Indicators of Welfare Dependence: Annual Report to Congress, 2003

Appendix A.
Program Data

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Contents

• Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
• Food Stamp Program
• Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

Endnotes

The Welfare Indicators Act of 1994 specifies that the annual welfare indicators reports shall include analyses of families and individuals receiving assistance under three means-tested benefit programs: the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program authorized under part A of title IV of the Social Security Act (replaced with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996), the Food Stamp Program under the Food Stamp Act of 1977, as amended, and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program under title XVI of the Social Security Act. This chapter includes information on these three programs, derived primarily from administrative data reported by state and federal agencies instead of the national survey data presented in previous chapters. National caseloads and expenditure trend information on each of the three programs is included, as well as state-by-state trend tables and information on the characteristics of program participants.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was established by the Social Security Act of 1935 as a grant program to enable states to provide cash welfare payments for needy children who had been deprived of parental support or care because their father or mother was absent from the home, incapacitated, deceased, or unemployed. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands operated an AFDC program. States defined "need," set their own benefit levels, established (within federal limitations) income and resource limits, and administered the program or supervised its administration. States were entitled to unlimited federal funds for reimbursement of benefit payments, at "matching" rates that were inversely related to state per capita income. States were required to provide aid to all persons who were in classes eligible under federal law and whose income and resources were within state-set limits.

During the 1990s, the federal government increasingly used its authority under section 1115 of the Social Security Act to waive portions of the federal requirements under AFDC. This allowed states to test such changes as expanded earned income disregards, increased work requirements and stronger sanctions for failure to comply with them, time limits on benefits, and expanded access to transitional benefits such as child care and medical assistance. As a condition of receiving waivers, states were required to conduct rigorous evaluations of the impacts of these changes on the welfare receipt, employment, and earnings of participants.

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) replaced AFDC, AFDC administration, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program and the Emergency Assistance (EA) program with a cash welfare block grant called the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Key elements of TANF include a lifetime limit of five years (60 months) on the amount of time a family with an adult can receive assistance funded with federal funds, increasing work participation rate requirements which states must meet, and broad state flexibility on program design. Spending through the TANF block grant is capped and funded at $16.5 billion per year, slightly above fiscal year 1995 federal expenditures for the four component programs. States must also meet a "maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement" by spending on needy families at least 75 percent of the amount of state funds used in FY 1994 on these programs (80 percent if they fail work participation rate requirements).

TANF gives states wide latitude in spending both Federal TANF funds and state MOE funds. Subject to a few restrictions, TANF funds may be used in any way that supports one of the four statutory purposes of TANF: to provide assistance to needy families so that children can be cared for at home; to end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work and marriage; to prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and to encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.

Recent Legislative Action

Legislative authority for the TANF block grant program expired September 2002. In February 2002, President Bush proposed a plan, Working Toward Independence, to strengthen welfare reform, in order to help families remaining on welfare and other low-income families move toward self-sufficiency. In May 2002, the House of Representatives passed HR 4737, the Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2002, which incorporated all of the key elements of the President's plan. The Senate did not take up welfare reform legislation in the 107^th Congress, so the program was temporarily extended. In February 2003, the House of Representatives passed HR 4, the Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003, an updated version of HR 4737, which would implement all of the key elements of the President's plan. Senate action is expected in 2003.

Data Issues Relating to the AFDC-TANF Transition

States had the option of beginning their TANF programs as soon as PRWORA was enacted in August 1996, and a few states began TANF programs as early as September 1996. All states were required to implement TANF by July 1, 1997. Because states implemented TANF at different times, the FY 1997 data reflect a combination of the AFDC and TANF programs. In some states, limited data are available for FY 1997 because states were given a transition period of six months after they implemented TANF before they were required to report data on the characteristics and work activities of TANF participants.

Because of the greatly expanded range of activities allowed under TANF, a substantial portion of TANF funds are being spent on activities other than cash payments to families. When tracking overall expenditure trends, the tables in this Appendix (e.g., Table TANF 3) include only those TANF funds spent on "cash and work-based assistance" and "administrative costs," not on work activities, supportive services, or other allowable uses of funds. Spending on these other activities is detailed in Table TANF 5. Note that TANF administrative costs include funds spent administering all activities, not just cash and work-based assistance. (Administrative costs under AFDC had included a small amount of funds for administering AFDC child care programs; such programs, and the costs of administering them, were transferred to the Child Care and Development Fund as part of PRWORA).

