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In most states, state law specifies the approach to sanctioning noncompliant TANF recipients. To ensure that all noncompliant families face the same penalty, states often specify in great detail the amount of the sanction, its duration, and the actions a TANF recipient must take to come into compliance. While it is relatively easy to catalogue state sanction policies, we know little about how sanctions are applied in practice and how their use varies. Federal law is silent on how TANF sanctions should be implemented. For example, we do not know if TANF staff routinely apply sanctions for all recipients immediately after a specified period of noncompliance or if they consider a client's circumstances before imposing a sanction. Similarly, we do not know what, if any, actions workers take to encourage compliance before imposing a sanction. To gain greater insight into how sanctions are used to promote participation in work activities, this chapter presents analyses of detailed case study data on the implementation of TANF sanctions in each of two welfare offices in the three study states.
Two fundamental research questions guide our analysis:
To answer these questions, we divide the implementation of TANF sanctions into six tasks: (1) informing clients about work requirements and sanctions, (2) defining program expectations and requirements, (3) monitoring participation in work activities, (4) deciding whether to impose a sanction, (5) imposing a sanction, and (6) reengaging sanctioned recipients in program activities. We consider each of the tasks in the order in which they typically occur.
For the present analysis, we gathered information on the implementation of TANF sanctions from several sources and using various case study methods. In each local office, we conducted semistructured interviews with program administrators, eligibility workers, case managers, and employment services staff, reviewed a small number of cases, and examined written program materials and documents. Given that we conducted interviews with a small number of staff in only a few offices in states with different sanction approaches, it is difficult to make broad generalizations about many aspects of the implementation of TANF sanctions. The information presented in this chapter represents our efforts to identify common themes within and across offices based on the information provided to us. We acknowledge that there may be a broader range of approaches and perceptions about the challenges to implementation than we uncovered.
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Sanctions are intended to encourage recipients who otherwise might not be inclined toward work or program participation to participate in work activities. Accordingly, clients must know what is expected of them and understand the associated consequences. In addition, they must believe that sanctions will be enforced and recognize that adverse effects could result from them. Similar to other studies (U.S. DHHS 1999; Nixon, Kauff, and Losby 1999; Overby 1998), we find that TANF clients routinely receive information on work requirements and sanctions, but case managers are skeptical about how well they understand it, at least initially. To increase the effectiveness of sanctions, some case managers regularly remind clients that a sanction will be imposed if they do not participate in work activities.
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In each of the study sites, TANF clients routinely receive information on work requirements and sanctions both when they apply for assistance and when they begin a work activity, especially group job search. Information is primarily provided verbally in both one-on-one and group sessions. In some cases, the verbal information is supplemented with written materials.
In all the sites, clients first learn about work requirements and sanctions in their initial intake interview. Work requirements are described as a condition of eligibility, with sanctions presented as the consequence for not meeting them. In programs that offer group job search activities, the information is reiterated in a group orientation session that often serves as a gateway to the program. Case managers focus on work requirements and sanctions in great detail when they develop an employment, self-sufficiency, or individual responsibility plan with a TANF client. In all the sites, case managers typically give clients a copy of their signed employment plan, which outlines their rights and responsibilities. In one of the local offices in South Carolina, case managers visit clients in their homes to provide an overview of the TANF program, conduct an initial assessment, and develop an employment plan. As a part of the meeting, they give clients a "rights and responsibilities" handout that describes what is required of them and the consequences of not following through with their responsibilities.
Despite efforts to inform clients about sanctions, case managers believe that personal and organizational issues sometimes undermine clients' ability to grasp fully the consequences associated with nonparticipation. First, case managers acknowledge that the volume of information clients receive about other welfare policies (e.g., time limits, diversionary assistance, earned income disregards) and the resources available to help them find employment (e.g., job search programs and child care assistance) may interfere with their ability to understand completely the TANF work requirements and associated sanctions. The receipt of so much information at one time makes it difficult for clients to focus on any one aspect of the program requirements or consequences.
