family sanction and may, therefore, be particularly prone to receiving another sanction.

The availability of county-level data in New Jersey and Illinois allows us to compare sanction rates in different localities that are operating under the same set of policies. In New Jersey, we find that sanctioning rates vary substantially by county, even after adjusting for differences across counties in the demographic characteristics of their caseloads (not shown). Adjusted partial sanctioning rates across the New Jersey counties during a 12-month period range from less than 20 percent of recipients sanctioned in some of the more rural counties in the northwestern part of the state to 41 percent sanctioned in Essex County, New Jersey's largest and most urban county (where Newark is located). Similarly, adjusted full-family sanctioning rates range from 5 percent or less in some smaller, more rural counties to 20 percent for full-family sanctions in Essex County. In Illinois, those living outside Cook County (where Chicago is located) were slightly more likely to experience any sanction but equally likely to experience a partial sanction. Since New Jersey has a county-administered and Illinois has a state-administered TANF system, the differences in these findings are not surprising. Because it is a county-administered system, counties in New Jersey have more discretion in how they implement sanction and other work-related policies than counties in Illinois.

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Which Recipients Are Most Likely to Be Sanctioned?

Consistent with previous studies, we find that, based on several measures, TANF recipients who are sanctioned are more likely to have characteristics that are associated with longer welfare stays and lower rates of employment. All else equal, those who are younger, less educated, or have never been married are significantly more likely to experience an initial sanction-related grant reduction or to be fully sanctioned in Illinois and New Jersey than families without these characteristics (see Table III.2).(3) We also find that, controlling for other characteristics, African Americans are more likely to be sanctioned than other racial and ethnic groups, while Hispanics and other nonwhites (typically Asians) are the least likely to be sanctioned in these two states. For example, African Americans in Illinois have a 24 percent probability of receiving an initial sanction-related grant reduction, while whites have a 20 percent probability; Hispanics, 18 percent; and other nonwhites, only 12 percent.

In South Carolina, younger and less educated TANF recipients are also more likely to be fully sanctioned. Other factors do not appear to affect significantly the probability of a full-family sanction, but the low rate of sanctioning in South Carolina makes it harder to identify important differences between various groups.

Table III.2.
Probability of Being Sanctioned, Controlling for Other Characteristics
  Predicted Probability of Initial Partial Sanction Predicted Probability of Full Sanction
Illinois New Jersey Illinois New Jersey South Carolina
Overall 23 32 11 14 5
Age in Years
Younger than 20 28 38 13 18 7
20 to 24 24*** 35*** 11** 15*** 6
25 to 29 20*** 33*** 9*** 14*** 3***
30 to 39 16*** 31*** 7*** 13*** 1***
40 or older 11*** 25*** 6* 10*** <1***
Ethnicity/Race
Non-Hispanic, African American 24 36 11 16 5
Non-Hispanic, white 20*** 27*** 10** 10*** 4
Hispanic, any race 18*** 26*** 8*** 11*** 2
Other 12*** 21*** 5*** 7*** 2
Marital Status
Never married 24 33 11 14 5
Separated, divorced, widowed 21*** 28*** 9*** 11*** 5
Married 20*** 27*** 10 11*** 3
Education
Less than high school diploma/GED 26 35 13 15 6
High school diploma/GED 21*** 30*** 9*** 13*** 4***
More than high school diploma/GED 19*** 27*** 8*** 11*** 3***
Number of Children in TANF Case
1 24 32 10 14 4
2 23 32 11 13*** 4
3 23 32 11 13*** 5
4 or more 23 32 10 13* 5
Age of Youngest Child in TANF Case
Younger than 1 24 31 9 13 5
1 to 2 25** 30 12*** 13 4
3 to 5 23 33** 11*** 15*** 4
6 or older 21*** 33*** 11*** 14** 5
Duration of Current TANF Spell
Less than 6 months 22 32 8 13 4
6 to 11 months 26*** 33** 11*** 16*** 5
12 to 24 months 25*** 31 12*** 15*** 5
25 months or more 22 32 12*** 14*** 4
Sample Size = 33,478 in Illinois; 51,545 in New Jersey; 10,852 in South Carolina
Source: Analysis of state administrative data by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Note: Tests of statistical significance reported here refer to the difference between the predicted probability for clients with the particular characteristic and the predicted probability for those in the reference category (indicated by italics) in each group. For example, for the characteristic "age," the reference category is "younger than 20," and all significance tests compare the predicted probability for those in a particular age category to the value for those who are younger than 20.
*/**/*** Difference between the predicted probability for clients with this characteristic and for those in the italicized reference category significant at the .10 level / .05 level /.01 level/