There also is potential for discontinuity between the AFDC and the TANF caseload figures. For example, under TANF there is no longer a separate "Unemployed Parent" (UP) program, as there was under AFDC. While a separate work participation rate is calculated for two-parent families, this population is not identical to the UP caseload under AFDC. Another program change is that under TANF some states provide cash and other forms of assistance to specific categories of families (e.g., two-parent families) under Separate State Programs; the TANF caseload figures do not include these families. Finally, it is possible that a limited number of families will be considered recipients of TANF assistance, even if they do not receive a monthly cash benefit. At present, the vast majority of families receiving "assistance" ⁽¹⁾ are, in fact, receiving cash payments; however, this may change over time.

AFDC/TANF Program Data

The following tables and figures present data on caseloads, expenditures, and recipient characteristics of the AFDC and TANF programs. Trends in national caseloads and expenditures are shown in Figure TANF 1 and the first set of tables (Tables TANF 1-6). These are followed by information on characteristics of AFDC/TANF families (Table TANF 7) and a series of tables presenting state-by-state data on trends in the AFDC/TANF program (Tables TANF 8-13). These data complement the data on trends in AFDC recipiency and participation rates shown in Tables IND 4a and IND 5a in Chapter II.

AFDC/TANF Caseload Trends (Figure TANF 1, Tables TANF 1-2). Welfare caseloads have declined dramatically during the past several years. In fiscal year 2001, the average monthly number of TANF recipients was 5.4 million persons, 57 percent lower than the average monthly AFDC caseload in fiscal year 1996 and the smallest number of people on welfare since 1968. From the peak of 14.4 million in March 1994, the number of AFDC/TANF recipients dropped by 65 percent to 5.0 million in September 2002. Over three-fourths of the reduction in the caseload since March 1994 has occurred following the implementation of TANF. These are the largest welfare caseload declines in the history of U.S. welfare programs.

As shown in Figure TANF 1, AFDC caseloads generally tended to increase in times of economic recession and decline in times of economic growth. The recent decline, however, has far outstripped that experienced in any previous period.

Several studies have attempted to explain the unprecedented decline in caseloads and, specifically, to disentangle the effects of PRWORA and welfare reform from the simultaneous growth in the U.S. economy. Separating these effects is difficult, however, because PRWORA was enacted at a time when the economy was expanding dramatically, offering a uniquely conducive environment within which to move many recipients off the welfare rolls and into the labor market. Other policy changes, most notably expansions in the Earned Income Tax credit, add further complexity.

In general, studies have found that both economic conditions and welfare reform policies have played important roles in the recent caseload decline. A review of a dozen studies concluded that roughly 15 to 30 percent of the caseload decline prior to 1996 was attributed by most studies to welfare policies under waivers to the AFDC rules with approximately 30 to 45 percent of the decline explained by economic conditions (Schoeni and Blank, 2000). A study by the Council of Economic Advisers (1999) of the post-PRWORA period finds that just over one-third of caseload decline can be explained by welfare reform policy, while 8 to 10 percent is due to the economy. A more recent study estimates that over half the decline in caseloads after enactment of PRWORA were attributable to welfare reform (O'Neill and Hill, 2001).

AFDC/TANF Expenditures (Tables TANF 3-6 and Figure TANF 2). Tables TANF 3, 4 and 5 show trends in expenditures on AFDC and TANF. Table TANF 3 tracks both programs, breaking out the costs of benefits and administrative expenses. It also shows the division between federal and state spending. Table TANF 4 breaks out the benefits paid under the single parent or "basic" program and the Unemployed Parent (UP) program, and also nets out the value of child support collected on behalf of recipient children, but retained by the state to reimburse welfare expenditures. This table presents data through 1996 only, because the TANF data reporting requirements do not require that caseload data be separated into "basic" and "UP" components. Table TANF 5 shows the variety of activities funded under the TANF program.