Second, case managers believe that the complexity of clients' lives sometimes interferes with their ability to focus on future consequences. In the experience of case managers, clients overwhelmed by personal and family challenges such as substance abuse, physical and mental health conditions, domestic violence, and child behavioral problems have difficulty focusing on anything other than how to address their most immediate needs and problems. Third, case managers express concern that clients may be aware of TANF sanctions but do not believe they will be imposed. Case managers think that clients' skepticism stems from limited use of sanctions before welfare reform and the uneven and changing imposition of sanctions in the current system. Finally, case managers believe that because some clients have other sources of support (e.g., unreported employment income, family, a spouse or partner, other government assistance, and so forth), they pay little attention to any information they receive on sanctions, and do not respond when a sanction is imposed, presumably because the adverse consequences are buffered by the availability of other supplemental resources.
Still, case managers report that, for some clients, the possibility of a sanction is sufficient to motivate them to participate in work activities. Thus, some case managers remind clients about the consequences of nonparticipation at every opportunity, but especially during telephone conversations and meetings, during conciliation reviews, and by means of sanction notices. Many case managers in the study sites indicated that the current sanction policies give them more leverage to enforce participation than previous sanction policies, thus making them more likely to use them to encourage participation. Case managers believe that, through their efforts, they are able to influence the behavior of some recipients, reducing the need to impose sanctions. Thus, they believe that sanction rates may not fully capture the impact of sanctions on increasing participation in work activities.
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PRWORA established broad rather than specific parameters to encourage participation in work activities, leaving states and localities with some flexibility to decide who must participate and in which activities. In general, states follow one of two approaches in determining who should be required to participate in work activities. They rely on either a universal engagement model, whereby they require all recipients to participate in work-related activities, or an exemption model, whereby they do not impose any work requirements on recipients who possess certain characteristics or face particular employment barriers. Common reasons for granting exemptions include personal and family challenges such as mental or physical health conditions that limit work and logistical challenges such as the lack of transportation or child care that also limit work.
States or local offices that have adopted a universal participation requirement often encourage participation in a broad range of program activities and permit flexibility in the required number of hours of participation. In contrast, states or local offices that exempt recipients tend to focus on placing recipients in more traditional work activities, primarily those defined as "countable" activities under PRWORA. The implementation of a universal participation requirement typically affords line staff considerable latitude to decide both how much and in what activities a recipient should be required to participate. In contrast, the implementation of an exemption approach often requires adherence to a defined set of procedures to determine who should be exempt and the placement of nonexempt recipients in a defined set of program activities.
The study sites all exempted some clients from participation in work activities and took similar approaches for doing so. All the study states grant exemptions for household heads who are experiencing physical and mental health conditions, are caring for a disabled family member, or are a current victim of domestic violence. The states also grant exemptions for household heads in their last trimester of pregnancy. New Jersey requires parents to begin participating in program activities when their youngest child turns four months; Illinois and South Carolina do not require parents to start participating until their youngest child is a year old.
In general, case managers follow an explicit set of procedures to determine who should be required to participate in work activities. While case managers exercise some discretion in modifying participation requirements, they expect most recipients to participate in countable activities for the number of hours per week specified in current federal law.
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Case managers rely on a combination of formal screening tools, assessment skills, and professional experience to identify clients' assets and liabilities and to determine which clients should be required to participate in work activities. Assessment generally begins at intake and continues throughout service delivery. Case managers use several techniques for assessing clients and identifying their needs, including initial screenings, formal assessment tools, informal interactions with the client, and intra- and interagency case conferences and sanction conciliation reviews.
Initial Screenings. Welfare staff begin to identify clients who qualify for an exemption from work requirements during the initial intake interview or immediately after clients are deemed eligible for cash assistance. Formal exemptions generally require additional documentation and undergo periodic review to determine if the client is ready to participate. Given the usually clear specification of exemption criteria, screening is a straightforward and rapid process. The challenge for case managers is to encourage clients to return the documentation required to verify the circumstances that qualify them for an exemption and to disclose hidden barriers to employment (such as substance abuse, mental health conditions, domestic violence) that may pose problems for participation.