Additional factors that can significantly affect the probability of being sanctioned in Illinois or New Jersey are the number of children on the TANF case, the age of the youngest child, and the duration of the current TANF spell, although findings along these dimensions are not as consistent across the states or between types of sanctions (initial partial or full-family) as those previously discussed. For example, in Illinois, in comparison to recipients whose youngest child is under the age of one, recipients whose youngest child is between the ages of one and two are significantly more likely to be partially sanctioned, but recipients whose youngest child is six years or older are significantly less likely to be partially sanctioned. Recipients whose youngest child is younger than one are significantly less likely than families with older children to be fully sanctioned. In New Jersey, families whose youngest child is between the ages of three and five or six and older are significantly more likely to be partially or fully sanctioned than recipients whose youngest child is under the age of one. We do find that recipients whose recent TANF spell has lasted longer than six months are more likely to be fully sanctioned in both states. However, part of this effect could simply be attributable to the greater opportunity for sanctions over time.

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How Do Personal Liabilities Influence the Likelihood of a Sanction?

We matched survey data on detailed personal characteristics (or what we term personal liabilities and assets) with the administrative data on sanctions in Illinois and South Carolina to examine factors beyond basic background and demographic characteristics that may help identify those recipients at greater risk of a sanction.(4) Based on a bivariate analysis presented in Table III.3, we find that those with a physical health problem, those with a learning disability, those caring for a family or friend with a health problem or special need, or those who are pregnant or have a child under age one in the household are more likely to be fully sanctioned in South Carolina. Differences in other characteristics between ever- and never- sanctioned recipients in South Carolina are relatively large but not statistically significant, presumably because of the small sample size of sanctioned cases.

In Illinois, recipients with no high school diploma, with limited recent work experience, with a physical or mental health problem, with two or more arrests, or with a child care problem are much more likely to be sanctioned (either partially or fully) (see Table III.3). A logistic regression model confirmed the bivariate analysis results.

Table III.3.
Personal Liabilities by Sanction Status
  Illinois South Carolina
Ever Sanctioned Never Sanctioned All Ever Sanctioned Never Sanctioned All
Human Capital Deficits
No high school diploma or GED 54** 40 44 42 38 38
Limited recent work experience 73*** 54 59 70 57 57
Performed fewer than four common job tasks 26 29 28 30 25 25
Personal Challenges
Physical health problem 26* 19 21 42*** 21 22
Mental health problem 35*** 21 25 34 30 30
Criminal record n.a. n.a. n.a. 12 10 10
Multiple arrests 25*** 13 16 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Severe physical domestic violence in past year 12 13 13 10 14 14
Chemical dependence 5 2 3 1 1 1
Signs of a learning disability 10 13 12 28*** 11 12
Difficulty with English 1 3 2 4 1 1
Logistical and Situational Challenges
Child or other family member or friend with a health problem or special need 32 35 34 51** 32 33
Pregnant or child under age one in household 38 34 35 43* 28 28
Child care problem 42*** 28 32 24 31 31
Transportation problem 25 19 21 22 32 31
Unstable housing 28 21 23 16 22 22
Sample Size 114 302 416 56 1067 1123
Source: MPR analysis of the 2001-02 survey of Illinois TANF cases, the 2002 survey of South Carolina TANF cases, and administrative data on the TANF caseload provided by Illinois and South Carolina
Note: Ever sanctioned is defined as: ever being fully sanctioned within 10 months in South Carolina; and ever being either partially or fully sanctioned within 12 months in Illinois.
*/**/*** Difference between the predicted probability for clients with this characteristic and for those in the italicized reference category significant at the .10 level / .05 level /.01 level/
n.a. = Data are not available.