Figure TANF 2 and Table TANF 6 show that inflation has had a significant effect in eroding the value of the average monthly AFDC/TANF benefit. In real dollars, the average monthly benefit per recipient in 2001 was 62 percent of what it was at its peak in the late 1970s.

AFDC/TANF Recipient Characteristics (Table TANF 7). With the dramatic declines in the welfare rolls since the implementation of TANF, there has been a great deal of speculation regarding how the composition of the caseload has changed. Two striking trends are the increases in the proportion of child-only cases and in employment among adult recipients.

One of the most dramatic trends is the recent jump in the proportion of adult recipients who are working. In FY 2001, 27 percent of TANF adult recipients were employed, up from 11 percent in FY 1996 and 7 percent in FY 1992, as shown in Table TANF 7. Adding in those in work experience and community service positions, the percentage working was at an all-time high of 33 percent in FY 2001 (data not shown). Similar upward trends are shown in data on income from earnings. These trends likely reflect positive effects of welfare-to-work programs, the strong economy, and the fact that, with larger earnings disregards, families with earnings do not exit welfare as rapidly. In addition, the increased employment of welfare recipients is consistent with broader trends in labor force participation among mothers with young children. Among single mothers with children under six and family income below 200 percent of the Federal poverty level, for example, the employment rate increased from 35 percent in 1992 to 59 percent in 2000 (data not shown). In addition, employment rates for white and black women ages 18 to 65 with no more than a high school education were at all-time highs in 1999, and for Hispanic women in 2000. There was some leveling off among all three groups in 2001 (as shown in WORK 2 in Chapter III).

Another dramatic change in the caseload is the increasing fraction of cases without an adult recipient (i.e., child-only cases). Such cases occur when the adults are ineligible (because they are a caretaker relative, SSI parent, immigrant parent, or sanctioned parent). Child-only cases have climbed from 11.6 percent of the caseload in FY 1990 to 37.1 percent in FY 2001. This dramatic growth has been due to both the overall decline in the number of adult-present cases as well as an increase in the number of child-only cases. Child-only cases are generally not subject to the work requirements or time limits under TANF.

In other areas, the administrative data show fewer changes in composition than might have been expected. There has been widespread anecdotal evidence that the most job ready recipients B those with the fewest barriers to employment B have already exited the welfare caseload and have stopped coming onto the welfare rolls, leaving a more disadvantaged population remaining. However, as the expectations for welfare recipients have increased, and fewer recipients are totally exempted from work requirements, others have speculated that the most disadvantaged recipients may also have been sanctioned off the rolls or terminated for failure to comply with administrative requirements. In fact, analyses of program data have not found much evidence of an increase or decline in readily observed barriers to employment in the current caseload.

The question of whether the caseload has become more disadvantaged cannot be answered simply through administrative data provided by the states, which do not contain detailed information on such barriers to employment as lack of basic skills, alcohol and drug abuse, domestic violence, and disabilities. A few recent studies have found very high levels of these barriers among the TANF population. These studies also have found that the effects of these barriers are interactive; while any one barrier to employment can often be overcome, the more barriers a recipient faces, the less likely she is to find a job and maintain consistent employment over a period of time.

AFDC/TANF State-by-State Trends (Tables TANF 8-14). There is a great deal of state-to-state variation in the trends discussed above. For example, as shown in Table TANF 10, while every state has experienced a caseload decline since 1993, the percentage change between the state's caseload peak and September 2002 ranges from 94 percent (Wyoming) to 29 percent (Nevada). Six states have experienced caseload declines of 75 percent or more. Table TANF 10 also shows that states reached their peak caseloads as early as May 1990 (Louisiana) and as late as June 1997 (Hawaii).

Figure TANF 1.
AFDC/TANF Families Receiving Income Assistance

Figure TANF 2.
Average Monthly AFDC/TANF Benefit per Recipient in Constant Dollars

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Food Stamp Program

The Food Stamp Program, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service, is the largest food assistance program in the country, reaching more poor individuals over the course of a year than any other public assistance program. Unlike many other public assistance programs, the Food Stamp Program has few categorical requirements for eligibility, such as the presence of children, elderly, or disabled individuals in a household. As a result, the program offers assistance to a large and diverse population of needy persons, many of whom are not eligible for other forms of assistance.