Formal Assessments. In all the study sites, the development of employment plans for nonexempt clients begins with in-depth assessments of clients' assets and liabilities. Some sites use formal assessments throughout the service delivery process. Welfare staff, employment and training service providers, and licensed professionals conduct the assessments. Welfare staff conduct an upfront assessment to determine the types of work activities to include in the client's employment plan and to identify the employment and training service provider to which they should be referred. The upfront assessments also focus on identifying logistical barriers such as transportation and child care and, in some cases, hidden barriers such as domestic violence, mental health issues, and substance abuse. Employment and training service providers' assessments reflect the types of services the agency provides. Agencies that provide education and training services administer basic skills tests (e.g., COPES, COPS, TABE), career interest inventories, and learning style assessments. Assessments conducted by agencies that primarily provide job search services tend to focus on personal and family challenges that may interfere with employment. Assessments conducted by employment and training providers may be conducted individually or in groups. Finally, clients who appear to have mental health or substance abuse problems may be referred for a more specialized clinical assessment. For example, in Illinois, mental health and substance abuse treatment staff who are colocated in the welfare office assess clients and link them to services. In South Carolina, a licensed psychologist at the South Carolina Department of Vocational Rehabilitation conducts in-depth psychological assessments. TANF recipients in New Jersey may be assessed either through specialized mental health or substance abuse initiatives or by vocational rehabilitation specialists.
Interactions with Welfare and Employment Services Provider Staff. According to case managers, clients are more likely to disclose barriers to employment when they trust the staff working with them. Typically, trust develops over time during routine interactions. Case managers report that smaller workloads and an emphasis on individualized case management help them develop trusting relationships that allow them to uncover hidden barriers that often contribute to participation problems.
Case Conferences/Conciliation Reviews. Welfare staff indicated that, in many cases, clients do not reveal hidden barriers to employment until they are faced with a sanction. Sometimes, clients may not be aware of how personal and family challenges interfere with working until they attempt to work or participate in program activities and fail in these endeavors. In such cases, the imposition or possibility of a sanction forces clients to acknowledge the presence of a hidden barrier and provides staff with an opportunity to work with clients to develop a plan for addressing the obstacle. Clients can address these issues formally through case conferences and conciliation reviews.
Exemptions eliminate work requirements only for those with the most serious barriers to employment. Regardless of their circumstances, all other recipients are expected to meet the same 30- or 35-hour per week participation requirement. In view of the wide variation in client circumstances, case managers report that they face many challenges in trying to encourage high levels of participation in work activities. Initially, the study sites almost always place recipients in a standard set of program activities. When participation problems arise, case managers can sometimes grant "good cause" exemptions to excuse clients temporarily from work activities. In addition, case managers can sometimes modify clients' work requirements to account for individual circumstances. Both strategies involve considerable case manager discretion.
Compared with formal exemptions, good cause exemptions are more immediate, temporary, and typically do not require formal documentation. Good cause exemptions often are provided for doctor's appointments, caring for a sick child, or attending a court hearing. They also may be granted for a situation that is expected to last for a short time (e.g., a temporary medical problem). While good cause can be used to excuse clients fully from their work requirement, it is more often used to grant an "excused absence" for missed hours or days.
In the study sites, most TANF recipients are required to participate in a relatively standard set of work activities, mainly group job search, and, in some instances, short-term training and work experience programs. The two sites in Illinois expect most recipients to participate in work activities at least 30 hours per week. In one local office, clients may be assigned to a paid work placement for which they receive the full amount of the TANF check for working at least 30 hours per week. The grant amount is reduced for each hour that falls below the 30-hour requirement unless there is good cause. In South Carolina, the Department of Social Services (DSS) specialty unit provides a range of work activities (e.g., job search, job club, basic and advanced family life skills workshops) for TANF recipients who, like Illinois TANF recipients, are required to participate at least 30 hours per week. In New Jersey, all recipients are required to participate in activities for 35 hours per week. Clients usually are assigned to activities that count toward the federal work participation rate.