Table III.4 presents predicted probabilities in Illinois based on a model that estimates the relative influence of each personal liability on the likelihood that a recipient is sanctioned (partially or fully), assuming that a TANF recipient exhibits "average" characteristics (such as age, race, marital status, and so forth) and only the liability under consideration. The model predicts that a TANF recipient with no personal liabilities has a 12 percent chance of receiving a sanction. Recipients without a high school diploma have an increased chance — at 19 percent — of receiving a sanction. Recipients with a physical health problem, mental health problem, or multiple arrests have a 20 to 21 percent chance of ever being sanctioned. Recipients with limited recent work experience or with a child care problem have an 18 and 19 percent chance, respectively, of ever being sanctioned.

We also find that the likelihood of ever being sanctioned increases substantially when a recipient has four or more liabilities. With one liability present, the likelihood of being sanctioned is 24 percent. When two or three barriers are present, the probability of being sanctioned is only slightly higher at 25 percent. However, when four or more barriers are present the probability increases dramatically, to 42 percent.

Table III.4.
Probability of Being Sanctioned in Illinois by Personal Liabilities
Liability Prevalence (%) Direction and Significance of Effect Predicted Probability of Being Sanctioned Difference from Probability with No Liabilities
No Personal Liabilities 4   12  
Human Capital Liabilities
No high school diploma or GED 44 + * 19 +7
Limited recent work experience 59 + 18 +6
Performed fewer than four common job tasks 28 - 11 -1
Personal Challenges
Physical health problem 21 + ** 21 +9
Mental health problem 25 + * 20 +8
Multiple arrests 16 + * 21 +9
Severe physical domestic violence in past year 13 - 9 -3
Chemical dependence 3 + 19 +7
Signs of a learning disability 12 - 8 -4
Difficulty with English 2 - 4 -8
Logistical and Situational Challenges
Child or other family member or friend with a health problem or special need 34 - 9 -3
Pregnant or child under age one in household 35 + 18 +6
Child care problem 32 + * 19 +7
Transportation problem 21 + 15 +3
Unstable housing 23 - 12 0
Source: Based on the results of a logit model predicting the probability of being sanctioned using data from 2001-02 survey of Illinois TANF cases and Illinois administrative data.
Note: The predicted probabilities presented here are based on the results from estimating logistic regression models for sanction rates within 12 months in Illinois. The model included and controlled for clients' sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, number of children, age of youngest child, and length of the current TANF spell.
*/**/*** Estimated effect of specified liability on being sanctioned is statistically significant at the .10/.05/.01 level.
n.a. = Data are not available.

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How Do Sanctioned TANF Recipients Fare?

To analyze how sanctioned recipients fare over time, we first examine the duration of sanctions and then the employment and TANF experiences of fully sanctioned recipients. For the first component of the analysis, we use data from all three states to examine the length and disposition of partial sanctions and the rate of return to TANF for fully sanctioned cases. For the second component, we exploit the availability of the rich survey data collected for the Work First New Jersey evaluation to examine the employment and welfare experiences of TANF recipients receiving full-family sanctions for the year after the sanction is imposed. (Similar data are not available in Illinois or South Carolina.)

How long do sanctions last?

Given the nature of sanctioning policy in Illinois and New Jersey, initial partial sanctions are typically short. If the recipient does not comply with work requirements, initial partial sanctions proceed to full-family sanctions within three months in both states. For this reason, more than 80 percent of initial partial sanctions in New Jersey and more than 90 percent of initial partial sanctions in Illinois end within three months (see Table III.5). In Illinois, initial partial sanctions end within one month for nearly half of the cases under such sanctions, suggesting that many individuals make efforts to cure an initial sanction quickly. Similarly, nearly 40 percent of initial partial sanctions end within one month in New Jersey.

Partial sanctions can end because the sanction is lifted and the full TANF grant is restored, because a full-family sanction is imposed, or because the family exits TANF for another reason. In New Jersey, the proportion of partial sanctions ending for each of these reasons are roughly evenly distributed, with a slightly lower proportion ending as a result of TANF exits for reasons other than a sanction (see Table III.5). In Illinois, over half of partial sanctions end when sanctions are lifted and the full grant is restored.