The Food Stamp Program was designed primarily to increase the food purchasing power of eligible low-income households to the point where they can buy a nutritionally adequate low-cost diet. Participating households are expected to be able to devote 30 percent of their counted monthly cash income (after adjusting for various deductions) to food purchases. Food stamp benefits then make up the difference between the household's expected contribution to its food costs and an amount judged to be sufficient to buy an adequate low-cost diet. This amount, the maximum food stamp benefit level, is derived from USDA's lowest-cost food plan, the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP).

The Federal government is responsible for virtually all of the rules that govern the program, and, with limited variations, these rules are nationally uniform, as are the benefit levels. Nonetheless, States, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, through their local welfare offices, have primary responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the program. They determine eligibility, calculate benefits, and issue food stamp allotments. The Food Stamp Act provides 100 percent federal funding of food stamp benefits. States and other jurisdictions have responsibility for about half the cost of state and local food stamp agency administration.

In addition to the regular Food Stamp Program, the Food Stamp Act authorizes alternative programs in Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. The largest of these, the Nutrition Assistance Program in Puerto Rico, had an average of 1.1 million participants in 2001, funded under a federal block grant of $1.3 billion. Unless noted otherwise, the food stamp caseload and expenditure data in this Appendix include costs for the Nutrition Assistance Program in Puerto Rico. Prior to 1982, the regular Food Stamp Program operated in Puerto Rico, under modified eligibility and benefit rules.

The Food Stamp Program has financial, employment/training-related, and "categorical" tests for eligibility. The basic food stamp beneficiary unit is the "household." Generally, individuals living together constitute a single food stamp household if they customarily purchase food and prepare meals together. Members of the same household must apply together, and their income, expenses, and assets normally are aggregated in determining food stamp eligibility and benefits. Except for households composed entirely of TANF, SSI, or general assistance recipients (who generally are automatically eligible for food stamps), monthly cash income is the primary food stamp eligibility determinant. Unless exempt, adult applicants for food stamps must register for work, typically with the welfare agency or a state employment service office. To maintain eligibility, they must accept a suitable job if offered one and fulfill any work, job search, or training requirements established by the administering welfare agencies.

Food stamp benefits are a function of a household's size, its net monthly income, its assets, and maximum monthly benefit levels. Allotments are not taxable and food stamp purchases may not be charged sales taxes. Receipt of food stamps does not affect eligibility for or benefits provided by other welfare programs, although some programs use food stamp participation as a "trigger" for eligibility and others take into account the general availability of food stamps in deciding what level of benefits to provide.

Recent Legislative and Regulatory Changes

Title IV and subtitle A of title VIII of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) contain major and extensive revisions to the Food Stamp Program, including strong work requirements on able-bodied adults without dependent children, restricted eligibility of legal immigrants, and a reduction in maximum benefits. These three provisions, and subsequent amendments, are discussed below; their impact on program participation and expenditures begins to appear in food stamp administrative data for 1997, with the fuller impact shown in data for 1998 and beyond.

First, a new work requirement was added for able-bodied adult food stamp recipients without dependents (ABAWDs). Unless exempt, ABAWDs between the ages of 18 and 59 are not eligible for benefits for more than 3 months in every 36-month period unless they are (1) working at least 20 hours a week; (2) participating in and complying with a work program for at least 20 hours a week; or (3) participating in and complying with a workfare program. Under the original legislation, the Department of Agriculture was authorized to waive application of the work requirement to any group of individuals at the request of the state agency, if a determination is made that the area where they reside has an unemployment rate over 10 percent or does not have a sufficient number of jobs to provide them employment. The provision was further moderated under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-33), which allowed states to exempt up to 15 percent of the ABAWD caseload (beyond those subject to waivers) and which increased funds for the food stamp employment and training program for the creation of job slots for able-bodied adults subject to time limits.