Even though the study states rely primarily on a "work first" approach, case managers may modify work plans for clients with barriers. For example, clients with a mental health condition may be allowed to count the hours in therapy toward their required work hours, or the case manager may temporarily reduce the number of hours clients are required to participate in work activities. According to case managers, flexibility allows them to develop attainable requirements for clients with serious and persistent barriers. To provide modified opportunities to clients, the sites relied on various strategies to improve access to specialized services. For example, mental health or substance abuse treatment providers may be colocated at the welfare office or with the employment service provider. One of the New Jersey offices contracts with the Division of Mental Health to provide counseling services for 100 TANF recipients. An employment service provider in one of the Illinois offices offers a series of workshops focusing on mental health conditions, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Another program provides intensive case management, parenting classes, and GED services for teen parents.
While we observed some flexibility in work requirements, staff indicate that they face considerable pressure to place clients in countable work activities in order to meet the federal work participation requirements. One program administrator complained that, in some cases, the limited flexibility forces staff to adopt unrealistic expectations of TANF recipients, particularly hard-to-employ recipients, who are at higher risk for sanctions. Case managers believe that limited flexibility sometimes creates a mismatch between what clients are required to do and what they are able to do. Case managers and program administrators believe that more flexibility would help them in setting realistic participation expectations for families experiencing several challenges in their lives.
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Monitoring participation in work activities is an integral component of implementing TANF sanctions. Careful monitoring provides case managers with the information they need to identify clients who are not participating in program activities and therefore are at risk of sanctions. Given that several case managers and several agencies are often involved in arranging and monitoring employment-related services for TANF recipients, the development of an effective monitoring system is a complicated endeavor. Effective monitoring and tracking of participation in work activities requires frequent contact with clients, clear communication between case managers and employment service providers, and efficient and timely reporting procedures.
The study sites all have systems in place for monitoring participation in program activities. The specific procedures used to monitor participation varied across the sites, but the case managers uniformly reported that they had access to the information they needed to monitor compliance with work requirements and that the information was provided to them in a consistent and timely manner. Still, local TANF administrators reported that monitoring participation is an ongoing challenge.
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Because of the way we selected the sites for the study, we have no way of knowing the degree to which the experiences of the study sites are representative of the experiences of most other local welfare offices. It was clear that the offices in the study sites had invested considerable time and energy to develop monitoring and tracking systems that allowed them to monitor program participation closely and in a timely manner. In a study of pre-welfare reform employment programs, Hamilton and Scrivener (1999) found that programs with a high level of enforcement, including close monitoring and tracking, produce higher participation rates than programs with a low level of enforcement. Effective monitoring may also benefit clients: knowing that their participation may be closely monitored might motivate clients to participate in program activities to avoid sanctions. Close monitoring of program participation also may expedite the identification of clients who are not participating because of one or more personal or family challenges or logistical barriers.
Each of the local welfare offices we visited during the study rely on formal and informal mechanisms for monitoring and tracking client participation. The offices use the information gathered on participation to make decisions about granting regular and good cause exemptions and imposing and reversing sanctions. Case managers rely little on client self-reports to track participation. Instead, the local welfare agencies we visited rely heavily on employment service providers or in-house employment units to manage monitoring and tracking responsibilities. In most cases, the welfare agencies themselves provide at least some employment-related services, making it possible for them to observe directly whether a client is participating. While monthly monitoring and tracking reports are the main source of information on participation, case managers also used other formal and informal communication strategies to obtain information on current participation and to confer with their colleagues about strategies for overcoming participation problems.
Monitoring and Tracking Reports. Most employment service providers in the study sites submit a weekly or monthly tracking report to the welfare office as a condition of their service contract. The reports summarize the number of hours and types of activities in which clients participated for the designated time period. In local offices with high caseloads where managers have less face-to-face contact with clients, welfare staff rely heavily on the monitoring and tracking reports to identify clients who are not participating in work activities.
Direct Notification. In addition to formal reports, employment service providers in each of the sites we visited during the study contact the case manager directly by telephone or e-mail when a client fails to attend a workshop session or participate in some other work activity. In most cases, employment service providers notify case managers within a few days if a client is not participating in work activities.