Table III.5.
Duration of Partial Sanctions and Reasons These Sanctions Ended Among TANF
Recipients in Illinois and New Jersey
(Percentages)
  Illinois New Jersey
Partial Sanction Ended Within
1 month 49 37
2 months 72 62
3 months 94 83
4 or more months 100 100
(Average length in months) (1.7) (2.3)
(Median length in months) (2) (2)
Partial Sanction Ended Because
Sanction lifted, full grant restored 55 36
Full family sanction imposed 22 38
Exited TANF for another reason 23 26
Sample Size 7,762 19,502
Source: Analysis of state administrative data by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Note: Analysis is based on cases that received a partial sanction within 12 months of baseline. Baseline is defined as November 2001 in Illinois and, in New Jersey, the time the case first received cash assistance during or after July 2000.

Full-family sanctions end if the family returns to TANF.(5) Most fully sanctioned families in Illinois and New Jersey ultimately do return to TANF, many within only a few months (see Table III.6).(6) For example, respectively 43 and 47 percent of those who leave TANF in Illinois and New Jersey because of a full-family sanction return within three months, suggesting that many families decide to comply with work requirements shortly after the full-family sanction is imposed. Within the first year, the majority of sanctioned leavers — 55 percent in Illinois and 63 percent in New Jersey — return to TANF. These TANF return rates are much higher than those for families that left TANF for reasons other than a sanction. Among other TANF leavers, only 26 and 39 percent returned to TANF within a year in Illinois and New Jersey, respectively.

Table III.6.
Sanctioned and Other Leavers Returning to TANF
(Percentages)
  Sanctioned Leavers Other Leavers All Leavers
Illinois
Returned to TANF Within
3 months 43 21 24
6 months 52 23 27
9 months 54 25 29
12 months 55 26 30
Sample Size 2,801 16,760 19,561
New Jersey
Returned to TANF Within
3 months 47 24 28
6 months 56 31 35
9 months 60 35 40
12 months 63 39 43
Sample Size 7,238 30,727 37,965
South Carolina
Returned to TANF Within
3 months 25 16 16
6 months 31 21 22
9 months 32 22 23
Sample Size 273 3,265 3,538
Source: Analysis of state administrative data by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Note: Illinois sample was truncated in order to observe a full 12 months after TANF exit. New Jersey sample includes cases who exited TANF within 12 months of baseline. "Baseline" pertains to the time the sample member first received cash assistance during or after July 2000. South Carolina sample was truncated in order to observe a full 9 months after TANF exit.

The rate of TANF returns is lower in South Carolina for both sanctioned and other TANF leavers, possibly because the TANF grant is about half that of the other two states and may provide less incentive for return or because the lower eligibility threshold makes it less likely that families with any earned income will be eligible for benefits. Also, since fewer sanctions are imposed, those who receive them may be the least likely to come into compliance. However, the pattern still holds that those who leave as a consequence of a sanction are more likely to return to TANF than those who leave for other reasons. Within nine months of exiting TANF, 32 percent of sanctioned leavers return while 22 percent of other leavers return.

What are the employment and welfare experiences of sanctioned recipients over time?

From previous research, we know very little about what happens to families after they are fully sanctioned. Advocates and some policymakers have expressed concern that full family sanctions may contribute to material hardship. Others posit that fully sanctioned families must have other sources of support or they would have returned to the welfare rolls for assistance. In this section, we use administrative data on TANF receipt combined with survey data on employment status from the Work First New Jersey evaluation to examine the employment and TANF status of fully sanctioned TANF recipients in the first year after the sanction was imposed. We restrict the analysis to the 126 survey respondents who received a full-family sanction during the survey follow-up period and for whom 12 months of post-sanction survey follow-up data are available. We only use data from New Jersey because it is the only one of the three study states for which we have the necessary monthly employment data to conduct this analysis.

Most recipients who received a full-family sanction either returned to TANF or found employment within the first year after being sanctioned. Only 12 percent spent all their time off TANF and showed no record of employment. On average, in the year after receiving a full-family sanction, recipients spent four months on TANF and not employed, one month on TANF and employed, three months off TANF and employed and four months off TANF and not employed (see Figure III.1).

Figure III.1.
Time Spent in Various Employment and TANF Statuses During the First 12
Months After a Full-Family Sanction in New Jersey
Figure III.1. Time Spent in Various Employment and TANF Statuses During the First 12 Months After a Full-Family Sanction in New Jersey
Source: TANF status from state administrative data. Employment status from a follow-up survey conduted by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Note:Figures represent the experiences of the 126 survey respondents who received a full-family sanction 12 or more months prior to their survey date.

