1. Selection of Sliding Scales or Flat Rates
    Related to issues of price sensitivity is the decision of whether to implement a flat fee premium for all participants or one that is based on a sliding-scale. While a flat-fee may be administratively appealing because it is simpler to administer, designing premiums on an income-based sliding scale may encourage greater participation. Of the nine states examined in this study, the Colorado Children's Health Plan is the only program that has a flat enrollment fee. The Colorado program has a $25 enrollment fee per participating child per year up to a total of $125 per family. Of the other eight states, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee all have monthly premiums based on a sliding scale that is based on family size and income. The California Kids and Washington Basic Health Plan Plus programs have no premiums.

    The Florida Healthy Kids program has a sliding scale based on three levels and premiums vary by county. Levels are based on the eligibility criteria the state uses for enrollment in the school lunch program: Free Lunch, Reduced Lunch, and Not on Lunch Program. This results in premiums in Volusia County of $10 per member/month for students on the free lunch program, $25 for students on the reduced lunch program, and $48 per month for those not participating in the lunch program. Florida Healthy Kids chose sliding scales based on the lunch program rather than income because it was easier for families to understand. The program staff indicated that many families do not know what percentage of poverty they are, whereas they know if they are receiving free or reduced lunch.

    Other programs have opted to base their monthly premiums on income. For example, TennCare participants who are below 100% FPL receive fully subsidized services, and those above 400% of the poverty level pay the full cost of the premium. Families that are between 100% and 400% of the poverty level pay premiums based on a sliding scale. States with premiums based on a sliding scale are illustrated in Attachment A.

  2. Other Factors Determining Premiums and Cost-Sharing
  3. Additional issues raised by the states in determining premium and cost-sharing features of their programs included raising revenues through premiums to offset costs and the use of copayments to affect utilization of services.

    States looked at raising premium levels to offset costs of adding services to their benefit packages. For example, to finance the addition of inpatient care, New York's Child Health Plus raised premium levels for all but the poorest families. Families with incomes between 120% and 160% of the federal poverty level went from paying no premium to a maximum of $36/member/month. Those with incomes above 160% of poverty saw their premiums rise 400% or more. Children in families earning less than 120% of the poverty level continue to receive coverage for free.

    States also considered how copayments would affect the utilization of health services. For example, some states have implemented higher copayments for emergency room services, which are generally viewed as costly and often inappropriately utilized, to encourage families to seek preventive and primary care services for their children. In order to encourage families to seek preventive care, the CaliforniaKids Program implemented a $25 copayment for emergency room use. Since the co-pay for doctor visits is only $5, the incentive is for parents to take their children to the physician's office and not the emergency room. Vision and dental copayments are set at $10 each, as well as $10 for non-generic prescriptions. This is to encourage parents to only purchase these items when they are absolutely needed. The Florida Healthy Kids program adopted a similar approach, requiring a $25 copayment for emergency room use, compared to a $5 co-pay for a physician visit.

  4. The Impact of Premiums and Copayments on Substitution
  5. The majority of states' efforts to limit substitution have been focused on the dynamics that drive families to "opt out" of purchasing insurance coverage for their children. State strategies to limit individual-based substitution have included the use of premiums and copayments that mirror requirements in the private market. For example, New York State believed that a $9-$13 monthly premium per child up to a family of three would discourage most families from dropping private insurance to enroll in the New York Child Health Plus Program. Data, however, did not support this belief. As a result, the state program continues to experiment with cost-sharing.

    States have also established copayments for physician visits, prescription, and emergency room use to mirror the requirements of private coverage. The Florida Healthy Kids program also believes that setting copayments at a comparable rate to private health coverage discourages families from substituting private coverage for the Healthy Kids program.

  6. The Role of Administrative Costs in Developing Approaches to Cost-sharing
  7. The administrative burdens on the program or its providers to collect premiums or copayments is another issue considered by the states. Many programs have shifted the burden of collecting copayments to providers in order to reduce the administrative costs to the program. However, it has been suggested by some states that, in many cases, providers have either been unable or unwilling to collect copayments from beneficiaries who were incapable or unwilling to pay for services rendered. This becomes a concern for providers who collect copayments from patients as a portion of their reimbursement under the program. For these providers, the inability to collect copayments may result in an overall decrease in their total reimbursement by the program.

    In addition to copayments, to the extent that premium arrangements are complex, administrative burdens may be increased. While all programs need to verify income to establish program eligibility, if premiums are set on a sliding scale, there are concerns with the need for more frequent verification procedures. States also identified concerns with administrative burdens required to communicate the complexities of the payment arrangements to both participants and providers. Costs associated with these issues were not identified.

    With the enactment of Title XXI, states will also be determining how best to handle the 5% limit on cost-sharing as a percent of income for families above 150% of the poverty level. For example as Colorado moves into its Title XXI program, The Colorado Children's Health Insurance Plan, they have decided that asking plans to monitor levels of family income for those above 150% of the poverty level would be too burdensome. Consequently, Colorado will allow families to monitor their own income. When a family's income changes so that the cost-sharing would exceed 5% of their income, families must submit documentation of their income to the state. At that point the state will reevaluate the family's cost-sharing. Colorado has also set the cost-sharing limits low enough so that there will be very few instances where the 5% is exceeded. Decisions regarding the details of the verification process were still being made at the time of this review.

  Individual child per month Family with two or more children, per month Copayments
Under 100% FPL No premium No premium $0-2 depending on service
101-150% FPL $9 $15 $0-2 depending on service
151-169% $15 $25 $0-5 depending on service
170-185% $20 $30 $0-5 depending on service