Formal Case Conferences. In some of the local offices, welfare and employment service provider staff meet regularly to discuss cases. For example, in one local office in New Jersey, staff from the local community college and welfare office conduct biweekly "Job Link" meetings in which they discuss problem cases, including clients not participating in work activities. In one South Carolina office, unit supervisors meet monthly with case managers to identify clients who are not participating and to determine how they may reengage them in program activities.
Informal Contact Between Welfare and Employment Service Provider Staff. Within most local welfare offices, welfare and employment service provider staff engage in frequent exchanges. In one local office, the administrator from the employment service provider visits the welfare office weekly to interact with staff. In some cases, employment service providers are colocated in the welfare office or are otherwise nearby. In one of the South Carolina offices, the in-house specialty unit provides employment services to TANF clients in a double-wide trailer located in the parking lot of the welfare office. Such proximity facilitates regular interaction among staff, making it easy to share information on clients who are not participating in work activities.
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Nonparticipation in work activities triggers the start of a process whereby case managers decide whether to impose a sanction. Case managers might simply base their decision on a client's record of participation, or they might follow a more personal approach, taking into account a client's unique circumstances. The two approaches afford case managers markedly different degrees of discretion: the first approach offers little discretion while the second approach offers considerable discretion. While less discretion may result in more equitable application of sanctions, case managers' exercise of more discretion provides clients with the opportunity to disclose and resolve issues that may have contributed to their inability to participate in program activities.
The study sites used a combination of the two approaches. When a recipient shows no record of participation in program activities and has had no contact with any program staff, case managers almost always decide to impose a sanction. The process for handling cases that show some record of participation is much more complicated, resulting in some variation among case managers within a site and substantial variation across sites.
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When case managers need to decide whether to impose a sanction, they weigh the cost of imposing the sanction against potential benefits. When sanctions are not imposed, the result may appear inequitable to other clients who are sanctioned for nonparticipation. In addition, if clients do not believe that a sanction will be imposed, they may be less likely to comply with program requirements. Case managers work in different office cultures, carry varying workloads, and build different relationships with their clients, all of which influence how they approach their work generally and how they approach sanctions specifically.
Sanction Message. Several factors converge to create a unique culture in each welfare office. With respect to sanctions, program administrators often set the tone as to how they are implemented. For example, a local administrator may decide that sanctions should be imposed only as a last resort; others, believing that the imposition of sanctions will lead to greater participation, might decide to impose sanctions without delay. In some cases, the local office culture may reflect a position taken by state administrators and handed down to local administrators. The use of sanctions in South Carolina over time illustrates the extent to which program administrators influence the decision on whether to impose sanctions. After a change in administration, the fraction of cases closed because of a sanction dropped from 25 percent to between 5 and 10 percent. At the outset of welfare reform, South Carolina's state welfare administrator emphasized a strong "work first" message that used immediate full-family sanctions to promote participation in work activities. His replacement, with pressure from local advocacy groups, changed the state's sanction philosophy from using sanctions as a first to a last resort.
Case Manager's Workload. When case managers carry large caseloads, they are more likely to rely solely on participation reports to decide whether to impose a sanction. Large caseloads make it impossible for case managers to individualize case management activities and less likely to be able to do the work necessary to uncover the conditions that might be contributing to participation problems. When case managers carry large caseloads and need to follow complex procedures for imposing a sanction, time constraints alone lead to the imposition of few sanctions. In fact, local offices with high workloads tend to automate rather than individualize the sanction process. For example, in one local office in New Jersey with heavy workloads, case managers rely on reports from employment service providers to determine when to impose sanctions. In another local office in New Jersey where case managers carry more manageable workloads they conduct home visits, telephone clients, and send letters to clients before imposing a sanction.
Complexity of the Sanction Process. In study sites characterized by a complex sanction process, case managers often are reluctant to impose sanctions because of the time needed to navigate the sanction process. For example, in one of the local sites, the review process for imposing a sanction includes a conciliation review, an extensive written report, and approval from the supervisor and local office administrator--a process that takes between two and four months. Accordingly, workers report that they use sanctions to encourage compliance but rarely impose them.