Separately, title IV of PRWORA made significant changes in the eligibility of noncitizens for food stamp benefits. As first enacted, most qualified aliens, including legal immigrants (illegal aliens were already ineligible) were barred from receiving food stamps until citizenship. Subsequently, the Agriculture Research, Extension and Education Reform Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-185) restored food stamp eligibility to certain groups of qualified aliens who were legally residing in the United States before passage of PRWORA on August 22, 1996 and were over 65 years of age on that date or are currently under age 18 or disabled.

Finally, the 1996 legislation restrained growth in future program expenditures by making changes in the benefit structure for eligible participants, including a reduction in the maximum food stamp allotment. Other provisions of the 1996 act disqualified from eligibility those convicted of drug-related felonies and gave states the option to disqualify individuals, both custodial and noncustodial parents, from food stamps when they do not cooperate with child support agencies or are in arrears in their child support.

Recent regulatory and legislative changes have been made to increase access to food stamps among working poor families. Regulatory changes announced in July 1999 and expanded in November 2000 allow states to reduce reporting requirements and make it easier for working families to report income changes on a semiannual basis. Under the November 2000 regulations, states also have the option of providing a three-month transitional food stamp benefit to most families leaving TANF. In addition, the Agriculture Appropriations Bill for 2001 (P.L. 106-387) provides states with the option of liberalizing the treatment of vehicle assets to align with the states' TANF rules on vehicle eligibility. These changes were intended to address concerns that some of the decline in food stamp caseloads may be leaving poor families without nutritional assistance as they make the transition from welfare dependence to full self-sufficiency.

The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 - also known as the Farm Bill - reauthorized the Food Stamp Program through fiscal year 2007. This law brought a number of significant changes to the program, including some which supercede earlier changes made through PRWORA and subsequent FSP legislation and regulations. Specifically, the Farm Bill restores food stamp eligibility to legal immigrants who have lived in the country five years and to legal immigrants receiving disability benefits, regardless of entry date. Children of legal immigrants are also eligible for food stamps regardless of entry date. Effective in fiscal year 2004, the requirement that income and resources of an immigrant's sponsor be counted in determining the eligibility and benefit amounts for immigrant children is eliminated. Each provision is effective at different times, but all restorations will be effective by April 1, 2003.

The Farm Bill also increased the asset limit from $2,000 to $3,000 for households with a disabled member, making it consistent with the limit for households with elderly, and replaces the fixed standard deduction with a deduction that varies according to household size and is indexed to cost-of-living increases, in recognition of the higher expenses larger households incur. For households in the 48 contiguous states and DC, Alaska, Hawaii and the Virgin Islands, the deduction is set at 8.31 percent of the applicable net income limit based on household size. (Households in Guam will receive a slightly higher deduction.) No household will receive an amount less than the previous fixed standard deduction or more than the standard deduction for a household of six.

Other Farm Bill changes include the authorization of $5 million per year for education and outreach grants to help inform the low-income public of their eligibility for food stamps, and increased flexibility for states in spending Employment and Training program funds to promote work. States also are now allowed to extend from three months to up to five months the period of time households may receive transitional food stamp benefits when they lose TANF cash assistance. Benefits are equal to the amount the household received prior to termination of TANF with adjustments in income for the loss of TANF. This change helps individuals moving off cash assistance to make the transition from welfare to work.

The Farm bill also implements a number of administrative reforms and program simplifications, including:

• changing the quality control system so that only those states with persistently high error rates will face liabilities;
• awarding bonuses to states that improve the quality and accuracy of their service;
• allowing states to exclude certain types of income and resources not counted under TANF or Medicaid, such as educational assistance, when determining food stamp eligibility;
• allowing states to deem child support payments as income exclusions rather than deductions as an incentive for parents to pay child support;
• allowing states to simplify the standard utility allowance (SUA) if the state elects to use the SUA rather than actual utility costs for all households, thus reducing administrative burden, costs and errors;
• permitting states to use a standard deduction from income of $143 per month for homeless households with some shelter expenses;
• allowing states to extend simplified reporting procedures to all households, not just households with earnings;
• eliminating the requirement that the Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) system be cost-neutral to the federal government to help support the EBT conversion process;
• allowing USDA to use alternative methods for issuing food stamp benefits during times of disaster when use of EBT is impractical;
• requiring food stamp applications be made available through the Internet; and
• combining Puerto Rico and American Samoa's block grants into one grant and indexing both with inflation.