The economic circumstances of TANF recipients in the year after receiving a full-family sanction varied substantially depending on their employment status at the time the sanction was imposed. One in four recipients in New Jersey was employed when the full-family sanction was imposed (not shown). Among this group, recipients typically spent most of their time employed and off TANF in the year after receiving the sanction and spent relatively little time either back on TANF or off TANF and not employed (see Figure III.1). The relative economic success of these sanctioned recipients suggests that many in the group may have been working or looking for work and preparing to leave TANF even in the absence of a sanction. Consistent with this interpretation, the follow-up survey showed that 60 percent of those employed when they received a full-family sanction reported "getting a job" as the reason for leaving welfare while only 22 percent reported a sanction as the reason (not shown).(7) Recipients who were not employed at the time they were sanctioned spent little time employed while off TANF during the year after being sanctioned and split their time fairly evenly between being on TANF and being off TANF and not employed (see Figure III.1). While on TANF, these recipients were employed for an average of one month.

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Do Sanctions Promote Compliance with Work Requirements?

In this analysis, we did not have comparative data to measure the relative effectiveness of imposing sanctions or imposing different kinds of sanctions. However, the data from Illinois and New Jersey strongly suggest that the imposition of a gradual full-family sanction does promote compliance with work requirements. Over an 18-month period, Illinois and New Jersey imposed initial partial sanctions on 26 and 38 percent of TANF recipients, respectively. As Table III.7 shows, in both states the majority of recipients who experience an initial partial sanction eventually come into compliance with work requirements (67 percent in Illinois and 60 percent in New Jersey). Eighty percent of recipients who come into compliance in Illinois and 60 percent in New Jersey do so before a full-family sanction is ever imposed. These results suggest that the imposition of an initial partial sanction is sufficient to encourage a substantial number of families to participate in program activities. What we cannot tell from these data is whether families would have responded differently if the initial grant reduction was not followed by a full-family sanction. It is also important to note that about one-quarter of recipients who received an initial partial sanction left TANF for reasons other than the imposition of a full-family. Some of these families may have left because they had access to other resources, including unreported earned income or because they found employment on their own.

Table III.7
Summary of Compliance After the Imposition of an Initial Partial Sanction
in Illinois and New Jersey
  Illinois New Jersey
% of Families with an Initial Partial Sanction Imposed % of Families with an Initial Partial Sanction Imposed
Initial partial sanction imposed 100 100
Evidence of compliance1 after a sanction is imposed 67 60
Full tanf grant restored before full-family sanction imposed 55 36
Return to tanf after full-family sanction imposed 12 24
Some employment, no return to tanf n.a. 8
Record of compliance or employment after a sanction is imposed n.a. 68
Exited tanf for reasons other than the imposition of a full family sanction 23 26
1 We define compliance to include all cases where the full TANF grant was restored after an initial partial sanction was imposed and all cases that returned to TANF after a full family sanction was imposed. Using this definition, families who started participating in assigned activities and those who received an exemption or modification of their work participation requirements are considered to be compliant with work requirements.

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Endnotes

(3) The predicted probabilities presented here and in Table III.2 are based on the results from estimating logistic regression models for sanction rates within 10 months in South Carolina and 12 months in Illinois and New Jersey. They represent the likelihood of the outcome in question for a client who has the particular characteristic in the table but who otherwise has the average characteristics of all clients. In addition to the client characteristics in the table, the models included and controlled for clients' gender and whether they had earnings either in the baseline month (New Jersey) or baseline quarter (Illinois and South Carolina).

(4) Similar data are not available in New Jersey. For a complete definition of employment assets and liabilities see Kirby, Fraker, Pavetti, and Kovac (June 2003), "Families on TANF in Illinois: Employment Assets and Liabilities." Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.

(5) From a recipient's perspective, a full-family sanction could also end when she finds employment. However, this information is not necessarily known to the welfare office.

(6) In Illinois, cases officially remain open for three months while under a full grant sanction. For purposes of comparison to New Jersey and South Carolina, we considered these cases closed immediately upon being fully sanctioned. Similarly, cases that were in a "zero grant" status for reasons other than a sanction were considered closed.

(7) In contrast, among those who were not employed when they received a full-family sanction, 58 percent reported leaving TANF because of a sanction while 21 percent reported leaving for work.

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