Relationship with the Client. Case managers in the study sites frequently mentioned that their decisions about whether to impose sanctions are influenced substantially by their relationships with their clients. Case managers report that they are less likely to initiate a sanction if the client consistently communicates with them about their circumstances. It is when clients do not respond to case managers' telephone calls or letters that case managers tend to initiate a sanction. Case managers also indicated that they will continue to work with a nonparticipating client without imposing a sanction if the client is willing to "meet them halfway" by making an effort toward progressing in their work plan. For example, for a client seeking a medical exemption from work activities, the case manager may identify a doctor who will conduct the evaluation but require the client to make the appointment to obtain the necessary documentation.
Comfort Level in Imposing Sanctions. Case managers vary in their comfort level in imposing sanctions. Some case managers worry about the sanction's adverse consequences on a family. Other case managers feel strongly that a sanction encourages recipients otherwise not inclined to participate to do so. When they are able to take steps to make sure that clients do not have any personal or family challenges that may limit their ability to participate, some case managers are more comfortable in imposing sanctions. Some case managers, believing that certain nonparticipating clients have access to other resources, are less concerned about adverse consequences and more willing to impose a sanction.
Number and Types of Personal and Family Challenges. Some case managers noted that they often give substantial leeway to clients with several serious barriers such as homelessness, mental or physical health problems, and learning disabilities, among others. If they believe that clients are facing circumstances that interfere with their ability to work or participate in work activities, they might delay the imposition of a sanction. Some case managers also take extra time to learn what might be causing a participation problem. For example, a case manager in one of the sites reported "a gut feeling" about a client who was not participating in her case plan. After conducting a home visit, the case manager discovered that the client had a child with severe behavioral problems and another child who was sick. Another case manager indicated that she checks the case record to see if nonparticipating clients have access to child care and transportation benefits. If they lack such supports, the case manager does not initiate a sanction.
Efforts to Reengage Clients Before Imposing a Sanction. In most of the sites we visited, case managers described extensive efforts to reengage nonparticipating clients before imposing a sanction. Case managers in each of the local offices send clients a sanction warning notice or letter advising them that that they are out of compliance, describing what they must do to meet participation requirements, and outlining the consequences of continued nonparticipation. Case managers in most of the local offices said that they contacted noncompliant clients by telephone. Two local offices, one in New Jersey and one in South Carolina, conduct home visits to nonparticipants. In some local offices, employment service providers also attempt to reengage nonparticipating clients. In all of the local offices, program administrators emphasize to case managers the importance of documenting efforts to reengage nonparticipating clients in the event that clients appeal the sanction. In both offices in South Carolina, the local office administrators will not approve a sanction unless case managers have documented that they made several attempts to reengage the nonparticipating client.
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Imposing sanctions is one of many tasks performed by TANF eligibility workers. As such, the procedures for imposing a sanction are often closely related to the procedures for handling other eligibility functions. Imposing a sanction usually involves several steps: (1) documenting program noncompliance, (2) sending sanction notices to clients, (3) conducting sanction conciliation reviews, (4) changing eligibility codes in the automated system to reflect changes in program status and the grant amount, and (5) monitoring the level and duration of the sanction. While the decision to impose a sanction involves considerable worker discretion, the actual process for imposing a sanction after that decision has been made is primarily procedural and involves little worker discretion.
In the study sites, the process for imposing a sanction ranges from relatively simple to highly complex. The more complex processes occurred at two stages. The first set of complexities occurred at the documentation stage and involved several levels of review to ensure the appropriate documentation of program noncompliance. The second set of complexities occurred at the eligibility stage and involved several actions on the part of eligibility workers to impose and then monitor the level and duration of a sanction. Early in the implementation of welfare reform, several of the sites struggled with how to impose sanctions efficiently. Simple processes for implementing TANF sanctions that do not require several levels of review make it easy for workers to impose sanctions but do not necessarily provide assurance that sanctions are implemented properly.