Food Stamp Program Data

The following six tables and accompanying figure provide information about the Food Stamp Program, including information about the Nutrition Assistance Program in Puerto Rico:

• Tables FSP 1-2 and Figure FSP 1 present national caseload and expenditure trend data on the Food Stamp Program, as discussed below;
• Table FSP 3 presents some demographic characteristics of the food stamp caseload; and
• Tables FSP 4-6 present some state-by-state trend data on the Food Stamp Program through fiscal year 2001.

Food Stamp Caseload Trends (Tables FSP 1-2). Average monthly food stamp participation in 2001 (including participants in Puerto Rico's block grant) was 18.4 million persons. This represents a slight increase over the 2000 record-low average. Average monthly participation fell from its peak of 28.9 million in an average month in 1994 to an average of 18.2 million persons in 2000. Both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the population, food stamp recipiency in 2000 was lower than at any point in the previous twenty years. See also Table IND 3b and Table IND 4b in Chapter II for further data on the recent decline in food stamp recipiency and participation rates.

Considerable research has demonstrated that the Food Stamp Program is responsive to economic changes, with participation increasing in times of economic downturns and decreasing in times of economic growth (see Figure FSP 1). Economic conditions alone did not explain the caseload growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however. A congressionally mandated study in 1990 concluded that a variety of factors contributed to this caseload growth, including expansions in Medicaid eligibility and changes in immigration laws, particularly the legalization of undocumented aliens, as well as a rise in unemployment (McConnell, 1991). Longer spells of participation also contributed to the caseload increase, according to an analysis of longitudinal data from the Survey on Income and Program Participation (Gleason, 1998).

Economic conditions were a significant factor in explaining the drop in food stamp caseload since 1994, according to an Economic Research Service review of recent research (ERS, 2000). Several econometric models suggest that economic variables explain between 25 and 44 percent of the decline in caseload. The full effect of the economy may be even higher, to the extent that some of the unexplained variation in the models reflects local economic conditions not captured in state-level economic variables.

Policy changes, most notably the enactment of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, have also contributed to the recent decline in food stamp caseload. The most direct impact was the elimination of eligibility for most legal immigrants and for many childless adults aged 18-50. Participation for these two groups fell sharply between 1994 and 1998 (Genser, 1999). In addition, changes in TANF policy may have affected food stamp participation, although these effects are less certain. Many studies of families leaving TANF cash assistance have found that many of these families leave the Food Stamp Program as well, despite appearing eligible for food stamp benefits. Econometric studies of the effects of specific changes in TANF policy, however, have found that only a small share of the decline in state food stamp caseloads was associated with waivers to AFDC policies. Increased stigma about welfare use and unintentional diversion from the Food Stamp Program may be additional factors affecting food stamp participation.

Food Stamp Expenditures. Total program costs, shown in Table FSP 2, were slightly higher in 2001 than 2000, the first increase after six years of declining costs. Total program costs (including Puerto Rico) were $19.2 billion in 2001; the comparable 2000 cost was $19.0 billion (after adjusting for inflation). The small increase in costs parallels the small increase in average monthly participation discussed above and shown in Table FSP 1. Average monthly benefits per person, also shown in Table FSP2, continued their decline of recent years (after adjusting for inflation). Benefits were $75 per person in fiscal year 2001, considerably lower than the $87 per person benefit (in constant dollars) paid in 1992.

Food Stamp Household Characteristics. As shown in Table FSP 3, the proportion of food stamp households with earnings has increased, from about 20 percent for most of the 1980s and early 1990s, to 27 percent in 2001. At the same time, the proportion of households with income from AFDC/TANF has declined, from 42 percent in 1984 to 23 percent in 2001, following the dramatic decline in AFDC/TANF caseloads. Over half of all food stamp households have children, although the proportion has declined somewhat from over 60 percent in most of the 1980s and early 1990s to 54 percent in 2001. The vast majority (89 percent) of households have incomes below the federal poverty guidelines.

FSP 1.
Persons Receiving Food Stamps