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Design of the State's Sanction Policy. Two of the study states (Illinois and New Jersey) implemented gradual full-family sanctions; South Carolina implemented immediate full-family sanctions. Given the interaction of several factors, it is difficult to tell how much the design of the state's sanction policy influenced the ease with which sanctions were implemented. Nonetheless, the state sanction policies clearly influenced the sanction process. In South Carolina, the design of the sanction policy (immediate full-family sanction) makes it relatively straightforward to change a recipient's eligibility status to take the sanction into account--the case is simply closed with a code indicating that the sanction was the reason for the closure. Because Illinois's and New Jersey's sanction policies are more complex and require multiple grant changes, they require more staff attention. In both states, case workers must initially reduce the grant and then later close the case if the family does not come into compliance. To streamline the process of imposing a sanction, both offices in New Jersey created separate sanction units to process all the eligibility changes for sanctioned TANF recipients. In one office in Illinois, these changes all are handled by one worker.
State and Local Philosophy Toward Sanctions. The experience in South Carolina demonstrates the way in which the state and local philosophy toward sanctions can influence the implementation of sanctions. When South Carolina made an explicit decision to reduce the use of sanctions, the approach to implementing sanctions shifted dramatically. After the decision, one local site required case managers to submit a detailed two- to three-page report describing the client's barriers, assigned work activities, and missed appointments; the case manager's efforts to reengage the client in work activities; and the outcome of reengagement efforts. The change in philosophy resulted in the imposition of fewer sanctions, along with substantial safeguards to reduce the inappropriate imposition of sanctions. (When these changes were implemented in South Carolina, the fraction of cases closed due to a sanction dropped from 25 percent to just 5 to 10 percent.)
Automation of the Sanction Process. As noted above, Illinois and New Jersey operate under similar sanction policies with gradual full-family sanctions and several levels of sanction for repeat instances of noncompliance. In both states, workers initially enter a code to reduce the grant, then they must follow-up at the appropriate interval to eliminate the full grant or close the case. The automated eligibility system calculates the amount of the grant, taking the sanction into account. However, workers must prompt the eligibility system to go from the initial partial sanction to the full-family sanction.
Despite variation across the study sites in the ease with which a sanction could be imposed, all sites have processes in place to promote proper use of sanctions. Local advocacy groups in South Carolina and Illinois were particularly influential in increasing awareness about the appropriate use of sanctions. The sites we visited during the study use different review processes to promote proper use of sanctions. All of the study sites require conciliation or supervisory reviews before imposition of a sanction. South Carolina requires approval from the supervisor and the county TANF director, and case managers use formal conciliation reviews to determine why clients are not participating in work activities as well as informal reviews to attempt to address clients' problems before imposing sanctions. One office in Illinois invites employment service staff and other community partners to attend conciliation meetings. Clients in all the study sites can appeal a sanction after it is imposed, although they rarely do so. The only sites in which clients brought appeals regularly were in New Jersey; one local site in that state received about 50 sanction appeals in one year.
Review processes also are in place for identifying clients who still receive TANF even though they are not complying with work requirements. Case managers acknowledged that sometimes clients "fall through the cracks." In one local office, supervisors gather information from participation reports and meet regularly with case managers to discuss cases in which sanctions have not been imposed on nonparticipating clients. The purpose of the review processes is to support case managers and clients and to ensure equity in the imposition of sanctions.
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Sanctions are intended to encourage families otherwise not inclined to participate in work activities to do so. In some cases, reluctant participants might decide to participate immediately after they are informed of the financial penalties associated with not participating or after they receive a notice advising them that their grant will be reduced or terminated. However, some families may not respond to these early warnings. Thus, programs must develop strategies for reengaging recipients in program activities after they are sanctioned. In addition to providing opportunities for sanctioned families deciding to comply on their own, the strategies might include proactive outreach efforts designed to encourage families to come into compliance.
The study sites all had instituted explicit procedures (known as "cure" requirements) for reengaging sanctioned recipients in work activities. While local offices had some flexibility in the implementation of the procedures, they were largely constrained by state policy decisions. None of the sites had implemented outreach strategies designed to encourage recipients to comply following the imposition of sanctions.
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States need to strike a delicate balance in developing and implementing cure requirements. Case managers believe that clients who complete strict cure requirements demonstrate that they have the capacity and willingness to participate in work activities. However, case managers worry that some clients with personal and family challenges may face barriers that preclude them from fulfilling the requirements. In addition, cure requirements perceived as too demanding may deter sanctioned clients from ever trying to comply. On the other hand, case managers fear that cure requirements that are too lenient may encourage clients to come into compliance, only to stop participating shortly thereafter. This revolving door increases the workload for welfare staff and may reduce the incentive for recipients to participate at the levels specified in federal law.
The study sites took different approaches to establishing cure requirements. In South Carolina, clients are required to participate in work activities for 30 consecutive days before the sanction is cured. New Jersey requires clients to participate for 10 consecutive days. If clients begin but do not complete the 10-day probationary period, they move to the next level of sanction, which is more stringent. In Illinois, clients must sign a "commitment to participate" form. Although state law specifies no minimum period of participation, Illinois case managers may impose a minimum probationary participation period. If the TANF case is closed, families must reapply for benefits and complete the 30-day up-front job search diversion requirement. All the states requiring a probationary period give sanctioned clients work supports (e.g., transportation and child care) as they try to cure their sanction.
In an effort to streamline the sanction compliance process, as a first step in curing their sanction, one of the local offices in New Jersey requires all sanctioned clients to attend a sanction compliance meeting held every Monday from 9:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. The purpose of the meeting is to (1) screen and assess clients, (2) advise clients what they must do to reverse their sanction, and (3) assist clients in obtaining child care and transportation assistance. The meeting is conducted by a case manager designated to work exclusively with sanctioned clients who need to cure their sanctions. She manages the entire process for reversing the sanctions. According to case managers, centralization of reengagement efforts reduces their workload since many clients who indicate an interest in curing their sanction do not follow through with participation in required activities. In the other sites, individual case managers work with clients as they reapply for benefits or try to have their benefits restored.
In all the sites, responsibility for initiating the process to cure sanctions resides with the client. Clients who want to cure their sanction are required to contact their case manager and complete the steps for lifting the sanction. None of the study sites has formal processes in place to conduct outreach to sanctioned TANF recipients once their TANF case is closed. All proactive efforts to encourage participation occur before imposition of the sanction.
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This analysis suggests that sanction policies, administrative procedures, and case manager discretion all influence how sanctions are implemented at the local level. Sanction policies provide a framework for implementing TANF sanctions while administrative procedures provide case managers with the information and tools they need to impose the sanctions. In all the sites, case managers were well schooled in the structure of sanction policies and how to apply them. In deciding whether to impose a sanction, case managers consider both the severity of the sanction and the ease with which it can be applied. Some managers are hesitant to impose a more stringent sanction if they believe it will create too much hardship for a family, and many choose not to apply sanctions if the administrative procedures are cumbersome.
The extent to which case managers use their discretion in deciding whether to impose sanctions largely depends on their workload. When workloads are high and administrative procedures not particularly cumbersome, managers tend to base their sanction decisions solely on client participation, relying little on their discretion. When workloads are more manageable, case managers exercise considerable discretion in deciding whether and when to impose sanctions. Case managers often choose not to impose a sanction when they know that a family is facing serious personal and family challenges and actively working to overcome those challenges. Case managers with more manageable workloads also invest time in trying to reengage recipients in work activities before imposing a sanction. Only after those efforts fail do they begin the process of imposing a sanction.
In all the study sites, case managers report that encouraging the participation of all TANF recipients in a standard set of work activities (primarily job search) is an ongoing challenge because of the broad array of personal and family challenges clients face. Case managers rely on alternative program options when they are available and needed but feel that their efforts to address clients' individual circumstances often are constrained because of the emphasis on engaging recipients in a standard set of countable work activities. While they have some flexibility to modify recipients' employment plans, case managers would prefer a system that routinely permits them to engage recipients in a broader range of program activities. They also feel that their efforts to address recipients' individual needs are hampered by recipients themselves. Despite routine assessments, case managers report that many personal and family challenges often remain unidentified until after participation problems arise.
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